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THE 

ENGLISH-SPEAKING 

PEOPLES 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS 
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
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THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO - 



THE 

ENGLISH-SPEAKING 

PEOPLES 

Their Future Relations and Joint 
International Obligations 



BY 

GEORGE LOUIS BEER 

Sometime Lecturer in European History at Columbia 

Unversity; Author of "The Old Colonial System, 

1660-1754," "British Colonial Policy, 

1754-1765," etc. 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1918 

All rights reserved 



*\A4 C 



3 



Copyright 1917 
By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 



Set up and electrotyped. Published, June, 1917. 
Reprinted September, December, 1917. 






TO 

E. C. B. 



PREFACE 

Some twenty years ago, when the question of a formal 
political connection between the British Empire and the 
United States for the advancement of the general inter- 
ests of the English-speaking peoples was quite prema- 
turely raised, Admiral Mahan contributed to the dis- 
cussion a characteristically thoughtful essay, entitled 
" Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion." The 
distinguished historian welcomed the " unmistakable 
growth of mutual kindly feelings between Great Britain 
and the United States " and pointed out that " this re- 
viving affection well might fix the serious attention of 
those who watch the growth of world questions, recog- 
nizing how far imagination and sympathy rule the 
world." He likewise emphasized the common political 
traditions and moral ideals of the kindred peoples and, 
above all, " that singular combination of two essential 
but opposing factors — of individual freedom with sub- 
jection to law — which finds its most vigorous working 
in Great Britain and the United States." Naturally, the 
interpreter of sea power did not fail to point out that, 
of the Great Powers these two alone were by geo- 
graphical position exempt from the burden of large 
armies, " while at the same time they must depend upon 
the sea, in chief measure, for that intercourse with other 

vii 



Vlll 



PREFACE 



members of the body upon which national well-being de- 
pends." 

Though recognizing the great potency of these con- 
verging forces and " though desirous as any one can be 
to see the fact accomplished," Admiral Mahan rejected 
the project as premature, because neither nation, but 
more especially the American, had as yet sufficiently 
realized its own interest in the sea and the identity of 
these separate interests. This identity, he said, " cannot 
be established firmly in men's minds antecedent to the 
great teacher, Experience." " The ground," he con- 
cluded, " is not prepared yet in the hearts and under- 
standings of Americans, and I doubt whether in those of 
British citizens." 

A great gulf separates 19 17 from 1894 when Admiral 
Mahan wrote these words. Since then all the unifying 
forces have been constantly at work and the needed 
lessons of " Experience " have come from an unwel- 
come war. Nor is the bitter process of education yet 
concluded. The question of the future relations of the 
English-speaking peoples has in consequence assumed an 
entirely different aspect. What in 1894 was unripe and 
academic, has to-day become urgent and practical. The 
purpose of this book is to examine the question in a 
comprehensive manner, though on a compact scale, tak- 
ing into account not only the obligations and interests of 
the peoples immediately concerned, but also the future 
of civilization as a whole. 

The opinions expressed therein have not been impro- 



PREFACE ix 

vised. They are the result of prolonged and intensive 
study of the relations between the two great branches 
of the English-speaking people. Ten years ago, in an 
account of British colonial policy during the critical years 
of the old Empire's history, the writer said : " It is 
easily conceivable, and not at all improbable, that the 
political evolution of the next centuries may take such a 
course that the American Revolution will lose the great 
significance that is now attached to it, and will appear 
merely as the temporary separation of two kindred peo- 
ples whose inherent similarity was obscured by super- 
ficial differences resulting from dissimilar economic and 
social conditions." It is not the object of this book to 
discuss the possibility of such a political reunion. If 
this outcome be in the lap of the gods, it will come in 
the fulness of time, be the date near or far. Any prema- 
ture forcing of the pace would probably merely retard 
such an eventual consummation, which in itself should 
be welcomed by all who realize that the effective exten- 
sion of law and justice can be accomplished only by the 
voluntary integration of progressively larger political 
entities. Hide-bound as we are by the traditions of the 
sovereign state demanding from its citizens supreme and 
undivided dedication, the world does not yet realize the 
possibilities of new forms of political organization which 
will permanently unite in a common co-operative pur- 
pose different nations and at the same time allow free 
play to distinct, but not discordant, loyalties of great 
intensity. However this may be, the object of this book 



x PREFACE 

is the more immediate one of explaining the advisability 
and necessity of a co-operative democratic alliance of all 
the English-speaking peoples, from which may possibly 
in time be developed such a new type of permanent polit- 
ical association. 

The co-operation of these culturally kindred peoples in 
the present war is patently a step in this general direc- 
tion and is a happy augury. It calls to mind the inspired 
lines from the " Areopagitica," that inalienable heritage 
of all English-speaking people, whatever be their phys- 
ical race or geographical origin. " Methinks I see in 
my mind," so Milton describes his purely English vision 
which it is hoped will be realized jointly by all the associ- 
ated English-speaking peoples, " a noble and puissant Na- 
tion rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and 
shaking her invincible locks : Methinks I see her as an 
Eagle muing her mighty youth, and kindling her un- 
dazl'd eyes at the full midday beam; purging and un- 
sealing her long abused sight at the fountain it self of 
heav'nly radiance." 

When so broad a range of fact and of theory is cov- 
ered in a limited space, it is impossible even by the free 
use of qualifications to give the intermediate shades that 
so vastly outnumber the blacks and whites of history. 
Even with the best of intentions a complex fact cannot be 
summarized in a brief sentence. Every effort has, how- 
ever, been made to state the facts accurately and to 
weigh them impartially. But apart from its historical 
and scientific background, this is essentially a livre de 



PREFACE xi 

circonstance, devoted to the discussion of public policy 
and hence dealing largely with an unpredictable future. 
The arrangement of the material and the relative degree 
of emphasis upon the various phases of the subject were 
naturally conditioned by the fact that the writer is, in 
the main, addressing his fellow citizens of the United 
States. It may seem strange to append to a volume of 
this character a series of notes. Their function is in 
part to acknowledge indebtedness for fact or thought and, 
in part also, to substantiate and corroborate the text. 
Their chief purpose, however, is to furnish a running 
bibliography to easily accessible and non-technical liter- 
ature for such of the readers whose interest may be 
stimulated to inquire further into matters that could be 
discussed only summarily in the text itself. In conclu- 
sion, it should be mentioned that some of the material 
in this book had already appeared in The Political Quar- 
terly, The New Republic, The Forum, The Annals of the 
American Academy and elsewhere. 

George Louis Beer. 
New York, 
June first, 1917. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I International Anarchy 3 

II Nationalism and Sovereignty 31 

III American Foreign Policy Before 1914 . . 67 

IV The Background of the War . . . . .91 
V America's Reaction to the War .... 125 

VI The Unity of English-Speaking Peoples . 169 

VII Economic Interdependence 201 

VIII Community of Policy 251 

Notes 275 



I 

INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY, 



" Or, aujourd'hui 
Nul ne peut plus vivre pour lui 
Seul, loin des autres. 

Tout ce qui est d'autrui devient aussitot notre; 
Qu'il s'accomplisse a l'autre bout de l'ocean 
Tout recul, tout progres, ou minime ou geant, 
Importe a mon pays, a ma race, a mon etre; 
L'univers tournoyant m'assiege et me penetre, 
Et mon coeur est coupable et fou, s'il s'interdit 
D'ecouter tressailir et penser l'infini." 

— Emile Verhaeren, L'Angleterre. 



"Remota justitia, quid regna nisi magna latrocinia?" 
— St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei. 



THE 

ENGLISH-SPEAKING 

PEOPLES 

CHAPTER I 

International Anarchy 

Introductory — Mediaeval Unity — Modern System of Sov- 
ereign States — International Law — Its Nature and Sanction 
■ — Its Limited Content — Its Ambiguity — Treaties — Interna- 
tional Commissions and Unions — Conferences and Congresses 
— Alliances. 

The present world-wide war, both in its outbreak and 
in its devastating course, has forcibly driven into the 
minds of most thinking men the firm conviction that the 
existing system of international relations is out of har- 
mony with the fundamental facts of modern life. In all 
quarters where the problems of the present and future 
torment the soul and perplex the mind of man there is 
the keenest of realizations that western civilization will 
in the future continue to be grievously imperilled unless 
some measures be devised to limit at least, if not entirely 
to eliminate, recourse to the ordeal by battle in the adjust- 
ment of interstate disputes. 

Some considerable measure of good will probably come 
from the holocaust. Presumably, the future boundaries 

3 



4 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

of Europe will be determined more in consonance with 
the wishes of those most directly interested than was the 
custom of a past when strategic considerations and 
dynastic interests played an unfortunately large part in 
the disposition of voiceless peoples. Subject nations, 
exploited politically and economically by dominant races, 
seem to be on the verge of emancipation and are looking 
forward to complete independence or to the guaranteed 
assurance of full opportunities for self-expression under 
a system of federal autonomy. The spirit of nationality 
is again working with that of democracy. Russia has 
already burst the fetters of autocracy, and the leaven of 
liberalism is not only working in a Prussianized Germany, 
but it is also quickening the democratic impulse in those 
countries that stand pre-eminently as the champions of 
freedom. 

Some of these anticipated benefits, possibly the most 
far-reaching ones — such as the democratization of Rus- 
sia, the unification of the British Empire, and the final 
healing of the breach between the two great branches of 
the English-speaking people — if they be realized, cannot 
be attributed to the war, which will merely have hastened 
the course of already progressing movements. Their 
consummation was dependent upon different factors. 
But other expected advantages, such as the re-unification 
and re-establishment of the Polish nation in an autono- 
mous state, the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or its 
reorganization so that the suppressed Slav nationalities 
may be freed from Magyar and Austro-German oppres- 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 5 

sion, the emancipation of the Armenians from the mur- 
derous Turkish yoke, could not have been effected except 
by force of arms under the existing international dispen- 
sation. 

Provided the lesson of the present agony be indelibly 
seared in the heart and mind of future ages, the coming 
generations will be able to lead a fuller and a freer life. 
In a measure the war has not only purified the peoples 
who have met the onslaught against the fundamental prin- 
ciples of western civilization, 1 but it may also chasten the 
spirit of the militaristic aggressor as soon as defeat has 
afforded the leisure for reflection. There is every pros- 
pect that the selfishness, materialism, and class-feelings 
so prevalent in all present-day communities will be mark- 
edly lessened by the intimate association of all ranks and 
classes in unmeasured sacrifices for a high purpose and 
by the resulting orientation of the mind and spirit 
towards quite other than predominantly self-regarding 
aims. 

The war may prove to be a turning point in the world's 
history. If it result in the definitive vindication of the 
democratic concepts of liberty and law, future generations 
will probably somewhat overlook the evil from which 
the good has sprung. But for the portion of living man- 
kind subjected to its destructive blast, the war is an 
almost unqualified evil of most momentous dimensions. 
No matter what be the exact military outcome, even if 
right fully prevail against might, the war cannot but cause 
misery in almost equal measure to both vanquished and 



6 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

victor. If it be only by such self-immolation that western 
civilization can be purged of the evils of military aggres- 
sion then the outlook is indeed dark. Civilization is 
bankrupt if free peoples can preserve their liberties only 
at such heavy cost. The supreme good that can come 
out of the war is the complete demonstration of its baleful 
nature and the consequent determination of free peoples 
to devise effective means of preventing in the future a 
recurrence of the evil even if as a result a measure of 
their cherished, but somewhat illusory, independence of 
action should have to be sacrificed. 

In the great intellectual travail engendered by this 
well-nigh universal abhorrence of the present dominion 
of force throughout the world, there is one point of 
almost complete agreement. It is generally recognized 
that, apart from the distinct condemnation that un- 
equivocally attaches itself to those whose imperious will 
to power either thwarted all efforts toward peaceful com- 
position or welcomed the arbitrament of force, the war 
is a direct outcome of the prevailing international anarchy 
and of the current selfish nationalism that is intimately 
connected with this lack of organization. That such a 
calamity was at all possible is due both to an actual con- 
dition and to a closely related state of mind. All states 
are in varying degrees infected with the self -regarding 
nationalism of the day. No one is quite free from it. 
The stress ordinarily placed upon so-called national in- 
terests with its almost inevitable concomitant, the tendency 
to disregard the conflicting rights of other states, the 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 7 

marked propensity to base foreign policy upon the mere 
enforcement of national rights to the neglect of their in- 
separable complementary obligations, has inevitably en- 
shrouded interstate intercourse with a murky atmosphere 
of fear and suspicion. But even if the mental attitude 
were far other, there is no organization in which the inter- 
national mind can express itself. The lack of any inter- 
state political system, the prevailing international anarchy, 
leaves the world's peace at the mercy of whichsoever one 
of the Great Powers is dissatisfied with existing terri- 
torial arrangements and is willing and prepared to employ 
force to gain its ends. So long as the community of 
states remains unorganized, " the will to war " of one of 
its members will always be able to thwart the pacific 
purposes of the majority. 

This international anarchy is the direct product of 
modern historical development. In mediaeval thought, 
mankind was generally conceived as constituting one vast 
community, a universal church-state with no territorial 
limits. 2 There were, it is true, endless and acrimonious 
disputes as to the respective positions of Church and 
State in this world-wide commonwealth, but both Papalist 
and Imperialist agreed in regarding mankind as con- 
stituting one society. 3 According to Dante, a pre-emi- 
nent member of the latter group, general peace was the 
indispensable prerequisite of man's perfect existence and 
this condition was obtainable only by a unified govern- 
mental system. 4 This mediaeval ideal, which was by no 
means ever realized, was generally discarded after the 



8 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

rise of the national states of Western Europe in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Despite superficial 
analogies, the gulf that separates the modern from the 
mediaeval political system is profound. " The change is 
from a world-empire to a territorial State, and from ec- 
clesiastical to civil predominance." 5 The mediaeval ideal 
of an inclusive unity was replaced by the modern view that 
the political world is composed of distinct communities 
" entirely independent, territorially omnipotent, and to 
some extent morally responsible." 6 

The governments of the national states — England, 
France, Spain — whose consolidation marks the dawn 
of the modern era successfully claimed for these bodies 
politic absolute freedom from all external control. 
Although basing their views to a considerable extent 
upon actual political facts and influenced largely by the 
analogy of the plenitudo potestatis that the Papacy had 
taken over from the Roman Empire, a series of remark- 
able thinkers — Machiavelli, Luther, Bodin, and Hobbes 
— deductively developed an abstract theory of unlimited 
state sovereignty both in internal and in external affairs. 
Mankind, instead of being regarded as one all-embracing 
community, was divided into distinct and separate politi- 
cal units connected by no legal bonds. Even the exist- 
ence of moral ties was not infrequently denied. Politics, 
if not completely divorced from ethics, led intermittently 
a separate life; and raison d'etat was held to be sufficient 
justification for heinous deeds and gross breaches of 
faith. This theory of unlimited state sovereignty still 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 9 

largely holds sway. In the political world of to-day the 
concrete realities are the sovereign states, each one of 
which is conceived by its government to be more or less a 
law unto itself. 

With their uncritical worship of success, historians 
have, as a rule, seen nothing but good in the downfall of 
medievalism and the rise of the modern system of 
sovereign states. Some ten years before the present war 
so conclusively opened the eyes of many to the funda- 
mental defects of existing interstate relations, the pres- 
ent Master of Balliol somewhat cautiously questioned 
whether the substitution of modern disunion for mediae- 
val unity had been all for the best and he denied the 
necessity of assuming " that anarchy and disruption are 
things good in themselves." 7 But almost from the very 
outset it was recognized that the Renaissance theory of 
state sovereignty led logically to the continuous warfare 
that was then devastating Europe and that some limits 
had to be set to the self-regarding actions of the sovereign 
state if civilization were to perdure. In fact, just as the 
mediaeval ideal of unity was never realized in practice, 
equally little was its superseding ideal of a world of self- 
sufficing, isolated political units in complete harmony 
with actual facts. The great Dutch thinker of the seven- 
teenth century, Hugo Grotius, perceived this clearly and, 
in contradistinction to Machiavelli and his followers, 
asserted that " human life is essentially a society, and 
that certain laws, of which fidelity to plighted word is 
the most important, are therefore as immutable as human 



io THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

nature." 8 With this idea in view, he elaborated a system 
oi rights and duties governing the relations of state to 
state. Grotius's work was essentially a protest against 
the international anarchy of his day, but his conclusions 
were by no means fully accepted by the statesmen and 
publicists of the three following centuries. His asser- 
tion of the binding force of natural law in interstate 
relations 9 has met with scant acceptance in practice. Yet 
it was recognized that some palliatives had to be adopted 
to restrict the war of all against all that was rapidly 
ruining great sections of seventeenth-century Europe. 
Hence, largely upon the basis of Grotius's epoch-making 
book, was gradually erected the structure of modern in- 
ternational law. 

It is idle in this connection to enter upon the vexed 
question whether international law is really law at all. 
For obviously, the answer depends primarily upon the 
definition of law that is adopted. International lawyers, 
partly as the result of something akin to the hero-worship 
that animates most biographers, naturally as a rule main- 
tain the affirmative of this proposition. Such also is the 
contention of so notable a jurist as Sir Frederick Pol- 
lock. 10 But other equally eminent authorities dissent. 11 
It is unquestionably true that international law has in 
great part developed gradually through custom, just as 
has the most vital portion of municipal law. But 
whereas the common law is regularly enforced by 
courts with authority to impose the judgments, interna- 
tional law has not passed beyond the customary stage. 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY n 

There are in existence no tribunals for its general enforce- 
ment and, no matter how strong or weak be its authority, 
its sanction is distinctly moral rather than legal in 
nature. Whether in its essence it be law or not, it cer- 
tainly differs radically from what English-speaking peo- 
ples confined to a tongue that does not distinguish 
between jus and lex, Recht and Gesetz, droit and loi, un- 
derstand by that term. An intrepid champion of the 
claims of international law to full legal recognition vir- 
tually concedes that there is a vital distinction when he 
says that " as, however, there cannot be a sovereign 
authority above the several sovereign states, the Law of 
Nations is a law between, not above the several 
states." 12 In actual practice, international law is merely 
a code of rules to which the states profess general adher- 
ence, but to which they actually render only a somewhat 
reluctant and fitful obedience. As a profound student 
aptly expressed it : 

" International Law is like schoolboy honour or good form, 
it does not destroy selfishness or quarrelling or cheating; but 
it proclaims that certain things are to be avoided and others 
are obligatory, and it unites even those most sharply divided 
as members in a single society. It does not solve the problem 
of man in society, but it recognizes it." 13 

When one turns from the nature and sanction of inter- 
national law to its content, one cannot but be struck by 
its limited scope. The fundamental function of law is 
to establish the rule o'f reason and justice in the relations 
of man to man and of group to group. But inter- 



12 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

national law has made scant progress toward such a con- 
summation. In considerable part, it is merely a code 
of etiquette prescribing the punctilio of interstate inter- 
course in times of peace. But in possibly even greater 
measure it is devoted to the formulation of the rules of 
war. 14 Although international lawyers insist that war 
is no illegality, still there is a distinct inconsistency 
between war and law because, no matter whether the 
decision reached by such a contention of hostile forces be 
just or unjust, the means themselves are the negation of 
reason and are in no way adapted to securing an equitable 
issue of the dispute. If it be admitted that justice is 
" the effort to eliminate from our social conditions the 
effects of the inequalities of Nature upon the happiness 
and advancement of men," 15 then war is its very an- 
tithesis, for its so-called " biologically just decisions " 
allow these inequalities full sway. 

So restricted in its scope is international law that the 
most vital questions do not come within its purview. 
The most fundamental issues, such as are most likely to 
lead to war, as for instance the open door in the depen- 
dencies of European states and in other backward, but 
still independent, countries, the Monroe Doctrine, the far- 
reaching problems involved in the attempts of Asiatics 
to settle within Caucasian communities, are outside its 
narrow range. It is of the utmost significance that all 
political subjects, whether of such contentious nature or 
otherwise, were rigorously excluded from the discussions 
at the Hague Conferences and that the general arbitra- 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 13 

tion treaties which have been adopted, as a rule, abso- 
lutely exclude from such adjudication all questions in- 
volving the vital interests, the independence, or the 
honour of the parties to them. 16 

Not alone is the moral sanction of international law 
only intermittently effective and not alone is its scope 
decidedly inadequate, but the existing war has furnished 
complete demonstration that much of its content is am- 
biguous. This criticism applies even to that part of 
international law which is embodied in general treaties. 
This is entirely apart from the fact both that the binding 
force of such treaties has not infrequently been chal- 
lenged with impunity, 17 and also that the Hague Conven- 
tions are not binding on the signatories if any one of the 
belligerents, no matter how insignificant, 18 be not a party 
to them. In addition, these treaties, which constitute 
what might be called the statutory as opposed to the cus- 
tomary part of international law, are not infrequently 
open to contradictory interpretations. This is in part 
due to the fact that at times no agreement at all could 
have been reached if the terms had been absolutely 
explicit and the document was signed only because from 
the very outset the diplomats were interpreting its mean- 
ing differently. A conspicuous instance is the Treaty of 
London of 1867 guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxem- 
burg. When this question came up for European deci- 
sion, Bismarck was insistent that the guarantee should 
bind each one of the signatories individually, while the 
British statesmen were tenaciously unwilling to assume 



i 4 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

such unlimited obligations. In this impasse the Russian 
representative suggested a phrase susceptible of different 
interpretations, " collective guarantee," 19 whose exact 
meaning has to this day remained undetermined. 20 Simi- 
larly, there is some confusion as to the treaty of 1839 
neutralizing Belgium. There are, of course, no qualifi- 
cations whatsoever as to the obligations assumed by the 
parties of the treaty to respect the neutrality of that king- 
dom, but questions have frequently been raised as to the 
duties of the signatories to proceed against those delin- 
quent in this respect. Gladstone especially was insist- 
ent in maintaining that Great Britain had not assumed 
an unlimited obligation, one that was irrespective of cir- 
cumstances, to proceed by force of arms against any and 
all violations of Belgium's neutrality. 21 Other British 
statesmen have taken the same view. 22 

Naturally even more indefinite than are these treaties, 
is that portion of international law based upon custom. 
Sharp differences of opinion that existed in an academic 
state before the war have since then become acute. 
Apart from the German practice that rests upon the 
anarchic, non-moral, and purely self -regarding precept 
that neither the usages nor the laws of war should be 
allowed to obstruct military ends, 23 it is in general true 
that when military needs demanded a measure, some more 
or less cogent argument or some more or less pertinent 
precedent could as a rule be found to justify its applica- 
tion. Especially contentious are the questions arising 
out of the inevitable conflict between the rights of bellig- 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 15 

erents and those of neutrals. The disputes about contra- 
band, continuous voyage, blockade, neutral mails, all tes- 
tify to the indefiniteness of international usage. Under 
such circumstances, when the allegation of illegality can 
be so readily denied, if not completely refuted, it is not 
surprising that states should refrain from opposing such 
actions on the part of other states as do not immediately 
affect their own interests. 

But only to a minor extent is such non-action the 
result of the vagueness of interstate usage. Under exist- 
ing conditions, a state does not as a rule feel justified, 
even if it be so inclined, to raise its voice against the most 
heinous and palpable violation of international law unless 
it itself is wronged. Much less does it recognize an obli- 
gation to intervene by act. While a. crime within the 
body politic is deemed an injury to society as well as to 
the individual adversely affected, a violation of inter- 
national law is not considered an offence against the 
community of states. It is plain that until this condition 
changes, until the community of states has become organ- 
ized, the rule of law as the approximate embodiment of 
justice and reason cannot be said to obtain in international 
relations. In the present unorganized world, there pre- 
vails an anarchy somewhat tempered on the one hand by 
international law, but even more so, on the other, by 
moral inhibitions that are recognized in varying degrees 
by the different states. This is the unavoidable result of 
the modern system based upon the absolute sovereignty 
of the independent state. 



16 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

While this abstract theory of sovereignty divided the 
world in sharply segregated politico-legal units, each one 
of these states was developing distinct interests outside 
its territorial confines and the intercourse between their 
respective citizens was becoming ever closer and more 
vital. In response to the need for some regulation of 
these important relations, there was developed not only 
the restricted and indefinite system of interstate usage 
known as international law, but there were also con- 
cluded between the states a lengthy series of special 
treaties granting to their respective citizens civil, commer- 
cial, and property rights within each other's territorial 
limits. In addition to such special treaties, others of 
broader scope were passed regulating the navigation of 
the Danube, the Congo, and the Suez Canal, controlling 
interstate communications by post, telegraph, and other 
means, giving international protection to commercial, 
artistic, and literary property. In these instances, as 
well as in others, permanent international offices have 
been established for the administration of these interstate 
interests. 24 

Many have hopefully, and possibly too sanguinely, 
welcomed these international organs, which have in- 
creased rapidly in numbers and in effectiveness since the 
middle of the nineteenth century as the real beginnings of 
international government. Be such optimism well or ill- 
founded, it should always be remembered that these in- 
ternational administrative bureaus are largely economic 
and exclusively non-political in nature. They have, how- 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 17 

ever, not only accomplished an immensely important 
work, but they have also greatly decreased interstate fric- 
tion by removing from the diplomatic field many subjects 
that might have given rise to dispute. While not infre- 
quently contentious, the questions handled in this way 
are such as do not affect what really are, or delusively are 
held to be, the vital interests of the state. 

Such interests are not handled by these international 
unions and commissions, but they are the subject of direct 
negotiation between the immediately interested parties or 
an attempt is made to decide them by general international 
conferences. Only very rarely and then virtually solely 
when the matter in dispute turns upon a question of fact 
or upon a well-defined legal principle, is there recourse to 
arbitration. If these means fail, the settlement is left to 
the adjudication of arms. In the all-pervading atmos- 
phere of a world-wide war, it is not generally realized 
to what an extent interstate disputes have been settled by 
peaceful means. Arbitration has played a significant part, 
however minor a one it be, in such settlements. The say- 
ing of the Greek philosopher that war is the father of all 
things is decisively contradicted by the fact that all Africa 
has in the past hundred years been divided up by peaceful 
negotiations between the European Powers. Other ter- 
ritorial changes elsewhere and even in Europe, though 
not on so vast a scale as this one, have likewise been peace- 
fully effected. These facts should give pause to those 
who oppose a supernational world organization merely on 
the ground that it would perpetuate an existing status 



18 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

that in time would become increasingly out of accord with 
the changing conditions of the world. This argument 
could with equal validity be directed against the state 
itself. If, as a rule, the state's organization can without 
violence be readjusted to dynamic conditions, so could 
that of the world state whose ultimate advent has been 
the hope of many a prescient philosopher, poet, and 
statesman. 

Direct negotiations between the Great Powers have 
disposed of many fundamental questions in all quarters 
of the globe. It is only necessary to mention the frontier 
between the United States and Canada, Heligoland, Per- 
sia, Morocco, Siam, and the South Sea Islands. But even 
more important is the work that has been performed by 
international congresses and conferences. After the col- 
lapse of Napoleon's attempt to establish a military domin- 
ion over all Europe, the war-weary Powers tried to 
perpetuate their alliance in order to give permanent 
peace to Europe. 25 The Holy Alliance, a project of the 
Tzar Alexander to which Austria and Prussia gave their 
adherence, was based upon lofty ethical principles, but it 
quickly proved impracticable in a world dominated by 
ideals far different from those of its mystic progenitor. 
But, at the same time, another plan with similar though 
more limited objects in view was developed by the less 
visionary statesmen of Europe. One of the articles of 
the coalition treaty of 1814 against Napoleon provided 
that the four contracting Great Powers — Great Britain, 
Russia, Austria, and Prussia — should remain in alliance 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 19 

for twenty years in order to maintain " the Balance of 
Europe, to secure the repose and independence of the 
Powers, and to prevent the invasions which for so many 
years have devastated the world." As the war was 
waged against Napoleon, not against France, within a 
few years of his overthrow, that state was admitted to 
this league of the Great Powers. 

Despite what would seem to have been the best of aus- 
pices, this scheme soon broke down. It was somewhat 
faulty in construction, in that it was based upon the 
hegemony of the Great Powers and disregarded the 
legitimate rights of minor states. They were left voice- 
less. However important in principle be this defect, in 
practice it proved only a very minor difficulty because no 
effective opposition to the united will of the Great Powers 
was possible. The fundamental trouble, however, was 
that no attempt was made to draw a line of demarcation 
between matters that were exclusively or pre-eminently 
domestic in character and such as were of international 
concern. Probably no such line can ever be rigidly 
drawn; it must certainly shift with changing circum- 
stances. At all events, when the various conferences of 
the Great Powers met, they began to interfere in the in- 
ternal affairs of other states. And, as reactionary influ- 
ences in Austria and Russia were constantly becoming 
more powerful, this interference was in favour of the 
established autocratic systems and hostile to the growing 
movement for constitutional liberty throughout Europe. 
In 1822, the Great Alliance met at Verona, where the 



20 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

Congress devoted its chief attention to the revolutionary 
uprising in Spain. France was prepared to send an 
army to suppress this movement, provided the support 
of the other Powers were given. The Continental mem- 
bers of the Alliance favoured the plan, but Great Britain 
refused to assent. This refusal, followed by British 
recognition of the independence of the Spanish-Ameri- 
can colonies and by British diplomatic assistance to the 
Greek insurgents, meant the breakdown of the attempt 
by the Great Powers to control the affairs of Europe. 

To Canning, the British statesman responsible for this 
outcome, this was a welcome result, as he would not allow 
his country to be a party to the suppression of Spanish 
liberalism, or to the re-imposition of Spanish rule in South 
America. Under the circumstances, his well-known 
words : " Things are getting back to a wholesome state 
again. Every nation for itself and God for us all. . . . 
The time for Areopagus and the like of that is gone by," 
express comprehensible, even if short-sighted, relief. 
While the body was dead, the spirit remained and from 
this abortive attempt at a confederation of Europe sur- 
vived the principle of European co-operation in the settle- 
ment of many matters that threaten the public peace. As 
has truly been said, " from the pacifist's point of view 
the nineteenth century should be remembered as much for 
its Conferences, its Congresses, and its Concert of 
Europe as for the growth of arbitration." 26 

Only a few years after Canning's memorable words, 
Great Britain, France, and Russia agreed in a series of 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 21 

conferences upon what seemed to them to be an equitable 
solution of the difficulties between Greek and Turk and 
compelled both parties to accept this settlement. The 
special authority thus acquired by these three Powers to 
regulate the affairs of Greece and her relations with 
Turkey was exercised on a number of subsequent occa- 
sions, of which the one not least important has been 
during the present war. This method of procedure was 
later extended to the affairs of the other Balkan states 
and the group of intervening powers was greatly ex- 
panded. In this manner grew up the Concert of Europe, 
whose special function was to prevent the Balkan problem 
from embroiling all Europe in war. 27 This system in- 
volved " a negation of the right of any one Power and 
an assertion of the right of the Powers collectively to 
regulate the solution of the Eastern question." It has 
been applied to a number of other questions that trans- 
cended the interests of the contiguous states or threatened 
the peace of Europe. By such action of the Powers in 
Congress assembled the neutrality of Belgium was effected 
in 1839 and, a generation later, that of Luxemburg. 
Such joint deliberation and decision was applied as well 
to the Congo region in Central Africa and later, at Alge- 
ciras, to Morocco. It was the refusal of Austria, sup- 
ported by Germany, to admit that her dispute with Serbia 
was a question of general European interest that precipi- 
tated the present war. 28 

Apart from what has been accomplished at the Hague 
Conferences, mainly in codifying the laws of war, it is 



22 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

plain to every one acquainted with the outlines of modern 
European history that these congresses and conferences 
have settled many questions and have on many occasions 
obviated war. Their acts have at times been flagrantly 
violated, as by Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 1908. Similarly, during the disputes 
about Morocco from 1906 to 191 1, but scant attention 
was paid to the Algeciras Act. 29 Finally, the outbreak 
of the war was marked by the German invasion of 
Luxemburg and Belgium, whose neutralization formed 
two of the vital corner-stones of the emerging European 
polity. 

If we look somewhat closer into this European system, 
the causes of its ultimate failure will become patent. It 
is plainly evident why these conferences and congresses 
have not solved the problem of substituting law and jus- 
tice for force in the settlement of interstate disputes. In 
the first place, in the background of all diplomatic nego- 
tiations is the sword, be it merely resting in the scabbard, 
half-drawn, or brandished with a threatening gesture. 
In the second place, as a direct consequence of the theory 
of sovereignty, the states meet as equals in these assem- 
blies, no matter how disparate be their size and political 
importance. Hence, each state has merely one voice 
and as it is logically held that a majority cannot bind a 
minority without infringing a state's sovereignty, unan- 
imity is essential. Finally, it should be noted that in 
such conferences as have settled important political ques- 
tions, mainly in the Balkans, the states most directly 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 23 

affected were as a rule not represented. The will of 
Europe, as interpreted by the Great Powers or by only a 
combination of some of them, was imposed upon Greece 
and Turkey. In other words, the Concert of Europe has 
been effective only when the questions at issue concerned 
others far more directly than themselves. Under the 
existing system, it is scarcely conceivable that such ques- 
tions as those of Ireland, the Philippines, Schleswig, 
Alsace-Lorraine, Finland, Poland, Bohemia, or Croatia 
can come before an international congress unless war has 
thrown them into the crucible. No one of the Great 
Powers will permit what it deems is a vital question to be 
determined by the vote of its peers. 

Of such vital questions, that of transcendent impor- 
tance is the independence of a state — not only its security 
from forcible subjection to another, but also the main- 
tenance of its influence and its relative freedom of action. 
The two score international commissions and unions that 
have been established in the past fifty years were not 
designed to protect the liberties of Europe. Nor is 
international law in itself a more effective defender of 
public right. Liberty and freedom have been upheld by 
other means. On the one hand, the Great Powers have 
guaranteed the neutrality of certain weak states, notably 
Switzerland and Belgium ; and, until the German invasion 
of Luxemburg and Belgium in August of 1914, this had 
been regarded as an adequate safeguard. But the main 
rampart of European liberty has been the doctrine of the 
balance of power and the alliances that have been formed 



24 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

to maintain it. Since the outbreak of the present war, 
it has become the fashion to cast stones at this system. 
But it does not follow that, because this system was 
unable to prevent the calamity, it was the cause thereof. 
A careful examination of modern history would demon- 
strate that the opposite was the case. Criticism, however 
valid for the most part it be, should not necessarily imply 
utter condemnation. The root of the trouble lies else- 
where, in the prevailing international anarchy. The fail- 
ure to create any supernational authority is the funda- 
mental cause of the catastrophe. The inevitable outcome 
of a world divided into sovereign states is the system of 
the balance of power with its alliances and armaments. 
It was an attempt to secure some measure of justice in 
interstate relations by preventing the strong from oppress- 
ing the weak. 30 It is obvious that, if each state remains 
isolated, free from protecting alliances, each would be 
at the mercy of the stronger and that ultimately one would 
absorb all the rest. Even if the weaker states were not ac- 
tually conquered, their freedom of action would be griev- 
ously impaired. It was this that Sir Edward Grey had 
in mind when, on July 30, 19 14, in reply for Germany's 
bid for British neutrality during the impending war, he 
wrote : " France, without further territory in Europe 
being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her 
position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to 
German policy." 31 Hence, under the modern state sys- 
tem, a Great Power cannot preserve its freedom without 
defensive armaments and alliances. Without both of 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 2$ 

these, it can have no security or freedom, and the world 
would soon be dominated by whatever political aggregate 
cherished such ambitions. 32 The determining factor 
would be merely the relative size of the respective states, 
which is largely a fortuitous matter and no indication of 
the degree of civilization attained. No one would con- 
tend that the civilization of Rome could compare to that 
of its small victim, Syracuse. Nor would the outcome 
give any promise of the predominance of the best; it 
would only mean wide-spread, if not universal, slavery. 

The most vital and real facts in interstate relations are 
these alliances. They condition and limit the state's free- 
dom in the most far-reaching manner and, at the same 
time, they alone have preserved that measure of freedom 
of action that the so-called sovereign states do actually 
enjoy. They more than anything else have tempered 
international anarchy and made life bearable. This sys- 
tem of the balance of power with its alliances has by no 
means always or even generally worked equitably or effec- 
tively. It has not always prevented war, though it has 
distinctly lessened the rule of force. Its aim is not the 
negative one of preserving peace, but that of protecting 
the liberty of the various states of Europe. In this, with 
most noteworthy exceptions, it has been successful. On 
every occasion when Europe was threatened by the abso- 
lute domination of a great military power, this system 
ultimately safeguarded freedom. 

Such was its record against Philip II, Louis XIV, and 
Napoleon. As Hans Delbrueck says, all Europe needed 



26 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

England in the struggle against Louis XIV, for without 
England the freedom of Europe could not be defended 
against France. 33 The same fundamental issue was at 
stake a century later in the struggle against the military 
despotism of Napoleon. 34 The military preponderance 
of Germany after the Franco-Prussian war and the far- 
reaching aims of the post-Bismarckian leaders have again 
raised the same fundamental issue and again the same 
system has spontaneously arisen to cope with it. 35 If it 
be successful in the end, as it promises to be — and 
otherwise the outlook would be most dismal for the entire 
world — the co-operative principle underlying this sys- 
tem of alliances will gain fresh vitality. Although one 
may totally reject Prince von Buelow's political creed, 
one cannot deny his acumen and insight and, when he 
says that " it betokens an unscientific and unpractical 
mode of thought to assume that after this world-war an 
era will dawn, which in its broad outlines as in its details 
is diametrically opposed to the past decades before the 
war," 3G he is uttering a truth that cannot with impunity 
be ignored in all the prevalent elaboration of schemes for 
international reconstruction. 

It has often been asserted, and equally often denied, 
that there is no half-way house between a world state 
and the existing system of sovereign states. If such a 
structure ever be erected, it will unquestionably not be 
proof against storm and weather. This will prove true 
whether it take the form of a reinvigourated and recon- 
structed Concert of the Great Powers, 37 or that of a 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 27 

League of Nations to Enforce Peace. Both have great 
possibilities; neither is a permanent abode, but only a 
temporary shelter. And even so, the Great Powers will 
not avail themselves of such protection to the exclusion 
of other means, until the foundations have been thor- 
oughly tested. During this interval, the system of 
alliances cannot be abandoned by a world that tenaciously 
clings to the theory of the sovereign state. This will 
probably become even more apparent if the bases of 
modern nationalism be examined and if due recognition 
be given to the exacerbation of national feelings result- 
ing from the internecine war. 



II 

NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 



" Une nation est une ame, un principe spirituel. Deux choses 
qui, a vrai dire, ne font qu'une, constituent cette ame, ce principe 
spirituel. L'une est dans le passe, l'autre dans le present. 
L'une est la possession d'une riche legs de souvenirs, l'autre le 
consentement actuel, le desir de vivre ensemble, la volonte de 
faire valoir l'heritage qu'on a recu indivis." 

— Ernest Renan, Qu'est ce qu'une Nation ? (1882). 

" Present facts, then, demand the recognition of continuous 
and normal interdependence of States. The nature of the State 
is to be understood, at least in part, from its relations with other 
States: and all philosophies which even imply that the State is 
isolated are out of date. Indeed, one may say that the modern 
State must be understood by this external reference." 

— C. Delisle Burns, The Morality of Nations, p. 50. 



CHAPTER II 

Nationalism and Sovereignty 

The Theory of Sovereignty — Its Disaccord with Actual Facts 
— The Unity of Western Civilization — Cultural and Economic 
Interdependence — The Rise of Large Political Aggregates — 
Their Significance — Nation and State — Modern Nationalism 
. — Effect of the War upon National Feeling — International 
Government and the System of Alliances. 

The stern obstacle to the political organization of the 
world is the sovereignty of the state. This legal doc- 
trine is the fundamental corner-stone of the modern state- 
system ; and, until it is totally abandoned or at least radi- 
cally altered, there is no possibility of a really effective 
super-state political system securing justice and right. 
The most essential attribute of sovereignty is that it is 
.supreme and unlimited, which means that it is subject to 
no earthly authority. A limited sovereignty would pat- 
ently be an unavoidable contradiction in terms. Hence 
its absoluteness. As to this, there has been a general 
agreement among political scientists, but in recent years 
there has arisen some serious questioning as to whether 
the state does actually exercise unlimited authority either 
within the body politic 1 or in its relations with other 
states. 2 

The literature on the subject is almost as voluminous 

31 



32 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

and as subtle 3 as is that on determinism and free will ; and 
the questions are somewhat akin. While it is unquestion- 
ably true that the limitations imposed upon the state are 
not legal in nature, they are, on the other hand, by no 
means mere self -limitations from which the state can es- 
cape at will. Just as the freedom of the individual is re- 
stricted by a thousand circumstances and conditions over 
which he has absolutely no control, so the state's activities 
are constantly being determined by forces outside it. It 
can be cogently argued and proven that legally the state is 
subject to no superior earthly authority, but of what 
avail is this legal sovereignty, if in practice the state is 
far from being a complete free agent? The theory of 
sovereignty serves to some extent merely to veil the real 
facts and to perpetuate a condition of international anar- 
chy that is becoming increasingly hazardous. 

The indivisible sovereignty that is ascribed to the state 
has two distinct aspects, an internal and an external one. 
On the one hand, it predicates the absolute authority of 
the state over all individuals and groups within its terri- 
torial limits. With this aspect, we here are not directly 
concerned. Its corollary is, however, of immediate im- 
portance, for sovereignty implies not only the absolute 
independence of the state, but logically also its isolation 
in an anarchic world of equally independent politico-legal 
units. It is an atomistic conception of the world that 
was even at the time of its formulation out of harmony 
with the actual facts and which has become increasingly 
so with the passing centuries. 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 33 

This disharmony between actual fact and legal theory 
has increased at an accelerated pace since the mechanical 
inventions of the past century have made mankind a unit 
in a concrete sense never before realized. As a result 
of the improved means of transportation and communi- 
cation, the world has virtually shrunk to a fraction of its 
former size and but little can happen anywhere that has 
not its reflex action in the remotest corners of the globe. 
This is especially true in the economic field. At the 
present day, values have been equalized throughout the 
world and a crop failure or a financial panic in one coun- 
try has repercussions of varying intensity in most distant 
regions. Though artificial barriers in the form of pro- 
tective tariffs somewhat prevent the full realization of 
this process, the world of to-day — in contrast with that 
of the past, when there were no steamers, cables and 
wireless — constitutes an economic unit. Such unity is 
not equally apparent in the cultural field, for to a modified 
degree East is still East, and West is still West. 

But within the ever growing unity of all mankind re- 
sulting from constantly increasing intercourse, there is a 
more clearly defined entity composed of the states of 
western civilization. When Romain Rolland speaks of 
" I 'unite morale de V Europe," 4 he is not merely using a 
glittering phrase, but one that corresponds to a reality. 
Apart, however, from the fact that Europe is the radiat- 
ing centre of western civilization, this unity actually in- 
cludes as well all states created by European forces, 
whether they be in Europe, in Africa, in Australasia, or in 



34 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

America. There is no absolutely uniform level of civil- 
ization in these states. Some, conspicuously a number 
in South and Central America, as well as in Eastern 
Europe, are still markedly backward; and there are 
notable and even portentous differences between others 
en approximately the same level ; but all in all, they con- 
stitute a unity because their similarities in fundamentals 
far outweigh their divergences in detail. 5 So true is this, 
that a war between the most advanced representatives of 
this group is in the nature of a civil war. 

Despite marked differences that are of the utmost sig- 
nificance, that relieve what otherwise would be a depress- 
ing uniformity and by their interaction stimulate a whole- 
some progress, the spiritual and moral lives of these west- 
ern peoples conform to standards that are, broadly speak- 
ing, common. There is a substantial uniformity in the 
general ethical code of the western man, whether he pro- 
fesses a formal religion or be an agnostic. Art, liter- 
ature, science, and philosophy, have likewise become inter- 
national. New forms and modes of expression spread 
quickly; discoveries and inventions by one are quickly 
adopted by all. The general content of western thought 
is essentially one. Unless differences are unduly em- 
phasized, as they can readily be, and even must be if a 
deeper and fuller understanding is to be reached, it is 
undeniable that the peoples of western civilization have 
been developing on ever more closely converging cultural 
lines. 

As a result, binding cultural ties have been established, 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 35 

but far more concretely cohesive are the bonds resulting 
from the commercial and financial interdependence of 
the western world. A large proportion of the citizens of 
every state have direct or indirect interests beyond the 
bounds of their own country; and the well-being of entire 
sections is determined by conditions among remote peo- 
ples owing an entirely distinct political allegiance. The 
welfare of England is largely dependent upon the 
food-stuffs and the cotton derived from America. That 
of the United States has hitherto depended in great part 
upon the willingness of Europe to furnish capital to assist 
in developing its resources and to build its railroads. 
The policy of Russia toward her Jewish population has 
had important effects upon the United States and so like- 
wise has had the immigration from Italy. 6 In like man- 
ner, the return of the partially Americanized immigrant 
to his native land has had significant political and eco- 
nomic effects in Italy and in the Balkans. 7 Insurance, 
banking, shipping, manufacturing, and commerce have 
become to a marked extent international and state bound- 
aries are ignored by large financial, industrial and com- 
mercial organizations that have their establishments in 
various countries. Furthermore, as a result of the system 
of incorporated companies with a joint stock, men of most 
diverse national and political ties often share in the risks 
and profits of one common enterprise. Englishmen, 
Canadians, Americans, Germans, as well as citizens of 
other states, are joint owners of such undertakings as 
the Canadian Pacific Railway. Instance upon instance 



36 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

might be cited to illustrate this internationalization, which 
has progressed to such an extent that many a man's chief 
economic interests are in foreign countries. Further- 
more, to an increasing extent, citizens of one state are 
more or less permanently domiciled within the limits of 
another ; and, with the downfall of the older doctrine of 
perpetual allegiance, citizenship is shifted with great 
facility. There has taken place a significant interpene- 
tration of nations. 

As a result of this process, both in the general cultural 
field and in the narrower economic one, mankind tends to 
become divided along horizontal lines of various nature, 
cutting across those vertical divisions demarcated by state 
frontiers. The development in this direction, especially 
in the socio-economic field, has not been so marked as to 
some it seemed likely to be a generation ago, but it is 
clearly apparent. 8 Many international organizations of 
most diverse character, some scientific, some commercial, 
others devoted to the interests of labour, have developed 
out of the inexorable needs of the situation. It is of the 
utmost significance that in the year before the war no 
fewer than 135 such international congresses met. 9 This 
interdependence has also, as has already been pointed out, 
necessitated the formation of international organs for 
the administration of certain interests common to all 
states. 

As a result of these intricate and vital ties binding 
together citizens of most diverse states in a network of 
intimate relations, a condition of interdependence has 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 37 

arisen that is at variance with the legal sovereignty of 
state. The state can no longer be held to be a completely 
free agent either in internal or in external affairs. The 
fiscal system of one state, its labour legislation, its regula- 
tion of emigration and immigration, its shipping laws, to 
mention only a few out of many policies, profoundly 
affect at times other states and shape their legislative 
enactments. Similarly, the military preparations of one 
state largely determine those of others. It was not of its 
own free volition, but as a consequence of conditions in 
Europe, that the United States in 19 16 felt obliged to 
increase its armaments and, as a result, imposed a series 
of taxes whose social effects may be far-reaching. In 
the same way, Germany's naval programme obliged Eng- 
land during the past decade greatly to expand her fleet 
and to divert large funds from other public services. 

Still less in the international field does the state enjoy 
that absolute independence and unfettered freedom of 
action predicated by its sovereignty. In some matters of 
common concern, international unions with deliberative 
and administrative functions are already almost in full 
control. 10 But even in the still unorganized part of the 
international system, the state's independence and free- 
dom are conditioned by the wills and wishes of other 
states. In so far as sovereignty implies freedom of action 
and complete independence, it is inconsistent with a 
world of equal states each one of which conditions and 
limits the actions of the others. Pushed to its logical 
conclusion, the theory of absolute sovereignty means that 



38 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

the state should be so powerful that it is able to work its 
will regardless of its fellows. But the outcome of this 
would be that there would be really only one sovereign 
state, while all the others would lose even the relative 
freedom and independence that they now enjoy. In the 
world of to-day, the state must perforce in part regulate 
its conduct by the wishes, interests and rights of other 
states, and the extent of this restriction of its freedom of 
action tends, as a rule, to be in indirect proportion to 
its resources in men, in treasure, and in armaments. 
Furthermore, all pretence to the complete freedom of 
action implicit in the concept of sovereignty must be 
abandoned in a Europe bound in a network of alliances 
which can force a state into war about an immediate 
issue in which it may not be at all concerned. Just as 
the individual cannot be explained apart from the com- 
munity that conditions his every act, so the state cannot 
be comprehended if its environment be ignored. The iso- 
lated state is an unreal abstraction that obscures funda- 
mental facts. 11 Futhermore, just as the individual can 
actually obtain real liberty only from membership in a 
community which necessarily restrains his complete free- 
dom of action, so the state cannot secure independence 
and liberty in isolation, but only by co-operation with its 
fellows. 

While it is probably patent from the foregoing that 
the independence implied by the legal sovereignty of the 
state is largely fictitious and is inconsistent with a world 
that has become a unit, yet the political world tenaciously 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 39 

clings to the existing system which draws sharp legal 
lines between groups that are socially and economically 
interdependent. As yet the states have evinced a decided 
unwillingness to submit themselves to a supernational 
authority. But without such an authority there is no 
method of establishing the rule of law in interstate rela- 
tions. Individual man, however, yearns for such an out- 
come and the permanent peace that will come with it. It 
was predominantly in response to this desire and need 
that, ever since the rise of the modern state system, there 
has been a constant tendency toward ever larger political 
aggregates. It is, as has been well said, pre-eminently 
necessary that " self-governing groups of men should be 
enabled to work together in permanent harmony and on 
a great scale." " In this kind of political integration," 
to quote John Fiske again, " the work of civilization very 
largely consists." 12 For only in this manner can peace 
be established on a comparatively permanent basis. Civil 
war is always a possibility. But, unless peaceful condi- 
tions approximate to permanency, there can be only slight 
progress in civilization. Chronic warfare almost abso- 
lutely bars advance. It was primarily in response to 
such need for peaceful co-operation that the larger politi- 
cal groups have arisen. The demands of the situation 
led to the unification of France, Spain, Germany, and 
Italy. Similar factors made necessary the union of Scot- 
land and England and are manifest even in the forma- 
tion of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 
They are plainly visible in the history of the United States 



4 o THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

and also in the unification of Canada, Australia, and 
South Africa. Furthermore, although such is not widely 
recognized to be the case, these same factors were the 
fundamental ones in creating that amorphous aggre- 
gate misleadingly designated as the British Empire, but 
more appropriately described as " a Commonwealth of 
Nations." In contradistinction to some other attempts to 
erect a similarly extensive and intricate political structure, 
the British Empire was predominantly the result of pri- 
vate initiative and individual enterprise. The Empire 
was not constructed on plans carefully elaborated by pre- 
scient statesmen, but grew as an inevitable consequence of 
the wide-spread activities of British pioneers. Terri- 
torial acquisitions were not systematically and deliber- 
ately planned by the government, but were, in general, 
either the somewhat accidental result of European wars 
into which Britain had been drawn or the unavoidable 
consequence of antecedently established interests that a 
not infrequently reluctant government, dreading further 
responsibilities, could not ignore. The entire develop- 
ment has been admirably summarized by Mr. Philip H. 
Kerr, when he says: 

"The British Commonwealth, indeed, has come into being, 
not through any consciously Imperial design, not, as Seeley said, 
in a fit of absence of mind, or by accident, but because it has 
supplied the needs of the people within it. Where chaos, or 
tyranny, or callous exploitation, or perpetual war and robbery 
reigned before, it has established peace, order, and justice. Un- 
der the protection of its laws one-quarter of the people of the 
earth live in peace and unity. It guarantees to every individual, 
of whatever race or colour, an equal liberty before the law. 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 41 

It protects them from devastation from without, and from dis- 
order within. It bridges, in its laws and its institutions, the 
gulf between East and West, between white and black, between 
race and race. It is even able to give full liberty to nationalism, 
and yet combine it with loyalty to a greater Commonwealth. 
To all it promises not good government only, but eventual self- 
government. ... It is easy to point to defects in its administra- 
tion and its institutions. The room for improvement and prog- 
ress is infinite. None the less it does, in its imperfect human 
way, meet an essential human need, and that is why it exists, 
and why it must continue to exist." 13 

However inadequately it be organized and however 
incompletely as yet means have been found safely to 
extend the sphere of self-government, this vast Common- 
wealth, comprising one quarter of the world's population 
of most varied races and creeds, of all stages of civil- 
ization, is in itself proof of the ultimate possibility of a 
world-community, " reconciling the freedom of indi- 
viduals and of individual states with the accomplishment 
of a common aim for mankind as a whole." The great 
barrier to this ultimate goal outlined by Kant and in fact 
to the necessary steps toward the preliminary integration 
leading to it, such as the voluntary coalescence of 
Great Powers in a greater body politic — for instance, 
the merger of the British Commonwealth and the United 
States, or that of Austria and Germany — is not merely 
the legal doctrine of state sovereignty, but those forces 
with which it is intricately intertwined and which are 
summed up in the inclusive term, nationalism. 

In political discussions considerable confusion not in- 
frequently results from the use of terms in a varying and 



42 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

undifferentiated sense. The ordinary interchangeable 
use of the words, state and nation, is a case in point. In 
this instance, the confusion could readily be avoided as 
the concepts are quite distinct. But in other instances, 
the poverty of the English language admits of no such 
escape. It is patent that, when we speak of international 
relations we mean those obtaining between states, yet the 
more accurate term, interstate, is not sanctioned by gen- 
eral usage. Likewise, the expression, supernational, is 
commonly used when super-state is really meant. The 
tyranny of language has led to considerable muddled 
thinking in these instances, but this evil has been even 
more manifest in the discussion of nationalism. The 
psychological forces denoted by nationalism are two-fold 
in nature, both those springing from membership in a cul- 
tural group and those arising from allegiance to a com- 
mon flag. It is obvious that these two sets of gregarious 
feelings are quite distinct in nature. But as a result of 
the rise of the national state, they have in varying propor- 
tions become merged and have produced modern 
nationalism. Both forces are usually co-existent, but 
the diverse manifestations of nationalism are sometimes 
predominantly the result of group solidarity based upon 
the nation and at other times they spring mainly from 
similar feelings toward the state. Thus what is known 
as economic nationalism is only to a minor extent the 
expression of national feeling, but is predominantly the 
attempt of men united in a state to further the economic 
interests of that particular political unit. Similarly, 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 43 

when one speaks of Swiss or of Belgian nationalism, what 
is meant is chiefly the patriotic devotion of men of 
diverse language and origin to a common body politic. 
On the other hand, the Southern Slav movement is based 
primarily upon the gregarious instinct of the politically 
separated fragments of that nation. Not only is 
nationalism a most complex force, but its content varies in 
nearly every instance. Further analysis and exposition 
will probably make this clearer. 

Though frequently and misleadingly confused in com- 
mon practice, state and nation are two fundamentally 
distinct concepts. The former is an exclusively politico- 
legal concept and, roughly, is merely a definite segment 
of mankind united in one body politic. On the other 
hand, the nation is etymologically an ethnical, but more 
accurately, a cultural concept, and is a similar portion of 
humanity bound together by other than mere political 
ties. From the physical standpoint nation and state are 
never absolutely identical, for their boundaries do not 
follow the same geographical lines. A state is frequently 
composed of a number of nations or parts of them, and 
in turn, nations are often split up into a number of states. 
This is true even of Western Europe, though not to the 
same extent as in the eastern section of that continent. 
Considerable portions of the Teutonic nation are under 
the rule of Austria and Switzerland, and the German 
Empire as constituted in 1871 embraced fragments of 
the French, Danish, and Polish nations. Likewise, parts 
of the French nation are included within Belgium, Ger- 



44 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

many, and Switzerland. The Italian nation, similarly, 
extends beyond the boundaries of the territorial state. 
This intersection of national and political lines is the 
direct consequence of the more or less artificial deter- 
mination of state frontiers according to dynastic, political, 
economic, and strategic considerations. It has been a 
fertile source of trouble, especially in the border-lands 
between nation and nation, because the pattern made there 
by these intersecting lines is so extremely complicated and 
intricate as to render well-nigh impossible a solution along 
national lines of the problems of Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, 
Bohemia, Macedonia and Transylvania — to mention only 
a few of the questions that the existing war has thrown 
into the crucible. In virtually every instance, there must 
remain a minority that will fret under the political 
affiliations which even the keenest sense of justice might 
assign to it. 14 

What are these deeply rooted cultural ties that bind 
together individuals into groups distinct from the political 
associations known as states? It is essentially true that 
mankind is akin and that its common humanity consti- 
tutes a primary unity. But this basic unity is as yet less 
energetic as a political force than are those differences 
that divide mankind into distinct groups. Of these the 
most important politically, though possibly not the most 
fundamental, are those physical differences, primarily 
the colour of the skin, that constitute unmistakable fis- 
sures in mankind's unity. The white, black, and yellow 
races have distinct physical characteristics that strike the 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 45 

eye, however much one might be inclined to ignore them. 
But within these primary divisions — and politically they 
are still primary, however factitious and superficial they 
may seem to be from an ideal standpoint — are less 
marked distinctions that establish definite groups within 
them. One such primary division is the Caucasian race, 
which is a definite entity that has produced the clearly 
defined European or western type of civilization. But it 
is a unity embracing infinite diversity and these diver- 
gences have led to the evolution of minor groups known 
as nations. A nation may be described as a group of men 
united by a consciousness both of common likeness to one 
another as well as of difference from others. The re- 
sulting consciousness of belonging together, apart from 
the political bond of the state, is the product of many 
factors, of which the most important are common, almost 
identical, moral standards, ideals, traditions, customs, 
and political instincts. As this unity in the fundamental 
content of thought is most likely to be attained by means 
of a common language, its possession is generally the 
most significant outward sign of nationality. Far less 
important than this essential like-mindedness toward 
basic values, is race unity or community of blood. For 
race, in so far as divisions within the Caucasian group are 
concerned, is primarily a cultural not a physical fact. 
The Slav brought up in a purely Teutonic environment 
is apt to become a typical German, and this tendency will 
become overpowering if both he and his associates are 
ignorant of his racial origins. This holds true as well of 



46 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

Englishmen, Germans, and Italians under the same cir- 
cumstances. Treitschke, the most Prussian of Prussians, 
was a Saxon of Tzech descent; and Nietzsche, the un- 
conscious prophet of Prussianism, prided himself on his 
Polish blood. In this connection also, it is decidedly 
significant that, during the fateful twelve days of 1914, 
British interests at Berlin and Vienna were in charge of 
men whose not remote ancestors were Germans. 

But the use of a common speech with its ensuing like- 
mindedness and community of civilization both in essen- 
tials and in details, though they be the basic facts of true 
nationality, do not always establish the existence of a 
nation. In addition, there must be among the indi- 
viduals what Sidgwick called " a consciousness of belong- 
ing to one another, of being members of one body, over 
and above what they derive from the mere fact of being 
under one government." 15 In other words, in ultimate 
analysis, nationality is predominantly a psychological 
fact. 

The demand of such self-conscious national groups for 
full expression dominated the history of the nineteenth 
century and gave rise to the doctrine of nationalism. 
This creed, as Mr. C. Delisle Burns has lucidly demon- 
strated, was the joint product of two preceding ideals, 
Renaissance state-sovereignty and eighteenth-century 
revolutionary rights. 16 To the concept of sovereignty, 
according to which each state was politically and legally 
a self-sufficient unit, was joined the doctrine of the 
French Revolution, that every people has an inalienable 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 47 

right to the form of government it desires, and that the 
imposition upon it of another rule is inherently inde- 
fensible. This doctrine justified each segment of man- 
kind in establishing its own form of government and in 
seeking self-centred isolation by means of complete politi- 
cal separation from other groups of varying differences 
in mind. The resulting nationalism was the basis and 
justification for the movement that led to the indepen- 
dence of the English and Spanish colonies in America 
as well as to the successful revolts of Greece and of the 
other Balkan states against Turkish dominion. It was 
on the strength of this principle of nationalism, then gen- 
erally accepted by progressive thinkers, that many Eng- 
lishmen of the liberal school espoused the cause of the 
South during the beginning of the American Civil War, 
since, in the absence of any clear and avowed intent on 
the part of the North to uproot negro slavery, it seemed 
merely an attempt of one group of men to force a dis- 
tasteful system of government upon others of a kindred, 
but clearly divergent, type. 17 

But nationalism is not only a disintegrating factor. 
The same forces that led to Greece's independence were 
predominant in the unification of Italy and of Germany. 
Consciousness of kind binds the like together and divides 
the unlike. But as absolute identity is never attainable, 
even if it were desirable, there are innumerable grada- 
tions of likeness and dissimilarity — myriad co-existent 
foci of attraction and repulsion between individual and 
individual, between group and group. Hence, national- 



48 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

ism may at one and the same time be a consolidating and 
a disintegrating force, not only as between two nationally 
kindred states, but even within the same body politic. 

Nationalism is, however, primarily a disintegrating 
force, because the average man's imagination and out- 
look are restricted and his sympathies and co-operation 
are more readily enlisted for the affairs of his immediate 
neighbours than for those of the larger community. It 
is predominantly outside pressure and the necessity of 
uniting to withstand it that compel small communities to 
unite into larger aggregates for the defence of their com- 
mon interests. It was the alien Austrian rule and the 
dread of its re-imposition that made and kept modern 
Italy united. Similarly, from joint military action in the 
war against France sprang, as Bismarck had shrewdly 
calculated, modern Germany. Secretary of State Seward 
likewise relied upon the consolidating effect of such pres- 
sure from without when, shortly after the secession of the 
Southern States, he urged upon President Lincoln the 
advisability of provoking a foreign war as the most effi- 
cacious means of restoring the union. 18 In final analy- 
sis also, the marked trend toward greater cohesion in 
the British Empire during the past decades has been the 
direct reaction to the international tension and, in es- 
pecial, to the German menace. 

Manifestly, the differences that divide the Caucasian 
race into separate nations are not always sharply defined. 
They are frequently impalpable in that they are pre- 
dominantly psychological, for the saying that a man 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 49 

belongs to the nation to which he thinks he belongs is 
essentially true. Between some of the nations, as for 
instance the Spanish Republics of South America, the 
differences in civilization are so slight that these states 
may be described as almost constituting one nation split 
by the memory of past quarrels and by present conflicting 
interests into separate political entities. The same is 
essentially true of Great Britain and the United States. 
As Professor John W. Burgess expressed it, " a nation 
may be divided into two or more states on account of ter- 
ritorial separation — as, for example, the English and the 
North American — and one of the results of this division 
will be the development of new and distinct national 
traits." 19 

That the English-speaking and Spanish-speaking 
nations are largely inchoate and are not more vital reali- 
ties is due primarily to the fact that the respective peoples 
of these two clearly defined groups are far from being 
fully conscious of their common nationality. Such con- 
sciousness is' essential. Under these circumstances and 
in the absence of outside pressure compelling them to 
join forces for the purpose of withstanding an imminent 
and common danger, distinct antagonisms based upon 
historical causes and mutual rivalries may even establish 
themselves. While economic facts do not determine 
nationality and the economic units into which some 
economists divide the world are predominantly historical 
and political products, nationalism is prone to seek ex- 
pression in economic policy. Attempts of the state to 



50 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

make itself economically strong, and thus politically 
powerful, accentuate in turn whatever divergent interests 
may exist between politically separated but kindred 
national groups. By such means are intensified differ- 
ences that under a system of free trade would have 
scarcely more disruptive tendency than the competitive 
economic rivalry between man and man within the state. 
Economic conditions are not a constituent factor of 
nationality, 20 but the economic policy of the state may 
still further disintegrate the inherent unity of a nation 
divided into separate political entities; and it may, on 
the other hand, give some measure of unity to a state 
composed of distinct and even antagonistic nationalities. 
Conflicting political ambitions and economic interests, 
the memories of past strife, self -regarding particularism, 
or even the mere dread of change, may keep kindred 
nations politically apart. But, at the same time, similar 
forces, above all the fear of more powerful neighbours, 
may keep mutually repellent nations within the same 
body politic. Before the war, Magyar and German- 
Austrian detested one another in full sincerity, but their 
common opposition to Russia, their combined ambitions 
in the Balkans, and their joint exploitation of the Slavonic 
and other subject nationalities that constituted a majority 
of the Dual Empire, preserved the unity of Austria- 
Hungary. 

Throughout the nineteenth century there was a well- 
defined tendency to accentuate the differences between 
man and man. Local institutions, provincial history and 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 51 

antiquities were cherished and studied with a painstak- 
ing care, almost incomprehensible to those outside the 
range of these interests. Declining or moribund lan- 
guages, like Tzech, Hungarian, Dutch, Flemish, and 
Gaelic, have been revitalized, despite the fact that they are 
a distinct handicap in that their use is necessarily con- 
fined to small numbers. 21 In some instances, mere dia- 
lects have been nurtured into literary languages. Many 
minor groups, little nations or fragments of larger ones, 
known as nationalities, have been called into distinct self- 
consciousness. Even in France, where nation and state 
are possibly most completely identified, voices are raised 
claiming that Brittany is in spirit a nation, though an in- 
separable part of a larger one, and demanding recogni- 
tion of this fact in the political field as well as the public 
teaching of the Celtic tongue such as obtains in the 
schools of Wales. 22 

This process of differentiation with its particularistic 
tendencies may to a great extent be attributed, as has 
been done by Lecky, to the spread of education and to the 
ensuing increased interest in all human affairs. 23 But, 
coincident with this disruptive tendency, increased knowl- 
edge has had integrating effects, some of which are far 
from wholesome. Thus, increased historical knowledge 
has led to an aggressive nationalism that seeks to re- 
create a remote past. The Germany of the Middle Ages 
— the Holy Roman Empire with its theoretical claims 
to universal dominion in all things temporal — is a potent 
element in modern German' aspirations. Similarly, 



52 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

Serbia looks back to the time when she was the leading 
nation in the Balkans. The same is true of Bulgaria. 
Though the Polish nation has by no means as yet been 
re-established, some Poles are already thinking of the 
greater Poland of the Jagiello Princes ! Likewise, " the 
Glory that was Greece and the Grandeur that was Rome " 
play an important part in the aspirations of those who 
look upon themselves as the direct descendants and heirs 
of these ancient states. Other instances might also be 
cited. Irredentism is by no means solely an Italian pol- 
icy. In order to justify modern national ambitions, the 
real past has in many cases been transfigured and, in 
some instances even, a mythical golden age has been 
created. To such an extent has this been done that there 
is almost full warrant for Froude's cynical saying that 
history is " like a child's box of letters, with which we 
can spell any word we please." 

But the spread of knowledge has likewise had integrat- 
ing effects of a far more beneficent character. Increased 
education has led to a fuller knowledge of other groups. 
The intellectual interdependence of the western world has 
in varying degrees counteracted the particularistic tend- 
encies inherent in the increasing differentiation into well- 
defined groups. The stranger is no longer fully a 
stranger and can be regarded with some measure of un- 
derstanding and sympathy. But to some extent still, as 
in the case of religion, loyalty to one's national kin, fre- 
quently expresses itself less in devotion to the nation's 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 53 

highest ideals, than in depreciation and dislike of other 
groups. 24 

Thus, in general, nationalism and internationalism have 
developed side by side throughout the nineteenth cen- 
tury. There is no inherent antagonism between the two. 
As has been finely and truly said by Mr. G. Lowes Dick- 
inson : " Internationalism does not attack the feeling 
' We belong to ourselves.' It attacks only its perversion, 
' We do not belong to you.' " 25 In spite of the increas- 
ing group differentiation, mankind's fundamental unity 
has during the past hundred years received ever more ex- 
tensive recognition and, at the same time also, the tend- 
ency has been to establish increasingly large political ag- 
glomerations, some of which are based upon the fullest 
consent of the self-conscious groups within them. This 
development has been made feasible by the abandonment 
of the old idea of a unicellular state and the develop- 
ment of the federal system. When unmolested, national 
self -consciousness is 'not apt to threaten the integrity of 
the state, and its political significance then consists merely 
in a tendency towards administrative decentralization and 
increased local self-government. It is not necessarily 
separatist. But when thwarted in its attempts at self- 
expression, nationalism becomes a disruptive force of 
first magnitude. Any attempt of a dominant race to 
impose its religion, language, and civilization upon a 
reluctant minor nationality within the state stimulates the 
tendency towards particularism and markedly accentu- 



54 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

ates the growth of differences. Polish national senti- 
ment had been powerfully stimulated by the persistent 
attempts of Germany and Russia to uproot the native 
language. The Southern Slav question and the renas- 
cence of Bohemian nationality are due largely to the re- 
pressive policies of Austria and Hungary. Whether it 
be in the Ukraine, in Croatia, in Bosnia, in Transylvania, 
or in Alsace-Lorraine, wherever national feeling is a 
serious menace to the state's integrity, this is due pre- 
dominantly to the pressure of a ruling majority. Even 
the memory of such a past, as in Ireland, is an influential 
factor. But wherever a broad policy is pursued, one not 
based on the principle of toleration — which implies 
superiority and inferiority — but upon the recognition 
of the inherent right of all groups to self-expression and, 
as a consequence, the constituent nations are allowed full 
freedom in the preservation of their own peculiar lan- 
guages, religions, and customs, then the disintegrating 
tendency is minimized and may become even negligible. 
These underlying facts will ultimately make possible a 
world-state. At present, the nearest approach to such 
an ideal is the British Commonwealth, wherein the va- 
rious nations constituting its four hundred and fifty 
millions live, not in complete concord, which can never 
be realized in a progressive world of divine discontent, 
but in sufficient harmony to render possible the meting 
out of a measure of necessarily imperfect justice to all 
under the rule of its far-flung law. 

As a result of the growing interdependence of the 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 55 

world and its increasing internationalism, the comity 
of nations had before the war outstripped that of states. 
Between individual and individual of different national 
groups there was markedly less hostility and, except in 
Eastern Europe, the antagonism between nation and na- 
tion as such had greatly declined. In every field of 
thought and activity, the western world was closely in- 
terrelated. There were even in existence some rudimen- 
tary organs of international government. But legally 
the world was divided into sharply defined units. In or- 
dinary times of peace, the consciousness of the state is 
largely latent and the most real associations of the aver- 
age individual are with religious, scientific, industrial, 
commercial, labour, and other professional groups, many 
of which cut across the state frontiers. But, as a con- 
sequence of the lack of interstate organization, when- 
ever the state is in danger the citizen must ruthlessly 
sever all ties extending beyond its bounds. Under the 
existing international anarchy, the ultimate dedication 
must be to the state and not to mankind as a whole. The 
layman or official, whose final allegiance is to the un- 
organized society of states, is inevitably regarded as not 
only derelict in his duty but as a traitor. The so-called 
self -regarding nationalism, to which is generally attrib- 
uted the conditions that made this war possible, is not 
primarily the product of the relations existing between 
nation and nation, but it is chiefly the inevitable result of 
the anarchy that must prevail in a world of sovereign 
states. Not that the feelings of nation to nation, as 



56 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

opposed to those of state to state, were without antagon- 
ism. On the contrary, there was considerable antipathy, 
but this was rapidly decreasing especially in the most 
advanced western nations. But under the existing in- 
terstate anarchy, states are perforce in a position of dis- 
trust and suspicion and their governments cannot es- 
cape from acting upon competitive, as distinct from co- 
operative, principles. Those entrusted with foreign af- 
fairs can scarcely avoid disregarding the interests of 
mankind whenever they seem to be in conflict with those 
of the state. 

Hence, before the war, although the most enlightened 
opinion throughout the western world, especially in Eng- 
lish-speaking countries, favoured the creation of some 
effective super-state authority that would eliminate the 
possibility of a world war, the problem could not even 
be adequately approached because no state was willing to 
limit its sovereignty. The people were far more ready 
for a radical solution than were the governments. These 
were bound fast by the view that above all else it was 
necessary to maintain unimpaired the sovereignty of their 
respective states. The war has to some extent reversed 
this situation. The governments now recognize the ne- 
cessity of some super-state authority, but national feel- 
ing has become so exacerbated that the prerequisite basis 
for the effective operation of such an all-inclusive organ- 
ization has been undermined. The extensive nature of 
the war and its intensive conduct have brought non- 
combatant as well as combatant within its direct ravages ; 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 57 

while, at the same time, details of every phase of its 
course, which in former conflicts reached but small cir- 
cles, have been made by the press the common property 
of all. In no previous war has each people been so fully 
and intimately acquainted with " the crimes and misdeeds 
of the enemy." German atrocities in Belgium and in 
Northern France, the bombardment of peaceful towns, 
the Zeppelin raids, the submarine campaign, the brutali- 
ties in Poland 26 — everything comprised in the policy of 
" frightfulness " — the Turkish massacres in Armenia, 
and the Austro-Hungarian outrages in Serbia, 27 have 
created a barrier whose temporary nature would not be 
light-heartedly affirmed if it were remembered that Crom- 
well's deeds in Ireland are still a factor in keeping the 
English and Irish peoples apart. The peoples of Cen- 
tral Europe have likewise some grievances and, no mat- 
ter how insignificant relatively they actually be, in their 
eyes they bulk very large. Nor does it matter much that 
the Allied blockade is a time-honoured measure of war; 
so long as the Teutonic peoples think the so-called "star- 
vation policy " not only unlawful but heinous, this fact 
will from their side strengthen and raise the barrier that 
their own conduct of the war had already established 
between the belligerent peoples. 

As a result there has developed a marked fissure in the 
unity of western civilization. The cleavage was already 
present before 19 14, but the outbreak and the course of 
the war have so broadened and deepened it that the abyss 
in view is formidable. It cannot be concealed by make- 



58 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

shift contrivances or by elaborate bridges; and the mills 
of the gods grind too slowly to warrant the hope of its 
disappearance for a number of decades. Hence, the con- 
ditions are really less favourable for the establishment 
of an effective all-inclusive super-state authority than 
they were before the war. One may be created, but it 
will have no real vitality until the suspicions aroused by 
Germany's disregard of her plighted word towards Bel- 
gium are dispelled. Without mutual trust in one an- 
other's good faith, there can be no real interstate co- 
operation in fundamental matters. Suspicion was rife 
before, but for decades to come it will thoroughly perme- 
ate the atmosphere of all international conferences, con- 
gresses, and councils composed of the present adver- 
saries. The development has, however, not been one of 
unqualified retrogression. While this cleavage in west- 
ern unity has been laid bare and enlarged, the peoples 
divided by this abyss have been drawn into much closer 
relations with those ranged on their own side of it. 
Their alliances, as a consequence, will in the future have 
a much broader democratic basis. 

Hitherto, these alliances have been predominantly 
those of governments, not of peoples ; and their compell- 
ing motive has been fear, rather than any mutual attrac- 
tion. This system of alliances was the result of the new 
conditions created by the rise of modern Germany after 
the successive defeats of Denmark, Austria, and France 
from 1864 to 1871. Bismarck, the master-builder of 
the German Empire, was not looking for new fields to 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 59 

conquer but, in his satiety, sought to render secure the 
elaborate structure. He frankly admitted that the idea 
of hostile coalitions gave him a nightmare. Dreading 
such a union of Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary, 
he turned to the latter country and, in 1879, concluded a 
defensive alliance with it. On many grounds, Bismarck 
would have preferred an alliance with Russia and, as he 
tells us, such an arrangement "was popular with nearly 
all parties." 28 The alliance actually concluded was pre- 
dominantly one of governments; its popular basis was at 
the outset most slender, though since then it has con- 
siderably broadened. Three years later, in 1882, Italy 
joined these two Powers and in this alliance were even 
more conspicuous the element of fear and the absence of 
a democratic factor. Originally, the alliance was entered 
upon, not out of good will towards the Central Powers, 
but mainly on account of resentment against France for 
acquiring a protectorate over Tunis which Italy cov- 
eted. 29 As time went on, this alliance, which ran coun- 
ter to national instincts, was kept intact chiefly be- 
cause it secured Italy from the hostility of Austria, her 
traditional enemy. The year after the formation of the 
Triple Alliance, Rumania joined this group on the same 
terms as had Italy. 30 Here again the same negative 
forces were at work. 31 This is well illustrated by the 
remarks of the Rumanian statesman, Take Jonesco. 
Some years ago, as he related the tale, " when two Min- 
isters of Foreign Affairs, one retired, the other in office, 
asked me at Paris how it was possible that we could be 



60 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

Allies of Hungary, we who could never become a great 
country except at the expense of Hungary, I answered — 
' and the alliance of Italy with Austria, do you under- 
stand that ? ' And when they said to me, ' Certainly, it 
is an alliance of fear,' I replied — ' Why do you think 
that Italy alone is afraid? ' " 32 

The Triple Alliance, although originally wholly de- 
fensive in character, gravely disturbed the European Bal- 
ance and inevitably aroused serious misgivings in Russia 
and France, who gradually drifted together until, in 1894, 
a series of prior agreements culminated in a similar de- 
fensive alliance. As the historian of this development 
has said, both France and Russia were suffering from 
" I' hypertrophic de la puissance allemande " and both real- 
ized the necessity of an equilibrium in Europe. 33 This 
alliance again was not based upon popular sympathies, 
but on fear. 

While in this manner a fairly stable equilibrium was 
being established in Europe, England stood in general 
aloof from both combinations. Despite a tendency to 
gravitate towards the Central Powers due to the dread 
of Russian expansion in Asia and to annoyance at 
France's uncertain colonial policy, these were really years 
of so-called " splendid isolation." 34 This policy of aloof- 
ness could, however, no longer be maintained after Ger- 
many by word and deed had plainly manifested exten- 
sive colonial ambitions and was building a navy of such 
extent as to threaten the safety of the British Common- 
wealth. With Japan was concluded an alliance that per- 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 61 

mitted the withdrawal of considerable naval forces from 
the Pacific. Then followed successive agreements with 
France and Russia that eliminated all outstanding dis- 
putes with them and paved the way for the co-operation 
of the three contracting Powers in international affairs. 
It would, however, require abnormally acute discern- 
ment to perceive in these arrangements any marked dem- 
ocratic elements. They were primarily agreements 
between governments to meet the impending German on- 
slaught. 

One of the most far-reaching results of the war prom- 
ises to be a significant change in the nature of these 
alliances. We are to-day very remote from the eight- 
eenth century when alliances were largely based upon 
dynastic considerations and when the partners in them 
changed with astonishing celerity and frequency. We 
are also rapidly leaving behind the age of merely gov- 
ernmental alliances based chiefly upon the negative fac- 
tor of fear. As a result of the stress of a war demand- 
ing untold sacrifices and the most unselfish collaboration, 
what were at the outset predominantly governmental ar- 
rangements are rapidly becoming co-operative associa- 
tions of peoples. A broad and firm popular basis for 
these alliances is being gradually developed. This is es- 
pecially true as regards the democratic combination that 
aims to resist the aggression of Teutonic autocracy and 
to quell the rebellion of the Central Powers against the 
free and progressive spirit of western civilization. In 
the relations of each to every other member of this demo- 



62 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

cratic group, the popular element will vary in proportion 
to the amount of reciprocal sympathy and understanding 
developed and must, now and in the future, depend upon 
the more or less close approximation of their respective 
national ideals. But, unless Germany is so decisively 
vanquished that all danger of renewed aggression is com- 
pletely eliminated, the element of fear will still consti- 
tute an important factor of cohesion. 

It is reasonably certain that the two existing sets of 
opposing alliances will, in some form or other, remain 
in existence. It is idle to expect them to be abandoned 
just when they are becoming living institutions. They 
are and will for some time continue to be, the most vital 
and real facts in interstate relations. They cannot with 
impunity be ignored by those who plan to organize the 
world and to create a supernational authority. That or- 
ganization will necessarily have to rest largely upon them. 
If an all-inclusive league of states to enforce peace be 
established, its membership will for a considerable time 
probably consist of three classes, the neutrals during the 
war and the two groups of erstwhile belligerents. On 
the other hand, if the proposed " League of Honour " 
be restricted to the world's democracies, this concert of 
purpose and action would be predominantly the present 
alliance against the Teutonic Powers, though probably 
more definitely organized and presumably also endowed 
with a continuing programme for maintaining and ex- 
tending the public right of the world. Whether it be the 
all-inclusive league or the democratic concert, the al- 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 63 

liances will probably continue at least until the super- 
national organization has satisfactorily demonstrated its 
full effectiveness as a bulwark of freedom. In fact, 
these alliances and the less formal associations in this 
war against Prussianism may in some instances produce 
far more durable results. To the extent that they are 
associations of peoples based upon mutual sympathy and 
respect and dedicated to a common high purpose, they 
may eventually lead to a new form of political union, 
unknown to a political science whose chief concern is the 
state of indivisible and absolute sovereignty. Unless 
within the proposed supernational league there goes on a 
process of ever closer and closer association between the 
states whose people are nearest akin so that ultimately 
permanent political union result therefrom, there is but 
scant prospect that mankind will ever emerge from the 
darkness of international anarchy into the full sunlight 
of a world-wide system of order and justice. 



Ill 

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 



" Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to en- 
tangle ourselves in the broils of Europe, our second never to 
suffer Europe to intermeddle with Cis-Atlantic affairs. Amer- 
ica, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those 
of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have 
a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. 
— Thomas Jefferson to James . Monroe, 

October 24, 1823. 



CHAPTER III 
American Foreign Policy Before 1914 

Introductory — American Political Philosophy and Ideals — 
Non-interference in Europe — The Monroe Doctrine — Opin- 
ions of the Elder Statesmen — The Policy of Non-intervention 

— The Assumption of Obligations in America and the Far East 

— Some Results of the Policy of Isolation. 

The modern system of sovereign states divides the 
world into sharply segregated politico-legal units. To 
the extent that this segregation is inconsistent with the 
growing social, cultural, and economic unity of western 
civilization, these entities are somewhat artificial. This 
system, however, determines the spirit and nature of 
interstate relations. As a result thereof, each one of 
these states is primarily, if not exclusively, interested in 
its own welfare and, in pursuing it, tends to disregard 
the rights and interests of its fellows and to ignore those 
of mankind as a whole. Under existing conditions, it is 
impossible for the statesman or for the layman to act 
upon the principle proclaimed by Mazzini : " You are 
men before you are citizens or fathers." 1 

At the same time, however, the fundamental unity of 
mankind, or at least of certain great portions thereof, 
which had never been wholly obscured since the days 

67 



68 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

of the Stoics, has prevented " the final and deliberate 
outward recognition of the view that States have no 
duties to one another and that the international polity 
is a fortuitous concourse of atoms." 2 But in case of 
conflict of interest between state and mankind and be- 
tween state and state, the citizen must ineluctably give 
his ultimate dedication and supreme allegiance to his 
own country. It follows inevitably from this situation 
that states are forced into competitive relations 3 , and 
that those in charge of their foreign affairs cannot in 
all respects conform to the ethical code binding upon 
individuals. 4 As long as the interests of the state are 
declared paramount, foreign policy must be dictated by 
more or less selfish considerations. All states are in 
varying degrees infected with this self -regarding nation- 
alism, which is the fundamental cause of the present 
war and which will cause further catastrophes in the 
future unless the state can be effectively controlled by 
some adequate and practical form of world-organiza- 
tion. Apparently, such a consummation cannot be fully 
realized for a considerable time, because the sense of 
international obligation and responsibility — the willing- 
ness to forego or even to jeopard national advantage in 
mutual service for mankind as a whole — is more or 
less undeveloped in all states and, hence, virtually no 
state is willing to limit its freedom and independence to 
the extent necessary to establish an effective superna- 
tional authority. 

At one extreme in the world of to-day is a state like 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 69 

the German Empire which, goaded on by the aggressive 
tenets of a reactionary economic and political philosophy, 
impelled by an almost pagan worship of the God of 
War and at the same time imbued with the self-imposed 
mission to redeem a " decadent world," prides rough-shod 
over the rights of others. At the other pole is England, 
whose policy is not only controlled by powerful moral 
inhibitions but, in addition, has been tempered by two 
generations of free trade and by centuries of intimate 
contact with most diverse peoples in all corners of the 
globe. As the head of a world-wide Commonwealth, 
whose persistence depends upon its performing a world- 
function, she has fully learned the value of the maxim, 
" Live and let live." Had this vast Empire been admin-; 
istrated primarily for selfish national purposes, its ex- 
istence would long since have been challenged by a united 
Europe. What was lacking in British policy was not 
adequate consideration for the rights and interests of 
other states, but the willingness fully and betimes to 
assume the responsibility of ensuring peace in Europe. 
In spite of the fact that England for years persistently 
strove to avert the threatening world war, she cannot 
escape some degree of negative responsibility fon it, 
chiefly in that she refused to assume the unwelcome 
burden of adequate military preparedness and thus in- 
directly encouraged Germany in her plan to dominate 
Europe and the world. The responsibility is radically 
different in kind and degree from that of Germany and 
must be shared by other states, some belligerent and 



70 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

some neutral, all of whom have over-emphasized their 
rights and have either minimized or ignored the com- 
plementary obligations to the still unorganized world- 
community of states. Almost, if not equally as disas- 
trous to the civilization of the world as are the aims 
and acts of Germany, was the traditional attitude of the 
United States which, immersed in concern for its own 
peace and liberty, had until 19 17 adhered to a policy 
of " no foreign entanglements " outside the western hemi- 
sphere that is tantamount to a repudiation of all respon- 
sibility for maintaining justice and right in interstate 
relations other than such as directly affected the Ameri- 
can continents. 

It follows from these premises that the United States 
cannot escape a certain degree of negative responsibility 
for the deplorable chaos into which civilization has 
fallen. American idealism and American practice in 
foreign policy presented a strange contrast. For 1 al- 
though German political philosophy has been widely 
taught in the United States by scientists trained in Ger- 
man universities, its tenets have not become an integral 
part of general thought. Above all, its doctrines, when 
accepted, had not been pushed to their logical extremes. 
The German theory of the state is of ancient lineage and 
has profound roots in German thought and practice, 6 and 
consequently it may be valid in so far as the German 
state is concerned. This is not questioned here. But 
when an American speaks of the state as an organism, 
he is using a metaphor. 7 Nor do his anthropomorphic 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 71 

tendencies lead him to endow the state with living per- 
sonality. 8 In the eyes of most Americans, this German 
concept of the state as a living organism with no moral 
responsibility but to itself, is a metaphysical abstraction 
corresponding in no degree to an actuality within their 
experience. And if, at times, the state is regarded by 
Americans as a persona iicta, the fictitious element is, 
in general, always kept in mind. Nor would Americans 
agree with the predominant German view that the state 
is based upon constraint and power, and that in deter- 
mining the inner character of any state it is essen- 
tial to find out whom the army obeys. 9 As Ameri- 
cans view it, their state is not based upon power 
but upon general consent, and the body politic is 
a co-operative group for furthering the welfare and 
the ideals of the individuals composing it. 10 Hence, 
American political thought, unlike that of Germany, does 
not make the organization an end in itself, to which the 
individual must be completely subordinated, 11 and whose 
aim must inevitably be the quest of power. 12 Liberty 
might, somewhat loosely, be named as the American 
state's supreme end. Nor is the German visualization 
of the world as an incoherent group of inherently antag- 
onistic states, each a law unto itself, in accord with 
American political traditions and ideals. The value of 
the state is not over-emphasized nor are the rights and 
importance of mankind as a whole ignored. The pre- 
vailing concept is that of a morally responsible state con- 
forming to the public opinion of the still unorganized 



72 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

world-community. There has always been implicit in 
American thought the ideal of such an ultimate com- 
munity based on the essential unity of humanity. 
America is deeply impregnated with the Kantian aim of 
universal peace, while modern Germany generally holds 
that the hope of banishing war from the world is not 
only senseless, but deeply immoral. 13 Practically noth- 
ing effective, however, had been done by the United 
States to make this ideal an eventual possibility. It 
had been debarred from doing so by the deliberate policy 
of aloofness from European affairs. 

The traditional American course of self-centred isola- 
tion was the joint product of factors within the body 
politic and of conditions in a Europe almost completely 
subject to autocracy at the time of this policy's formula- 
tion. American political life has been largely dominated 
by three concepts — independence, union, and the Monroe 
Doctrine. The independence gained after years of strug- 
gle is deemed a sacrosanct heritage that should not in 
the least be impaired. This ideal of independence is 
interwoven with the concept of sovereignty and both have 
been somewhat technically interpreted by the lawyers, 
whose influence in American political life overshadows 
that of all other groups. Most of these lawyers have 
sat at the feet of Blackstone and his definition of sov- 
ereignty as " the supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncon- 
trolled authority" has played a considerable part in 
American history. The legalistic bent of American pub- 
lic men and the intense devotion of the people to every- 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 73 

thing associated with independence have had their share 
in keeping the United States aloof from Europe. In 
addition, and as in the case of all English-speaking peo- 
ples, American political thought and action have been 
largely devoted to insistence upon the rights of indi- 
viduals. What Mazzini called " the sterile Declaration 
of Rights " seemed to most Americans to embody the 
doctrines essential to a well-ordered society. The pre- 
vailing political creed was, and to some extent still is, 
predominantly the individualistic and negative one of 
rights, and there has been a marked, though rapidly 
decreasing, tendency to ignore the complementary obli- 
gations. When applied in interstate relations, this atti- 
tude resulted in a stress on the value of American 
rights together with a notable unwillingness to assume 
responsibilities for the welfare of the interstate com- 
munity. The conjoint result of these factors is that, 
while the United States advocated the highest ideals of 
international comity, no other state was, at the same 
time, more reluctant to restrict its freedom of action by 
positive and active co-operation with others in attaining 
this goal. 

Many of the fundamental features of American for- 
eign policy — insistence upon the " impregnable inde- 
pendence and the equal sovereignty of the United States 
with any or all other nations of the world," the develop- 
ment of the doctrine and practice of absolute neutrality, 
the assertion of the principle of the freedom of the 
seas, the advocacy of international arbitration, and the 



74 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

conclusion of extradition treaties — date from Washing- 
ton's Administration, when an embattled Europe pre- 
sented many difficult problems to the young Republic. 14 
But even more far-reaching than were these specific lines 
of action, was the general policy, adumbrated earlier, 
but clearly outlined by Washington in his famous Fare- 
well Address of 1796. Herein he stated: 

" The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations 
is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them 
as little political connection as possible. . . . Europe has a set 
of primary interests, which to us have no, or a very remote, 
relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, 
the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. 
Hence therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, 
by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or 
the ordinary combinations and collusions of her friendships or 
enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and en- 
ables us to pursue a different course. ... It is our true policy 
to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the 
foreign world." 

This advice of Washington has been taken literally, 
quite apart from the conditions that suggested its wis- 
dom to him, and it is furthermore usually ignored that 
in the same address he not only advised an honourable 
adherence to the existing defensive alliance with France, 
but in addition stated that, " taking care always to keep 
ourselves, by suitable establishments on a respectable de- 
fensive position, we may safely trust to temporary alli- 
ances for extraordinary emergencies." 

Five years thereafter, in his notable first inaugural 
address, Jefferson advocated the same general attitude 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 75 

in the following trenchant words : " Peace, commerce, 
and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alli- 
ances with none." 15 At the same time, in a famous letter 
to Thomas Paine, he elaborated these views, writing: 
" We shall avoid implicating ourselves with the Powers 
of Europe, even in support of principles which we mean 
to pursue. They have so many other interests different 
from ours that we must avoid being entangled in 
them." 16 

This principle of abstention from interference in Euro- 
pean affairs formed one of the corner-stones of American 
foreign policy prior to 19 14. The other was definitely 
laid only in 1823 when the Monroe Doctrine was formu- 
lated, but it was a logical consequence of the former 
action. As early as 1808, Jefferson wrote that the object 
" must be to exclude all European influence from this 
hemisphere " ; 17 and, twelve years later, he emphasized 
" the advantages of a cordial fraternization among all 
the American nations, and the importance of their co- 
alescing in an American system of policy totally inde- 
pendent of and unconnected with that of Europe." 1S 
From Monroe's famous message dates the definitive 
adoption of these two correlative principles as inflexible 
rules of action. This outcome was, however, not reached 
without some struggle which served to emphasize that a 
clear-cut parting of the ways had been reached. 

There were, at that time, three important movements 
in the world that deeply appealed to the American people. 
Greece was attempting to free herself from the Turkish 



76 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

yoke and the South American colonies had all but suc- 
ceeded in severing their political ties with Spain. In 
that country a revolution against the absolutist Bourbon 
monarchy was in full swing and France, acting under a 
mandate of the Continental Powers, was intervening by 
force to suppress the uprising. Furthermore, it was 
feared, and not without reason, that as soon as Spanish 
liberalism was crushed, the reactionary Concert of Eu- 
rope would attempt to restore Spanish America to her 
former European allegiance. South America was far 
more closely connected by military 19 and commercial 
ties with England than with the United States, and her 
future naturally aroused great interest there. In this 
conjuncture, the British Foreign Secretary, George Can- 
ning, suggested to Richard Rush, the American repre- 
sentative at the Court of St. James, that Great Britain 
and the United States should co-operate in opposing an 
attempt on the part of the European Concert to re-sub- 
ject South America to Spanish rule. When President 
Monroe received this offer, he forthwith sought the ad- 
vice of his experienced predecessors in office, Jefferson 
and Madison. 20 

Jefferson fully appreciated the momentous nature of 
the question and, in reply, wrote : " Our first and funda- 
mental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in 
the broils of Europe, our second never to suffer Europe 
to intermeddle with Cis- Atlantic affairs. America, North 
and South, has a set of interests distinct from those 
of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should there- 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 77 

fore have a system of her own, separate and apart from 
that of Europe. While the last is labouring to become 
the domicile of despotism our endeavour should surely 
be to make our hemisphere that of freedom." 

These historic words are usually quoted apart from 
their context in order to justify a policy far other than 
that actually advocated by Jefferson. For the aged 
statesman further pointed out that one European state, 
most of all, could frustrate this outcome and that, by 
accepting Great Britain's proffer of co-operation, the 
United States would " detach her from the band of 
despots, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free 
government and emancipate a continent at one stroke." 
Great Britain, he continued, " is the nation which can 
do us the most harm of any one, or all, on earth; and 
with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. 
With her then we should the most sedulously cherish 
a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to 
knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side 
by side, in the same cause." 21 

Madison entirely concurred with Jefferson and went 
even further. He advised the acceptance of Canning's 
offer because " with that co-operation we have nothing 
to fear from the rest of Europe; and with it the best 
reliance on success to our just & laudable views." " Our 
co-operation," he added, " is due to ourselves & to the 
world : and whilst it must ensure success in the event of 
an appeal to force, it doubles the chance of success with- 
out that appeal." Furthermore, Madison queried: 



78 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

" Will it not be honourable to our country & possibly 
not altogether in vain, to invite the British Gov* to 
extend the avowed disapprobation of the project ag st the 
Spanish Colonies, to the enterprise of France ag 8 * Spain 
herself; and even to join in some declaratory act in 
behalf of the Greeks?" 22 

President Monroe, who independently was inclining 
towards the opinion that the present exigency justified 
a departure from the " sound maxim " of political isola- 
tion, was confirmed in this opinion by the advice of his 
predecessors. 23 His Secretary of State, John Quincy 
Adams, however, vigorously dissented from this view, 
partly because he was under the influence of Clay's vision 
of a Pan-American system, 24 partly because the proposed 
co-operation with Great Britain would have bound the 
United States not to acquire some coveted parts of the 
Spanish-American possessions, 23 and partly also because, 
as an ally of Great Britain, the United States would nec- 
essarily play a very secondary part. Finally, he realized 
that the same ends would be accomplished by separate 
action since Great Britain, whose sea power would be 
the determining factor, could not allow Europe to con- 
quer South America. 26 Adams, likewise, opposed the 
contemplated action in favour of the Greek and Spanish 
insurgents. 27 His views prevailed. Two passages in the 
President's message — one " speaking in terms of the 
most pointed reprobation of the late invasion of Spain 
by France," the other recognizing the independence of 
Greece — were deleted. The British offer of co-opera- 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 79 

tion, furthermore, was rejected. Adams' purpose, as 
stated by himself, was to remonstrate " against the inter- 
ference of the European powers by force with South 
America, but to disclaim all interference on our part 
with Europe." Accordingly, Monroe's famous message 
of December 2, 1823, apart from some platonic good 
wishes to Greece, dissociated America from the European 
polity and disclaimed any American interference in Eu- 
ropean affairs. It further announced as an exclusively 
American policy that the United States was opposed to 
the extension of the European political system to Amer- 
ica and that the New World was no longer open to colo- 
nization by the Old. 28 

Thus for a mixture of weal and woe, whose exact 
proportions a critical future will determine better than 
can a self-satisfied present, the surviving Elder States- 
men were over-ruled and the United States became bound 
to a policy of self-regarding detachment from Europe. 
Daniel Webster's famous speech in favour of the Greek 
insurgents delivered in Congress shortly after Monroe's 
message, led to no action on the part of the government. 
In view of the overwhelming opposition to it, the reso- 
lution in connection with which it was made was not 
even pressed to a vote. 29 For two full generations this 
continued to be the norm of conduct. No matter how 
strongly public sentiment was aroused in the United 
States, as for instance for Kossuth and the Hungarian 
rebellion, 30 the government refused to take action. At 
the same time, while not interfering in Europe, the 



80 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

United States to the extent that it was prudently able, 
opposed all European action in the American continents. 
In these long decades, the two principles became organi- 
cally connected in the popular mind. As Secretary Olney 
said during the Venezuelan dispute of 1895-96: 
" American non-intervention in Europe implied Euro- 
pean non-intervention in America." 

In the conduct of its foreign relations, the United 
States proceeded strictly upon the legal theory that all 
states, as a direct consequence of their sovereignty, were 
absolutely equal, no matter to what extent they differed 
in size and resources. Hence, while no other state was 
allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of the United 
States, there was, in turn, to be no intervention on its 
part in the political concerns of other states. Non-in- 
tervention was the prevailing rule of conduct not alone 
towards Europe, but also towards those parts of America 
that were under the aegis of the Monroe Doctrine. 31 
The situation was anomalous and could not last. In 
1895, during the Venezuela boundary negotiations, Sec- 
retary Olney informed the British Government that " the 
United States is practically sovereign on this continent, 
and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines 
its interposition." 32 This elicited from the Marquess of 
Salisbury the natural reply that the United States was 
not " entitled to affirm . . . with reference to a number 
of states for whose conduct it assumes no responsibility, 
that its interests are necessarily concerned in whatever 
may befall those states simply because they are situated 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 81 

in the western hemisphere." Shortly thereafter, the 
United States recognized the fundamental truth contained 
in these words, namely, that all rights necessarily imply 
corresponding obligations. The war with Spain for the 
purpose of abating the intolerable conditions existing in 
Cuba was a signal instance of this principle in action. 
Its theoretical justification was elaborated a few years 
later by Theodore Roosevelt in connection with the inter- 
vention in Santo Domingo. He then absolutely repudi- 
ated the doctrine of non-intervention in cases of chronic 
wrong-doing and of anarchy in the western hemisphere, 
and asserted that, with the benefits derived from the Mon- 
roe Doctrine, must be accepted certain responsibilities. 33 
" Just as there has been a gradual growth of the ethical 
element in the relations of one individual to another," 
he declared, " so we are, even though slowly, more and 
more coming to recognize the duty of bearing one an- 
other's burdens, not only as among individuals but also 
as among nations." 34 This principle of intervention in 
cases of chronic disorder in the western hemisphere was 
subsequently applied in other instances, notably in Haiti 
and in Nicaragua. It has been half-heartedly invoked in 
the increasingly complex and disordered conditions ob- 
taining in Mexico. The uncertain course of President 
Wilson towards that problem has only in part proceeded 
from the fact that its size implied the assumption of far 
more onerous responsibilities than in the case of Haiti. 
But, in addition, an unfortunate attempt was made to 
act simultaneously upon two irreconcilable principles. 



82 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

The duty to assist Mexico in restoring order upon an 
equitable social system was recognized and thus led to 
a measure of intervention in her political affairs. But 
at the same time, the legalistic trend of American politi- 
cal thought demanded, inconsistently, that no violence 
be done to the sovereignty of an independent state. 

While the United States was thus somewhat hesitat- 
ingly and with faltering steps assuming the responsibility 
for some measure of justice and order in the western 
hemisphere, it was at the same time extending the scope 
of its interests in the Far East. On a very limited scale, 
these ante-dated the Spanish-American War but, as a 
result of its unforeseen course, the United States acquired 
extensive possessions not only in the Caribbean but also 
in the Pacific, and, as a consequence, assumed new and 
far-reaching obligations. It became a world-power in a 
sense quite different from what it had been in the years 
of introspective seclusion when it limited its external 
action to advancing the comity of nations by lofty pre- 
cepts and to encouraging the growth of democratic liber- 
alism by mere expressions of sympathy. This newer 
attitude was clearly expressed in 1898 in President Mc- 
Kinley's instructions to the American Peace Commis- 
sioners about the retention of the Philippines. He said : 

"Without any original thought of complete or even partial 
acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila 
imposes upon us obligations that we cannot disregard. The 
march of events rules and over-rules human action. Avowing 
unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, 
and still solicitous to adhere to it, we cannot be unmindful that, 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 83 

without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought 
us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and 
discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and 
career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly- 
written the high command and pledge of civilization." 

This newer attitude towards world-affairs was revealed 
not only in the assumption of responsibility for the politi- 
cally backward peoples in the Philippines, Hawaii and 
Samoa, but also in the policy adopted towards the Chinese 
question. The policy of the " open door " in China as 
explicitly formulated by Secretary Hay in 1899 and the 
subsequent participation in the concerted military action 
of the European Powers during the Boxer Rebellion of 
1900 were conspicuous manifestations of the emergence 
of the United States as a world-power. But here again 
there was marked hesitation. This was due to many fac- 
tors, of which not the least was the underlying dread of 
weakening the Monroe Doctrine. For many feared that 
action on the part of the United States beyond the bounds 
of the western hemisphere might be held to justify Euro- 
pean interference in American affairs. 

There was some basis for these fears. To obviate 
such a possibility, the aloofness of America from Europe 
was again strongly emphasized. Thus the assumption 
of fresh responsibilities in America and in the Far East 
was accompanied by renewed formal assertions of the 
policy of non-intervention in European affairs. At the 
Hague Conference of 1899, the convention for the pa- 
cific settlement of international disputes was signed by 
the American delegation subject to the following declara- 



84 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

tion and it was subsequently ratified with this reservation 
attached. The declaration reads: 

" Nothing contained in this Convention shall be so construed 
as to require the United States of America to depart from its 
traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or 
entangling itself in the political questions or policy or inter- 
nal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything 
contained in the said Convention be construed to imply a relin- 
quishment by the United States of America of its traditional 
attitude toward American questions." 

This reservation, which significantly joined together 
the policy of non-intervention and that more specifically 
embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, was repeated at the 
Hague Conference of 1907. In the interval, the United 
States had enunciated this policy in another connection 
as well. The American representatives signed the Algeci- 
ras Treaty about Morocco without assuming for their 
country " obligation or responsibility for the enforcement 
thereof " ; and the Senate, in ratifying the treaty, added 
the further proviso that attendance at the Algeciras Con- 
gress was " without purpose to depart from the tradi- 
tional American foreign policy which forbids participa- 
tion by the United States in the settlement of political 
questions which are entirely European in their scope." 

This traditional policy of aloofness from European 
affairs is tantamount to a refusal to assume those obliga- 
tions that every state owes to the unorganized world- 
community. This negative policy may have been expedi- 
ent, but it unquestionably is devoid of moral value. Its 
wisdom cannot be measured by its material success, for 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 85 

the great danger in all utilitarianism is the concomitant 
deterioration of character. No attempt can here be made 
to assay it according to this standard. But even in the 
days of America's weakness, when the nation was still 
young, it had some unfortunate consequences that a pro- 
vincial outlook almost invariably ignores. The myopic 
absorption of the United States in its own development 
was an unquestionable factor in protracting Europe's 
struggle against the domination of Napoleon. Writing 
of that period, Admiral Mahan with characteristic in- 
sight pointed out : " The United States, contrary alike 
to the chief interests of mankind and to her own, sided 
upon the whole, though by no means unanimously, against 
Great Britain." 35 In his days of academic freedom, 
Woodrow Wilson likewise pointed out " the deep im- 
policy " of America's attitude and actions during that 
earlier world crisis. He then wrote: 

" Napoleon was the enemy of the civilized world, had been 
America's own enemy in disguise, and had thrown off the 
disguise. England was fighting him almost alone, all Europe 
thrown into his scale and hers almost kicking the beam; and 
now America had joined the forces of Napoleon, in fact if 
not in intention, as he had subtilely planned. It was natural 
that the raw and rural nation should thus have seen its own 
interests in isolation and indulged fts own passion of resent- 
ment with selfishness. England's policy had cut America to 
the quick and had become intolerable, and it did not lessen 
America's exasperation that that policy had been a measure of 
war against the Corsican, not against her. It was a tragical but 
natural accident that the war should be against England, not 
against France." 36 

The only legitimate defence for such a policy of self- 



86 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

centred aloofness from the questions that determine the 
broad course of history is impotence; but the United 
States steadfastly adhered to this attitude even after it 
had become one of the Great Powers and it thus for- 
feited the influence it could have exerted upon the affairs 
of mankind. 

It is true that the United States attempted in various 
directions to exert its influence for the advancement of 
humanity, but except to a limited extent, and then well- 
nigh exclusively in Central and South America, it refused 
to assume any obligations for the application of its politi- 
cal ideals. One does not have to be an adherent of the 
German theory of force to realize that in interstate rela- 
tions, as at present regulated, mere words, unless there 
is a willingness if necessary to back them up by deed, are 
futile. Force alone leads to Prussianism, to the doctrine 
that might makes right, with its dire consequences both 
to victor and victim. But mere words, no matter how 
cogent be the moral arguments, are on many occasions 
totally ineffective, especially when it is known that there 
is no intention whatsoever of wielding anything more 
warlike than the pen. The futility of such a course in 
the unorganized world of to-day was sadly realized by 
Secretary Hay when he was obliged to witness the break- 
down of his Chinese policy by Russia's action in Man- 
churia. In 1903, he wrote to Henry White: 

" The Chinese, as well as the Russians, seem to know that 
the strength of our position is entirely moral, and if the Rus- 
sians are convinced that we will not fight for Manchuria — as 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 87 

I suppose we will not — and the Chinese are convinced that 
they have nothing but good to expect from us and nothing but 
a beating from Russia, the open hand will not be so convincing 
to the poor devils of Chinks as the raised club. Still, we must 
do the best we can with the means at our disposition." 37 

In that the United States resolutely refused to become 
involved in any European matters and, furthermore, in 
that, because of its patent unwillingness to use more than 
moral suasion, it left to others the protection of its poli- 
cies in the Far East, Americans cannot escape a degree 
of negative responsibility for the existing world-wide 
war. An examination of recent international history 
and of the fundamental aim of German world politics 
will make this nexus more apparent. 



IV 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 



" With Austria, with France, with Russia, we have already 
squared accounts; the last settlement, that with England, seems 
likely to be the most protracted and most difficult." 

— Treitschke. 

" In the great conflicts of the future, the German people, 
whose loss of millions of Germans to Anglo-Saxondom in the 
nineteenth century has moved the world's centre of gravity in a 
sense unfavourable to them, will need all inner powers of 
shoulders, fists, and heads, the people's power, and the produc- 
tion-power, the fighting-power, the mind-power, and the master- 
power, in order to guard their rights among the peoples by land 
and sea." 

— Ernst von Halle (1902). 

" In the future, however, the importance of Germany will 
depend on two points: firstly, how many millions speak German? 
secondly, how many of them are politically members of the 
German Empire?" 

— Friedrich von Bernhardt. 



CHAPTER IV 

The Background of the War 

Position of the English-Speaking Peoples — German Ambi- 
tions — The Duel with " Anglo- Saxondom " — The German 
Menace and its Effects — Proposals for an Anglo-American 
Alliance — British Foreign Policy — ■ The European Defensive 
Coalition — Morocco — Persia — China — The Anglo-German 
Settlement of 1914 — The Bagdad Railroad — Central Africa — 
Summary. 

There is a disconcerting vagueness about Germany's 
ambitious plans and there has been some indecision and 
discussion as to the steps required to reach the desired 
goal, but the underlying thought is unmistakable. 
Whether the immediate aim was expansion in the Near 
and Middle East 1 or over-seas in Africa, America and 
China, the ultimate end was identical. Somewhat over 
a generation ago, an American historian wrote as follows : 

" The work which the English race began when it colonized 
North America is destined to go on until every land on the 
earth's surface that is not already the seat of an old civilization 
shall become English in its language, in its political habits and 
traditions. . . . The race thus spread over both hemispheres, and 
from the rising to the setting sun, will not fail to keep that 
sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy which 
it began to acquire when England stretched its arm across the 
Atlantic to the shores of Virginia and Massachusetts. . . . The 
world's business will be transacted by English-speaking people 

9i 



92 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

to so great an extent, that whatever language any man may 
have learned in his infancy he will find it necessary sooner or 
later to learn to express his thoughts in English. ... By the 
end of the twentieth century such nations as France and Ger- 
many can only claim such a relative position in the political 
world as Holland and Switzerland now occupy." 2 

The fundamental truth of these descriptive and pro- 
phetic words, uttered by John Fiske in 1880, has been 
amply proven by subsequent events, despite the fact that 
in this interval Germany had annexed a vast colonial 
domain and had developed an extensive over-sea com- 
merce. Since 1880, the United States has acquired the 
Philippines and other islands in the Pacific and has as- 
sumed a virtual protectorate over the backward countries 
bordering on the Caribbean Sea. Egypt, together with 
large sections of Central Africa, have come under the 
British aegis and South Africa has been united in an 
autonomous system whose lingua franca is destined to 
be in increasing measure English. British India has 
expanded over the outlying turbulent border regions and 
the Malay States have gradually come within the orbit 
of British order and justice. In 1912, somewhat over 
37 per cent, of the world's foreign trade was credited to 
English-speaking countries and their dependencies, which 
was three times the share of Germany in this total. 3 Un- 
less arrested by military force, the progressive spread of 
the English language and of English political institutions 
was destined to proceed with the slow and irresistible 
momentum of a glacier, because it sprang from the needs 
of the situation itself. The strength of the movement 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 93 

came from its response to human wants. It is a living 
process, growing with the changing demands of the times 
— one spontaneously generated by the activities and 
needs of countless individuals following their own im- 
mediate private ends. Only to a very minor extent is it 
the result of prescient planning, for governmental pol- 
icies have been as a rule determined and shaped by the 
inexorable logic of pre-existing facts and circumstances. 
The development of the British Empire and the growth 
of the United States, together with the spread of English 
political civilization throughout the length and breadth 
of the world, has been the most momentous political 
development of the past three centuries. Although in 
general very imperfectly understood in Germany, its sig- 
nificance was by no means minimized. In fact, it became 
an obsession with a people indoctrinated with the creed 
of Germanic superiority and impressed with the belief 
that they were, in the words of the Kaiser, " the salt of 
the earth." When the German statesmen, economists, 
and publicists tried to pierce the veil of the future and 
to picture the world toward the end of the present cen- 
tury, they saw three great political aggregates — the 
American, the British, and the Russian 4 — outranging in 
cultural influence and in potential strength all other states 
of western civilization and dwarfing a Germany whose 
political growth under existing territorial arrangements 
could apparently not compete with theirs. Hence the 
insistent striving for a repartition of the world in con- 
formity both with Germany's actual military strength 



94 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

and with some hypothetical future need for more land 
for her growing population, as well as for new markets 
and fresh sources of supply for her expanding industries. 
There was no question of any real need or of any 
actual handicap under existing conditions. Germany was 
exceptionally prosperous. Her foreign trade was rap- 
idly expanding and her busy work-shops and thriving 
agriculture were more than absorbing her growing popu- 
lation. Concurrently, the birth-rate was falling rapidly, 
more rapidly even than was the death-rate. As a result, 
emigration in the true sense of the word had virtually 
ceased. In fact, entirely apart from the seven or eight 
hundred thousand foreign wandering labourers who came 
yearly to Germany, mainly from Poland, Austria, Italy, 
and the Netherlands, to assist in the harvest and in gen- 
eral industry, the number of foreigners permanently domi- 
ciled in Germany was constantly increasing. As their 
numbers considerably exceeded those of the emigrants, 
Germany had actually become a land of immigration, like 
the United States. 5 This fundamental change did not, 
however, preclude the possibility of a return to condi- 
tions existing in the nineteenth century, when millions 
of Germans settled in English-speaking countries. Ac- 
cording to the official German view, such emigration was 
a distinct calamity for it not only negatively and rela- 
tively weakened the German State by decreasing its po- 
tential economic and military strength, but it added to 
the forces of competing aggregates. Moreover, the chil- 
dren of these emigrants had, as a very general rule, no 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 95 

cultural affiliations with Germany, but became integral 
parts of their English-speaking environment. 

Weltpolitik and Kaltitrpolitik went hand in hand. The 
desire to play a commanding political part in the world 
and the wish to impress German civilization upon it, both 
made the existing partition of the world seem inequitable. 
In reaching this judgment, some vital factors were ig- 
nored. The spread of German civilization was hampered 
by the undeniable fact that, wherever German civilization 
was in close contact with another advanced type, it grad- 
ually lost ground. This was true not only of the German 
nuclei in English-speaking countries, where the circum- 
stances were distinctly unfavourable, but it was also quite 
marked in German Poland, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, 
and elsewhere. 6 Prince von Buelow attributes to political 
ineptitude this failure of Germany to make moral con- 
quests. " How can it otherwise be explained," he asks, 
" that in the struggle between different nationalities the 
German has so often succumbed to the Czech and the 
Slovene, the Magyar and the Pole, the French and the 
Italian? — that in this sphere the German has usually 
come off second best in comparison with almost all his 
neighbours ? " 7 Similarly, Friedrich Naumann has dem- 
onstrated " that the modern Germans almost everywhere 
in the world are unfortunately bad Germanizers." 8 

Germany's egregious failure not only to germanize, but 
even to conciliate her Polish, French and Danish sub- 
jects, is primarily due to the fact that her policy was 
based upon the theory that wherever two nationalities 



96 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

live side by side, one must be the hammer and the other 
the anvil. But blows serve only to intensify the anvil's 
national feelings. While the cause of this lack of suc- 
cess was not generally understood in Germany, the con- 
dition itself was fully appreciated and there was, before 
the war, a distinct realization of the fact that further con- 
quests in Europe itself were futile and that the balance 
must be redressed by acquisitions over the seas. The 
course of military events during the war has forcibly di- 
verted Germany's ambitions towards Eastern Europe. 
But the diversion in intent is presumably only temporary, 
and at most it is intended to establish German military 
predominance in Europe on so unassailable a basis that 
a policy of extra-European expansion may in the future 
be safely pursued. The experiences with her Polish and 
French subjects had convinced Germany that her future 
was largely on the water and that her enemy of enemies 
was the English-speaking world. 

Before the war, Germany possessed a colonial domain 
approximately six times as large as her own area. While 
its resources are undeniably large, 9 they had never been 
thoroughly tested, primarily because the German emigrant 
refused to settle there. The few who did seek their for- 
tunes outside of Europe either had not the pioneer spirit 
or were better fitted by education to the complex civi- 
lization of already settled communities. Moreover, the 
bureaucratic methods and the military spirit of the Ger- 
man colonies repelled settlers, while the freedom of the 
English-speaking communities was exercising a powerful 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 97 

counter-attraction. Germans especially have forgotten 
that it is individual initiative and the hard labour of the 
settler and trader that have developed the United States, 
Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, as well as Singa- 
pore and Hong Kong. The English colonial domain of 
the seventeenth century was largely what Spain and 
Portugal in their desire for facile wealth had not con- 
sidered worth the taking, and every land is mainly what 
man makes of it. Disregarding or ignoring these con- 
siderations, Germany looked with envious eyes upon the 
flourishing English-speaking communities scattered over 
the globe. t They said to themselves that Spain and Portu- 
gal had once divided the world between them, before 
France, Holland, and England had emerged as colonizing 
nations and that another repartition was by no means 
out of the question. " Was einst geschah, kann wieder 
geschehen." 

Thus it came about that of the three great political 
aggregates that Germany foresaw as dominant in the 
future world, the Russian was regarded as fundamenta- 
bly unassailable, because its Slavonic peoples could not 
be assimilated or profitably governed and exploited. The 
great obstacle both to the further progress of German 
power and prestige, and to the spread of German civili- 
zation, appeared to be the English-speaking peoples with 
their ability to absorb German and other alien elements. 
Moreover, the non-military character of their political 
systems and the looseness of their general social organi- 
zation seemed in the minds of those impressed with oppo- 



98 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

site ideals to be infallible indications of inherent weak- 
ness and incontrovertible proof that this entire historical 
process, from the days of Shakespeare on, had been 
largely fortuitous. As Germany's future was deemed to 
depend upon a radical overthrow of these conditions and 
as their plans for expansion could be realized only at 
the expense of the British Commonwealth or in con- 
travention of the Monroe Doctrine, the arch-enemy to 
Germanism, cultural as well as political, appeared to be 
the so-called " Anglo-Saxon block." 

In his widely read and influential book, " Der Deutsche 
Gedanke in der Welt," Paul Rohrbach said: 

" It is not necessary to claim for the German idea that it will 
exist like the Roman either as the mistress of the world or not at 
all, but it is right to say that it will exist only as the co-mistress 
of the culture of the world, or it will not exist at all. The 
Anglo-Saxons have spread over such vast expanses that they 
seem to be on the point of assuming the cultural control of the 
world, thanks to their large numbers, their resources, and their 
inborn strength." 10 

Similarly, Maximilian Harden wrote with alarm about 
what he called Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the New and 
Old World. According to him: 

" Great Britain and North America tend to form a community 
of interests. On the two oceans, the Anglo-Saxons of the two 
continents group themselves together in unity of will. The 
hegemony of the white race will be theirs, if we do not make 
up the old quarrel. United with France, we should be invincible 
on land and sea." " 

This was written during the Agadir crisis. Two years 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 99 

later, in 19 13, another well-known publicist, Friedrich 
Naumann, called attention to the millions of Germans 
that had been absorbed by English-speaking communities, 
and proclaimed that this English factor was not only a 
national danger, but the national danger. 12 The press 
likewise lamented the slow but sure disappearance of the 
German elements in the English-speaking countries of 
America, Africa, and Australia. 13 The great duel of the 
present and future was widely held to be an ineluctable 
combat a I'outrance between Germanism and Anglo-Sax- 
ondom. 14 Germany, said an influential Pan-German 
writer in 1902, must take the lead in South America 
against American " jingoism " and must establish her- 
self firmly in the Far East, " or the great duel between 
Germany and the Anglo-Saxon races will end in favour 
of the latter " and Germany will then politically sink to 
the level of Holland. 15 To counteract this tendency in 
the cultural sphere, there was organized in 1881 the 
" Educational Alliance for the Preservation of German 
Culture in Foreign Lands," whose principles declare that 
" not a man can we spare if we expect to hold our own 
against the one hundred and twenty-five millions who 
already speak the English language and who have pre- 
empted the most desirable fields for expansion." 16 

Not only is the cultural solidarity of English-speaking 
peoples fully recognized, but also the fact that their sep- 
arate developments have formed part of what is essen- 
tially one historical process. Briefly, the broad purpose 
of German imperialism was, and presumably still will 



ioo THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

be unless its illusory basis is clearly demonstrated in this 
war, to eject the English-speaking peoples from the prom- 
inent positions that they have acquired in all continents. 
What English-speaking pioneers — discoverers, adven- 
turers, traders, and settlers — have slowly and laboriously 
accomplished by individual enterprise, the German Em- 
pire with its consciousness of military strength and its 
contempt for non-military states planned to duplicate in 
a few decades. 

The detached observer, whose interest is in the progress 
of civilization itself rather than in the comparative politi- 
cal importance of different states, would naturally not 
be disturbed by the prospective relative decline in Ger- 
many's political rank. Nor would he be dismayed at the 
fact that a constantly smaller percentage of humanity — 
though actually an ever increasing number of individuals 
— was habitually using the German language. All that 
is valuable in German civilization would still be the heri- 
tage of an interdependent world. According to his super- 
national view, a real grievance would arise only if the 
English-speaking peoples were selfishly to debar German 
individuals from sharing in the advantages that they 
had acquired. This was conspicuously not so either in 
the British Commonwealth or in the United States. 
With the self-regarding nationalism of our prevailing 
international anarchy, it is, however, quite comprehensi- 
ble and almost inevitable that Germany's leaders should 
look upon the situation with different eyes. Membership 
in large aggregates is a potent psychological force. As 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 101 

Mr. Dickinson has said, " men who are insignificant as 
individuals acquire a sense of extended life by belonging 
to a powerful nation." They feel a pride in large num- 
bers, in great areas, in swelling statistics of trade and 
finance, and " they do enjoy, in that gross way, the sense 
of power." 17 There is, of course, a good deal that is 
ignoble in this gregarious pride and a good deal that is 
false in this sense of vicarious accomplishment, but mem- 
bership in such large nations is in many respects a distinct 
advantage. 18 With patriotism the largely self -regarding 
sentiment that it is, it was quite natural that Germany 
should desire to maintain her relative political and cul- 
tural rank in the world. Had she proceeded to do so 
by peaceful methods, by conciliating her subject popu- 
lations, by attracting within her orbit the bordering peo- 
ples of kindred stock, and by populating her vast colonial 
domain, she would have escaped condemnation and prob- 
able disaster. Her methods, however, were the aggres- 
sive ones of the time-honoured Prussian philosophy of 
" blood and iron " and her aim was to construct a Greater 
Germany by undermining and grasping what others had 
laboriously built up. The German language with its ac- 
companying civilization was to be forced upon unwilling 
peoples, and those Germans who had emigrated to Eng- 
lish-speaking countries were to be induced to retain their 
cultural, and even political, affiliations with the Father- 
land. 

This distinctly hostile purpose towards the English- 
speaking peoples first manifested itself overtly and plainly 



102 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

during the years when the difficulties between Briton and 
Boer in South Africa were reaching a climax and when 
Spain was forced by the United States to relinquish the 
last remnants of her old colonial empire in the East and 
the West. One direct result of this menace was the 
significant movement for greater cohesion that has made 
the British Empire a unit during the present war and 
which promises, after its conclusion, to lead to the crea- 
tion of more or less adequate political machinery for the 
continuous expression of this solidarity. Another simul- 
taneous result, just as truly although somewhat less obvi- 
ously traceable to the German peril, was the marked in- 
crease in friendship between England and the United 
States and their cordial co-operation in some international 
questions, especially in the open door and territorial in- 
tegrity policy as regards China. 19 In England, where the 
sense of international realities was keener than in the 
United States and where, on the whole, there was a 
deeper feeling of kinship and of high regard than that 
prevailing in America, 20 there was some attempt to em- 
body this growing friendship in a formal alliance. On 
the eve of the Spanish-American War, Earl Grey said to 
John Hay, the American Ambassador in London: 
" Why do not the United States borrow our navy to 
make a quick job of Cuba? They could return us the 
favour another time." 21 On the same day, Joseph 
Chamberlain told Hay that he was extremely desirous 
of a close alliance with the United States, or, if that were 
prevented by American traditions, " of an assurance of 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 103 

common action on important questions." " Shoulder to 
shoulder," so Hay reported Chamberlain's words to Presi- 
dent McKinley, " we could command peace the world 
over." 22 A few weeks later, in an address before the 
Birmingham Liberal-Unionist Association, Chamberlain 
specifically proposed an Anglo-American alliance. 23 
With characteristic courage and clarity, he said: 

" What is our next duty ? It is to establish and to maintain 
bonds of permanent amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic. 
There is a powerful and generous nation. They speak our 
language. They are bred of our race. Their laws, their litera- 
ture, their standpoint upon every question, are the same as 
ours. Their feeling, their interests in the cause of humanity 
and the peaceful developments of the world are identical with 
ours. I don't know what the future has in store for us; I 
don't know what arrangements may be possible with us; but 
this I do know and feel, that the closer, the more cordial, the 
fuller, and the more definite these arrangements are, with the 
consent of both peoples, the better it will be for both and for 
the world." 

In the United States such proposals did not elicit any 
notable response. A few, very few, it is true, isolated 
Americans raised their voices in favour of such an alli- 
ance, 24 and the plan unquestionably appealed to John Hay 
when he presided over the State Department. Against 
its realization, however, stood not only the traditions of 
aloofness inherited from " The Fathers of the Republic," 
but also the prepossessions of many Americans against 
Britain as the historic foe, as well as the prejudices of 
some elements of America's heterogeneous population. 
Some of the difficulties were somewhat impatiently em- 



104 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

phasized in John Hay's letter of June 23, 1900, to Henry 
White. Herein he wrote: 

" What can be done in the present diseased state of the public 
mind? There is such a mad-dog hatred of England prevalent 
among newspapers and politicians that anything we should 
now do in China to take care of our imperilled interests, would 
be set down to ' subservience to Great Britain.' . . . All I 
have ever done with England is to have wrung great concessions 
out of her with no compensation. . . . Every Senator I see says, 
' For God's sake, don't let it appear we have any understanding 
with England.' How can I make bricks without straw? That 
we should be compelled to refuse the assistance of the greatest 
power in the world, in carrying out our own policy, because all 
Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are fools — is 
enough to drive a man mad." 25 

The great mass of the American people were immersed 
in their own diverse affairs and had only the most super- 
ficial knowledge of international politics, while their 
leaders, with lack of courageous foresight, refused to 
question the traditional policy. It was realized by only 
an infinitesimally small fraction of the American people 
that what was primarily protecting South America from 
German ambitions was not so much the Monroe Doctrine 
as British sea power. Had the United States entered 
into such an alliance, it is more than probable that Ger- 
many would at the outset have realized the futility of a 
forcible attempt to change the course of history. As a 
cultural entity, " the Anglo-Saxon block " did not seem 
to be an insuperable obstacle, but a clearly defined alli- 
ance upon this solid foundation would presumably have 
given Germany pause. Had such an alliance been con- 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 105 

summated at the turn of the century, the entire course of 
history would have been quite different and far more con- 
formable to American ideals and interest ; and its crown- 
ing climax, the present world-wide agony, would in all 
probability have been avoided. Americans can well ask 
themselves whether they can claim entire dissociation 
from the slaughter on Europe's blood-stained fields. The 
world is so closely interrelated that no great state can 
selfishly decline to assume the obligations resulting from 
membership in the world community without disastrous 
consequences not only to others but in the end to itself 
as well. It has been well said that a better international 
future depends upon whether or no Terence's oft-quoted 
saying, " Humani nil a me alienum puto," is translated 
by every intelligent citizen as, " I will treat nothing of 
human import as a foreign question." Such a counsel of 
perfection was the very antithesis of American practice. 
Clinging to its self-regarding isolation, the United States 
left the defence of English-speaking civilization to the 
British Commonwealth. 

Britain is the centre of a vast political aggregate, mis- 
leadingly designated as an Empire, but rapidly develop- 
ing into a genuine Commonwealth of diverse nations and 
races. 26 It covers approximately one fifth of the world's 
area and includes somewhat more than one quarter of 
mankind. Its foreign commerce was in volume even 
more than proportionately extensive and its mercantile 
marine was equal to about one half of the world's entire 
tonnage. On account of these facts, the British Empire is 



106 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

in more or less close contact with all peoples throughout 
the world, and every political change even in the most 
remote places must, to some extent at least, affect its 
fortunes. Yet the foreign policy of this vast Common- 
wealth was during the past fifteen years completely domi- 
nated by one single element — the German peril. That 
was the determining factor in recent international history 
and explains many apparently unconnected events in 
Africa, China, Persia, the Balkans, and Asiatic Turkey. 
The dreaded menace was not economic, for in spite of 
some apprehensions aroused by Germany's commercial 
expansion, the British Government steadfastly adhered 
to the free trade policy and claimed full justification for 
this course in the remarkable growth of Britain's foreign 
trade. 27 Nor was Germany's desire for additional ter- 
ritory in Africa and for economic expansion in Asiatic 
Turkey deemed menacing. The peril consisted in the 
fact that Germany, at a time when her publicists were 
evincing the most extravagant ambitions, was intent upon 
adding to the most powerful army in the world a navy 
of such dimensions as to render precarious the safety of 
the British Commonwealth. In 19 10, a well-known stu- 
dent of German life and institutions discussed the Anglo- 
German tension with Count Paul Metternich, the German 
Ambassador at London. Mr. Dawson opened the con- 
versation with a remark to the effect that " trade jealousy 
was no longer a cause of serious friction, nor was colonial 
rivalry," when the Ambassador interrupted, saying: " I 
know what you are going to say — it is the navy, and you 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 107 

are right." 28 This menace diverted British foreign pol- 
icy from its hitherto general support of liberty — such, 
for instance, as had been given to the cause of Greek 
freedom and to that of Italian liberation and unification 
— and concentrated it upon national security. In many 
respects this had unfortunate consequences, as in the 
Balkans, where England was predominantly disinterested 
and was prevented from exerting her full influence from 
fear of precipitating a general war. 29 Under the circum- 
stances, it was inevitable that the main object of British 
policy should be security and that all efforts should be 
made to avert a European war into which the British 
Empire would inevitably be drawn. The plan adopted to 
prevent the impending German attack was to settle all 
outstanding disputes with other states and to create a 
diplomatic combination — an informal league to enforce 
peace — that would hold Germany back. 

In 1902 was concluded the alliance with Japan that 
enabled England to concentrate her naval forces in the 
West. Two years later, the Entente Cordiale disposed 
of all outstanding questions with France; and, in 1907, 
a general settlement with Russia was made. The crea- 
tion of this defensive combination, however, necessitated 
the reversal of certain policies that not only were in full 
accord with British liberalism, but had also seemed essen- 
tial to national security. This was notably the case in 
Morocco and in Persia. In both of these countries the 
grave initial disorder had set in that always results from 
the close contact of backward peoples with the progres- 



io8 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

sive western world. 30 The situation was much the 
same as that prevailing in Mexico since 1913, only 
whereas in this case, as in the similar ones of Haiti, 
Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua, it was generally recog- 
nized that the United States alone had the right to inter- 
vene, in the cases of Morocco and Persia, unsanctioned 
interference by one European Power would inevitably 
be resented by one or more of the others. 

In Morocco, both England and France had quite im- 
portant commercial interests of approximately equal ex- 
tent. In addition, apart from historic political ties, Eng- 
land had a strategic concern in the future of Morocco. 
This was, however, far less vital than was France's con- 
nection arising from the long frontier between Algeria 
and Morocco with its record of chronic disorder. Spain 
likewise had a deep political concern in the fate of Mo- 
rocco and also some commercial interests, of about the 
size of Germany's. That country's existing trade was 
quite insignificant, but its possible future expansion de- 
manded the maintenance of the open-door and, at the 
same time, some Pan-Germans were clamouring for the 
acquisition of the southern part of Morocco. 31 The tra- 
ditional British policy had been to preserve the integrity 
of Morocco and to assist its government in the work of 
administrative regeneration. 32 It may be that the ideal- 
ism which in part dictated this policy was misplaced, and 
that, in preventing France from introducing into Morocco 
what is generally deemed to be civilization, England was 
retarding the course of progress. It is quite probable 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 109 

that the hope of reform from within was entirely illusory, 
but even a cursory elucidation of this question would 
carry one far afield. What is germane in the present dis- 
cussion is that England in 1904 completely reversed her 
policy and, in so far as she was concerned, virtually 
allowed France to establish a protectorate with the com- 
mercial open-door in Morocco. It is idle to speak of 
France's recognition of England's established and admit- 
ted position in Egypt as an adequate equivalent. These 
two elements of the agreement were entirely dispropor- 
tionate in value. 33 The essential point is that, under the 
pressure of the German peril, England without com- 
mensurate return abandoned a cherished policy that was 
based both upon liberal principles and upon what prior 
thereto had been deemed the exigencies of national safety. 
This German factor was the decisive one and it likewise 
played a great part in determining British policy towards 
Persia. 

For essentially the same reasons, conditions very simi- 
lar to those in Morocco prevailed in Persia. Chronic 
disorder — political, economic, and financial — had re- 
sulted from intimate contact with the complicated eco- 
nomic machinery of the western world. The great 
bulk of Persia's foreign commerce was with her two 
mighty neighbours, Russia and the British Empire. 
Economically, and politically also, due to closer physical 
contact, Russia's interests predominated. In the back- 
ground stood Germany, again with but a most insignifi- 
cant trade, but interested in an unknown future that was 



no THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

largely dependent upon the possible extension of the un- 
built Bagdad Railway to the Persian frontier. As in 
the case of Morocco, British policy towards Persia had 
idealistic as well as self -regarding elements. For a long 
time Russia had regarded Persia as " irretrievably 
doomed." As Lord Curzon wrote in 1892, " she regards 
the future partition of Persia as a prospect scarcely less 
certain of fulfilment than the achieved partition of 
Poland." 34 Russia's intention, apparently, was ulti- 
mately to annex the entire North, with its robust Turkish 
peasantry. A decade later, another competent student of 
this problem wrote that Russia " holds the Shah and the 
Central Government of Persia in the hollow of her hand 
by the two-fold power of the sword and the purse." 35 
Here again the question arises whether or no, in support- 
ing the integrity of Persia and in resisting the Russian 
advance so that Asia should not become "a field of con- 
tiguous European ambitions," England was not hamper- 
ing the spread of civilization. In this connection, it 
should be remembered that the northwestern province of 
Persia, Azerbaijan, has no national connection with that 
country. Its population is well-nigh entirely Chaldsean 
and Tatar, and their cultural affiliations are wholly with 
peoples under either Turkish or Russian rule. Moreover, 
Russia's record of pacification and civilization in Central 
Asia is a remarkably favourable one. In fact, the con- 
trast between the conditions of progress north of Persia 
and the disorder in that country was startling. 36 

However this may be, England consistently opposed 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR in 

Russia's undertaking the work of pacification in Persia, 
partly in order to preserve that country's integrity so as 
to permit of a national regeneration from within, but 
probably even more so to keep Russia and British India 
as far as possible apart. In 1907, the friction over this 
problem was removed by the agreement that settled the 
disputes outstanding between Russia and England. In 
so far as Persia was concerned, this agreement provided 
that the two interested Powers were to respect the integ- 
rity and independence of that country. What the nego- 
tiators had in mind was not the absolute independence 
of the sovereign state, but such independence as existed 
at that very time when Persia was virtually a quasi-pro- 
tectorate, jointly of Russia and England. It was not the 
independence of a Germany or of a France, but some- 
thing less than that of a Mexico and something more 
than that of a Santo Domingo that was meant. Further- 
more, in order to obviate friction, Persia was divided into 
three spheres, of which the Russian was to the North- 
west and the British to the Southeast, while between 
them was that denominated as neutral. Either country 
was at liberty to secure commercial and political conces- 
sions in this central sphere, but neither was allowed to 
do so in that reserved exclusively to the other country. 
It has frequently been assumed that this agreement was 
tantamount to a partition of Persia. Such are its poten- 
tialities; but such was not the intent of the British Gov- 
ernment, nor as yet has this been the outcome. In so 
far as England was concerned, the agreement was " in 



ii2 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

reality of the nature of a renunciation." 37 The so-called 
British sphere from which Russian concessions were ex- 
cluded, consists mostly of desert; it has only one town 
of importance and is very sparsely inhabited. 38 More- 
over, this arid region is virtually co-extensive with Per- 
sian Baluchistan, which is separated from British Balu- 
chistan only by artificial political frontiers. 

The agreement has worked far from well, especially 
from the standpoint of Persia. 39 It did not meet the 
crying needs of Persian anarchy and was at best only a 
makeshift. Moreover, it was concluded at a time when 
an attempt was being made to establish a modern consti- 
tutional regime in Persia. This had led to ever increas- 
ing disorganization. The administration was intermit- 
tently paralysed and brigandage was rampant. Under 
these circumstances, Russia intervened and occupied 
Azerbaijan in the Northwest. She could largely justify 
her action by the prevailing disorder which was- injuring 
Russian subjects and. their property. 40 But, in addition, 
it would appear that Russia tended to interpret the agree- 
ment of 1907 as leading to an actual partition of Persia. 

While England objected to the Russian occupation of 
the northwestern province of Persia, her opposition was 
presumably far less vigorous than it would have been, 
had the general European situation not been so menacing. 
One of the periodical collapses of Persian administration 
occurred during Mr. W. Morgan Shuster's energetic at- 
tempt to reorganize the chaotic financial system. His 
brief career of tactless efficiency, 41 in which he signifi- 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 113 

cantly aroused the opposition of both Russia and Ger- 
many, 42 exactly synchronized with the Agadir crisis in 
Europe. If during these tense months of 191 1, when 
Europe was on the very brink of war, England and Rus- 
sia had seriously quarrelled over what, compared to the 
gravity of the threatening world war, was but a most in- 
significant issue, there is but slight reason to believe that 
the greater peace would have been preserved. A break 
in the Entente combination would in all probability have 
been the signal for Germany actually to use the sword 
that had already been drawn from the scabbard. 

In the Far East, also, the German peril decidedly af- 
fected British action and policy. Although the principle 
of the open-door and the policy of maintaining the integ- 
rity and independence of China were mainly formulated 
by Secretary Hay, their advocacy by the United States 
had been largely futile, simply because it was generally 
recognized that under no circumstances would armed sup- 
port be offered. Hence England, whose aims were iden- 
tical with those of America, had to seek co-operation else- 
where. In 1900 was concluded the Anglo-German Con- 
vention regarding the territorial integrity of China and 
the open door there. But when, immediately thereafter, 
Russia refused to withdraw from Manchuria the troops 
that had been used in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion, 
Germany declined to intervene on the plea that the con- 
vention applied only to China proper exclusive of Man- 
churia. 43 Having failed by these means to check Russian 
ambitions, England contracted in 1902 an alliance with 



ii 4 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

Japan, which fully recognized the independence of China 
and Korea. 44 As the ostensible upholder of the Anglo- 
American policy of Chinese integrity and equality of com- 
mercial opportunity for all foreigners, Japan secured the 
sympathy and support of the English-speaking world dur- 
ing the ensuing war with Russia. The Treaty of Ports- 
mouth of 1905 that concluded this war likewise recognized 
the Anglo-American policy. But, in the meanwhile, the 
German menace in Europe had become acute — the first 
Morocco crisis of 1905 had aroused grave forebodings 
in England — and to the British Foreign Office the fu- 
ture of Korea and of Manchuria, as well as British 
interests there, seemed naturally far less important than 
a general European war and the possible disruption of 
the Empire. This was, of course, quite patent both to 
Japan and to Russia, and they did not hesitate to take 
advantage of it. Unostentatiously, except in regard to 
Korea, but steadily, the open-door policy was repudiated 
and the integrity of China was undermined by the for- 
mer enemies, Japan and Russia. The efforts of Secre- 
tary Knox under the Taft Administration to thwart this 
outcome were mere empty gestures since it was known 
that there was never the slightest intention to follow 
word by deed. They served merely to bring Russia and 
Japan closer together. In view of the German peril, 
England's hands were tied when Manchuria and Mon- 
golia were being gradually detached from China and the 
open door was being slowly shut. 45 

While the German menace and the dread of a general 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 115 

war dominated England's policy and made it subservient 
to the aims of her Allies in the defensive combination, at 
the same time every effort was made to reach a complete 
settlement with Germany. Even an alliance had been 
suggested by Chamberlain during the Boer War and, 
thereafter, a number of attempts were made to lessen 
the naval rivalry. After the grave Morocco crisis of 
191 1, these efforts were even more energetically renewed. 
As the Belgian representative in London at that time 
wrote : " Ce qui est certain est que le but que Ton a en 
vue est pacifique. On voudrait a tout prix diminuer la 
tension existante entre les deux pays." 46 The crux of 
the difficulty was Germany's determination to build a 
powerful navy and England's equally firm resolution to 
retain her relative position among maritime powers. In 
view of German obduracy, no agreement for the limita- 
tion of naval armaments could be reached and the insen- 
sate rivalry continued with virtually no change in the 
comparative naval strength of the two competitors. 47 
But at the same time, other negotiations were begun with 
the object of satisfying Germany's insistent demand for 
economic and territorial expansion. Thus Professor Hans 
Delbrueck wrote in 191 2: "It cannot be doubted that 
since the fear of almost certain war during last summer, 
England is honestly ready to accord us a large and good 
place in the sun." 48 The negotiations were continued in 
this spirit and had been carried to a successful conclusion 
before the outbreak of the war. At that time, there was 
no issue between Germany and Great Britain except, as 



n6 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

has been pregnantly said, the issue of the geographical 
position of the British Isles and the existence of the 
British Empire. This is by far the most instructive 
chapter in the diplomatic history of the ante-bellum years, 
but its significance has been obscured by the fact that full 
details are not as yet available. Sufficient is, however, 
known to outline its main features. 49 

This far-reaching settlement referred to two widely- 
separated regions, Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa, 
where German colonial ambitions conflicted with vital 
interests of the British Empire. In Turkey, the dis- 
agreement arose in the main from the fact that the con- 
struction of an extensive system of railroads under 
German control would place a great military power on 
the flank of both routes to India and Australasia, the 
shorter one by Suez and the longer one by the Cape. 
During the prolonged negotiations over the Bagdad Rail- 
way, England's chief aim had been to render it impossi- 
ble for Germany to establish a formidable naval base on 
the Persian Gulf and to make these waters, which Eng- 
land had effectively and from a world viewpoint satisfac- 
torily policed and controlled for over a century, a scene 
of tense international rivalry. 50 Hence, for years, the 
exclusively German control of the projected extension of 
the largely unbuilt Bagdad Railroad to the vicinity of the 
Persian Gulf had been opposed. On June 29, 19 14, the 
day after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdi- 
nand at Serajevo, Sir Edward Grey gave the House of 
Commons the main outlines of the settlement of this com- 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 117 

plex matter. 51 He announced that various agreements 
with Turkey and with Germany had been or were being 
concluded and that their final signature and publication 
was delayed by one point only, namely, the completion 
of the necessary separate negotiations between Turkey 
and Germany. 52 The essential features were that Ger- 
many was to continue the Bagdad Railway to Basra, a 
deep-water port on the Shatt-al-Arab, some sixty miles 
from the head of the Persian Gulf proper, and that the 
railroad was not to be extended beyond that point except 
by some future agreement. Equal rates were guaranteed 
and, in order to see that there was no discrimination, " so 
far as the conditions of commerce of all nations are con- 
cerned," two British directors were to be admitted to the 
German operating board. In return, Turkey recognized 
the status quo in the Persian Gulf, which was equivalent 
to the admission of Great Britain's long-established pre- 
dominance there. 53 While apparently safeguarding the 
economic and strategic interests of the British Empire, 
this entire agreement gave Germany practically a free- 
hand in the economic exploitation of the potentially im- 
portant region between the Tigris and Euphrates. If 
Germany's intentions were limited to making Mesopo- 
tamia and Irak again the garden-spots that they had been 
in antiquity, she could have no complaint against the set- 
tlement. At all events, the chief champion of the Bag- 
dadbahn greeted the adjustment with very marked satis- 
faction. 54 

Concurrently also, an agreement in reference to Africa 



n8 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

was concluded. Here the ambitions of the two nations 
were apparently irreconcilable. The British plan, frus- 
trated in 1894 by the opposition of France and Germany 
but still deeply cherished by not a few, was to link up 
Rhodesia and South Africa with the Soudan and Egypt 
by a railroad passing entirely through British territory. 
Germany's conflicting aim was to join her separated pos- 
sessions on the eastern and western coasts into one com- 
pact mass dominating the centre of Africa from the At- 
lantic to the Pacific. The realization of either scheme 
not only implied the abandonment of the other, but was 
dependent upon some territorial re-arrangements in the 
Belgian Congo, while the German plan furthermore im- 
plied a complete change in the status of Portuguese An- 
gola, north of German Southwest Africa. 

The spirit in which England conducted these negotia- 
tions was clearly fore-shadowed in Sir Edward Grey's 
speech of November 2.7, 191 1, after the Agadir crisis 
had been surmounted by a tenuous margin. He then 
said: 

" If there are to be big territorial changes in Africa, brought 
about, of course, by the good will of and negotiation with other 
Powers, then we are not an ambitious competing party; and 
being not an ambitious competing party ourselves, if Ger- 
many has friendly arrangements to negotiate with other foreign 
countries with regard to Africa, we are not anxious to stand 
in her way any more than in theirs." 

In 1912, when the negotiations about this African im- 
passe were initiated, Hans Delbrueck stated that a re- 
arrangement of the African map such as would make 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 119 

forever impossible Cecil Rhodes's scheme of a Cape to 
Cairo railroad " would be the strongest proof imaginable 
that England recognized us as having equal colonial 
rights with herself." It is not quite clear that the Lib- 
eral Government, in its efforts to avert war, went to this 
extreme length, but it is unquestionable that important 
concessions were made. To what extent British terri- 
torial concessions were involved and what success, if any, 
Germany had in negotiating with Portugal and Belgium 
about their respective African possessions, has not as yet 
been divulged by the interested chancelleries. 55 But Paul 
Rohrbach, one of Germany's most ardent advocates of 
extensive African expansion, who evidently had access 
to official information, declared that in Africa English 
policy had shown itself to a surprising degree accommo- 
dating. 56 

From this brief summary of British policy during the 
past decade, it is apparent that some important British 
interests were impaired and some political principles were 
jettisoned in the hope of averting the world war that was 
England's nightmare. The chronicle is one of almost 
constant renunciation. The course was the reverse of 
aggressive; nor was it provocative, except to the nega- 
tive extent that avowed pacific tendencies constitute a 
goad to those who regard juxtaposed states as neces- 
sarily and ever in the dynamic relation of hammer and 
anvil. The entire policy was unquestionably what Pro- 
fessor Keutgen of Hamburg dubbed it : " Eine Politik 
der Schwaeche." It certainly is a far cry back to 1849, 



120 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

when Palmerston instructed the British representative at 
Vienna to express to the Austrian Prime Minister " openly 
and decidedly " England's indignant disgust at the 
rigours adopted in suppressing the rebellions in Italy and 
Hungary. Its very weakness, verging on pacificism, 
convinced Germany that England was a negligible factor 
and in this way it stimulated the German " will to war " 
and conduced to bring about the catastrophe whose funda- 
mental purpose it was to avert. On the other hand, Sir 
Edward Grey's policy of a defensive coalition was based 
upon a fuller realization of the imminence and gravity 
of the German peril than obtained in most well informed 
quarters in England. Despite the bitterest criticism — 
whose foundation has since been completely destroyed 
by Germany's conduct during the fateful fortnight of 
1914 — he persisted in his course and succeeded in keep- 
ing intact a diplomatic group of such strength as will, in 
all likelihood, thwart the German plan of world domina- 
tion. 

During the course of these vicissitudes of the past 
decade, not a few things were done which were repugnant 
to the American conscience and which affronted Ameri- 
can idealism. Whether or no this conscience was always 
accurately informed and this idealism always free from 
mischievous sentimentalism is not at present a pertinent 
question. The essential point is that the American Gov- 
ernment, pursuing its traditional course, was silent ex- 
cept when China was concerned; and that the vehement 
complaints of a few individual Americans totally ignored 



THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 121 

the possibility of their country's having some duty in 
these matters. In the complacency of their negative 
rectitude, Americans did not contemplate the undeniable 
fact that those who might have prevented the deeds that 
seemed to be objectionable, in the Balkans, China, Per- 
sia, and elsewhere, were well-nigh helpless so long as the 
United States adhered to its policy of self-regarding iso- 
lation. In addition, definite American interests were 
prejudiced. The policy of the open door in China could 
not be maintained by England alone without breaking 
up the European defensive combination against Ger- 
many and the knowledge that the United States would 
under no circumstances use more than moral suasion ren- 
dered American advocacy of it wholly ineffective. A 
reconstruction of what the past might have been, had the 
United States been willing to assume obligations for the 
welfare of the world, is not a futile pastime, but is a val- 
uable object lesson for the future. 



V 
AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 



" Questo misero modo 
tengon l'anime triste di coloro, 
che visser senza infamia e senza lodo. 
mischiate sono a quel cattivo coro 
degli angeli che non furon ribelli, 
ne fur fedeli a Dio, ma per se foro." 

— Dante, Inferno, Canto iii. 

"My friends, so sure am I that liberty and security in this 
land of ours depends upon the destruction and abandonment of 
the hated principle of national aggrandizement and immorality, 
and the enthronement of the principles of national responsibility 
and morality, that for all the countless generations to come after 
us in our dear land, I am grateful with all my heart to those 
men who are fighting in the trenches in France and Belgium 
and Russia and Italy and the Balkans to-day for the liberty and 
peace of my children's children." 

— Elihu Root, January 25, 1917. 

"Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace 
of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples." 

— Woodrow Wilson, April 2, 1917. 



CHAPTER V 

America's Reaction to the War 

The Issue — Its Relation to the United States — American 
Public Opinion — Neutrality and Pacificism — Preparedness 
and Pan-Americanism — The Administration's Policy — The 
League to Enforce Peace — President Wilson's Endorsement of 
this Programme — Its Possibilities and Limitations — Amer- 
ica's Entrance into the War — An Inclusive League or one of 
Democracies — The Entente Group — An Alliance of the Eng- 
lish-Speaking Peoples. 

To-day the world is in the throes of an agonizing war 
in which certainly the immediate, if not the ultimate, fate 
of western civilization is at stake. In the background is 
the imperilled future of all English-speaking peoples. In 
the middle field lies the fate of the Balkan countries as 
well as those of Turkey and of the projected Mittel- 
europa. Prominent in the very immediate foreground 
stands the issue of German domination over Europe. 
Upon the decision of this last issue inevitably depends 
the outcome of the two others, for all three are insep- 
arably interrelated. In the days of Louis XIV and of 
Napoleon, the fundamental issue was whether or no Eu- 
rope, primarily, was to be saved from the domination 
of one supreme military power. But the present strug- 
gle involves not only the freedom of Europe, but in addi- 

125 



126 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

tion that of the whole world as well, for the attempted 
hegemony of Europe was to serve as the basis for Ger- 
man mastery of the other continents. German ambitions 
avowedly looked to an extra-European goal. Further- 
more, as a result of the subjection of this greater issue 
to the arbitrament of arms, all the vexatious and stub- 
born European problems, arising from artificial boundary 
lines based upon political, economic, and military con- 
siderations and resulting in suppressed and exploited na- 
tionalities, are in the crucible. However vitally impor- 
tant be some of these questions, they are completely over- 
shadowed by the attempt of Germany to dominate Eu- 
rope and to impose her will by military force, regardless 
of fundamental treaties and of established interstate cus- 
tom and morality. Her success would mean in the fu- 
ture no freedom of action for any of the western con- 
tinental powers. France, Italy, Spain, together with 
Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian 
countries, would be forced into the Prussian-German 
orbit and their policies would be completely dominated 
by Berlin as the capital of Central Europe. The free- 
dom so vociferously and violently demanded by Ger- 
many for herself is tantamount to slavery for the rest of 
Europe. 

This ascendency once established, it would be easy 
for Germany, by means of the added economic re- 
sources, to create a navy of such strength as to be able 
successfully to challenge the British Commonwealth or 
the Monroe Doctrine if the English-speaking peoples 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 127 

should not be re-united, and possibly even if they should 
join forces to resist their declared enemy. Hence the 
continued insistence of the Entente Allies that they will 
not make peace until the menace of German domination 
has been removed. When he was Britain's official spokes- 
man, Mr. Asquith clearly defined the supreme end in 
view in the following carefully measured words: 

" We intend to establish the principle that international prob- 
lems must be handled by free peoples, and that this settlement 
shall no longer be hampered and swayed by the overmastering 
dictation of a Government controlled by a military caste. That 
is what I mean by the destruction of the military domination of 
Prussia: nothing more, but nothing less." 

The aim of the Allies is to secure an unbound and a 
free Europe, to which Germany shall no longer have 
either the will or the power to dictate by intermittent 
threats of war. Both Germans and Englishmen are in 
essential agreement as to the only means of accomplish- 
ing this destruction of Prussian-German militarism. In 
the course of a most lucid analysis of this militaristic 
system, Professor Hans Delbrueck said that the decisive 
question in determining the inner character of a state 
always is : " Whom does the army obey ? " In demo- 
cratic countries like England or France, it is of course 
a minister responsible to the legislature, but such an ar- 
rangement, he shows, would be inconceivable in Ger- 
many. There the old personal connection between the 
primitive Teutonic chieftain and his following of faith- 
ful warriors perdures in the similar personal relation of 
army and War Lord. According to Delbrueck, this per- 



128 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

sonal bond is the greatest force in the Prussian-German 
State; it is the rock- foundation of the German polity 
and could be destroyed only by the most terrible of mili- 
tary defeats — " durch die allerfurchtbarste der Nieder- 
lagen." * Mr. Balfour clearly recognized this fact when 
he stated that one of the three essential conditions of a 
durable peace is that " the aggressive aims and the un- 
scrupulous methods of the German Powers should fall 
into disrepute among their own peoples." 2 The same 
truth is likewise lucidly expressed by Bismarck's biog- 
rapher, Mr. J. W. Headlam. Peace will come, he writes, 
when " Germany has learnt the lesson of the war . . . 
that the voice of Europe cannot be defied with im- 
punity." In the following vigorous sentences this un- 
derlying idea is further amplified by him. 

" Germany asks for security ; she shall have it — precisely the 
same security that France and Russia and Italy and Holland 
enjoy; a security based partly on her own strength, but even 
more on the recognition of the laws and principles of Europe. 
Germany asks for guarantees, she shall have them — precisely 
the same guarantees with which every other State has to be 
content; the guarantee that the tyrannical overgrowth of any 
one State or confederation of States will arouse in the rest 
of Europe a coalition before which every nation, even the 
strongest, must bow. These laws of European life have been 
learnt in the course of centuries by all nations and accepted, 
and they have always been learnt in the same way, in the bitter 
school of experience and war. Germany is now learning the 
lesson, and the war will continue until the lesson has been com- 
pleted; then it will stop. It will stop when it has been burnt 
into the heart of the whole nation so that it will never be for- 
gotten. Men talk of the terms of peace. They matter little. 
With a Germany victorious no terms would secure the future 
of Europe; with a Germany defeated no artificial securities will 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 129 

be wanted, for there will be a stronger security in the conscious- 
ness of defeat." 3 

It is, however, open to the most serious question, 
whether the oft-drawn distinction between the German 
people and their government is really sound. The German 
people have for generations been so impregnated with 
the creed of Teutonic racial superiority, they are in large 
part so thoroughly permeated with the over-weening 
ambitions of an aggressive Kulturpolitik and Weltpolitik 
based upon the doctrines of ascendency, and they have so 
widely accepted a materialistic code that rejects all moral 
considerations in interstate relations, that even the over- 
throw of an autocracy supported by the army and a sub- 
servient bureaucracy would by no means guarantee the 
liberties of the world and make it safe for the peace- 
loving democracies. The systematic educational drill of 
two generations cannot be nullified and discredited in a 
day. But the overthrow of militarism and the estab- 
lishment of democracy would at least allow the entrance 
of the light. 

In comparison with the menace of Prussian-German 
ascendency over the world, the future of Constantinople, 
of Alsace-Lorraine, of Bohemia, of Jugo-Slavia, and of 
Poland are relatively of subsidiary importance. What 
matters in first line is that one state shall not have either 
the purpose or the means to impose its sway upon Eu- 
rope. Thus the immediate issue at stake is the freedom 
of Europe and directly involved in it are the ultimate 
liberties of the world and the fate of all English-speaking 



130 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

peoples. In addition, the future of democracy hinges 
upon the outcome. This was true from the very outset, 
but the war has become quite patently one of democracy 
against autocracy since the Russian Revolution and the 
entrance of the United States into the crusade for pub- 
lic right and liberty in alignment with the Entente. In 
a world so unorganized politically that its peace is at the 
mercy of one Power and its satellites, the crucial test of 
any form of social organization cannot be the more or 
less satisfactory character of its internal political life, 
but must perforce be its ability to defend itself and to 
survive in a struggle imposed by others. The world's 
democracy is being subjected to this crucial test. While, 
on the one hand, upon the utter discrediting of German 
militarism largely depends the growth of German liberal- 
ism, on the other hand, the maintenance of free institu- 
tions in Western Europe and even throughout the entire 
world is contingent upon an Allied victory. Such victory, 
however, does not at all imply the disintegration or crush- 
ing of Germany, which never were the avowed or im- 
plied aims of Britain's official spokesmen. Were de- 
mocracy to fail in this grave crisis, were its efforts un- 
availing to secure for itself an unmolested future in 
Europe, then indeed would its fate there be sealed and 
its fortunes in America, Africa, and Australia would be 
dangerously imperilled. Upon the defeat of Germany 
depends the future of liberalism throughout the entire 
world. The welfare of the United States is only some- 
what less directly contingent upon the frustration of Ger- 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 131 

man ambitions than is that of the British Commonwealth. 
It is naturally in the extreme difficult to gauge ac- 
curately the opinion of a country of such vast dimensions 
and of such striking economic and social differences as 
are those of the United States; and this difficulty is ag- 
gravated by the fact that its civilization is in large sections 
still fluid in character. Nor is it possible to define in 
static terms and in brief compass a body of dynamic 
thought and feeling that is constantly fluctuating from 
month to month. 4 That there should be unanimity of 
thought in a democracy of free speech and unfettered 
opinions is of course out of the question, but the first 
thirty months of the war before American participation 
in it disclosed certain marked cleavages that denoted 
most imperfect integration. It was inevitable that the 
foreign-born population should in large measure have 
been polarized by its former connections with the bellig- 
erents. Although the immigrant may be wholly loyal to 
the United States, he cannot as a general rule be com- 
pletely Americanized and must inevitably retain some 
affiliations with his native land. In the second genera- 
tion, however, and even more so in the third, the process 
of Americanization has been nearly complete. The main 
failures of the melting-pot have occurred sporadically, 
where quickly acquired wealth or prominence united with 
education enabled the immigrants of such inclinations 
to maintain their imported culture in the home circle 
and thus to transmit it in a modified form to their chil- 
dren. On the whole, such instances are rare, and hy- 



i 3 2 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

phenism is a less serious problem 5 than is the marked 
abyss that exists between the comparatively few who, 
enfranchised from the thraldom of catchwords, think in- 
dependently and the great general public that is in servi- 
tude to head-lines and to traditional formulae. With the 
latter, in a democracy based upon theoretical equality all 
along the line and with universal suffrage as a potent 
factor, are inevitably aligned the bulk of the politicians. 
In addition to this striking divergence between the opin- 
ion of the intelligentsia and the views of the great mass 
of Americans, there was revealed a new sectionalism of 
considerable gravity. The Northern Atlantic sea-board, 
the South, the Middle West, and the Pacific Coast, each 
developed a distinct public opinion on the questions aris- 
ing out of the European War. In general also, there was 
manifest a marked flaccidity of national temper that 
would have astounded the robust generation bred in the 
rigours of the Civil War which, until very recently, con- 
trolled the destinies of the United States. 6 

But the mere aggregate of the diverging views of 
different individuals, groups, classes, and sections does 
not constitute the opinion of the body politic. This ef- 
fective opinion can usually be summarized in definite 
terms. On the outbreak of the European War, a wave 
of mingled horror and despair ran from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific and these feelings were subsequently intensi- 
fied by the systematically barbarous and ruthless charac- 
ter of the war waged by Germany on land and sea. The 
fate meted out to Belgium made an indelible impression 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 133 

and was a powerful factor in creating the strong anti- 
German sentiment that with many variations and vicissi- 
tudes consistently pervaded the United States during the 
thirty months of the war, prior to the severance of diplo- 
matic relations with Germany on February 3, 191 7. The 
sympathy for the Allies was more a reflex of this feeling 
than a positive sentiment for a cause which, in general, 
was imperfectly understood by a people largely ignorant 
of affairs beyond the confines of America. Although 
the American people always had some vague perception 
that the most far-reaching issues were at stake, they had 
for a long time only the faintest realization of the extent 
to which their own future welfare was dependent upon 
the defeat of German ambitions. As a consequence, 
Americans did not quickly perceive that their own inter- 
ests not only warranted but even demanded participation 
in the struggle against Germany. Naturally, with the 
still undeveloped sense of responsibility for the welfare 
of the rest of the world, the cause of public right and 
international morality in itself made no compelling ap- 
peal. Hence, quite apart from any tendencies towards 
pacificism, the United States was for over two years 
preponderantly averse from being drawn into the war. 
In fact, as the conflict developed, its ruthless intensity 
greatly strengthened the normally pacific temper of the 
people and made overwhelming the popular demand for 
a strict adherence to neutrality, unless Germany should 
render such a course absolutely impossible. 

In the eyes of not a few Americans, there seemed to 



i 3 4 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

be something dignified in this neutrality, as if the United 
States had been placed in the position of a judge ap- 
praising the actions of the warring, and hence, as they 
thought, necessarily erring nations. Others prided them- 
selves on some moral quality that, they assumed, was in- 
herent in an attitude of neutrality. A distinct echo of 
such sentiments is to be found in the remark made by 
Mr. N. B. Baker, the Secretary of War, during the spring 
of 1916, that the United States was "now in the dom- 
inant moral position in the world." 7 

To the Entente Allies, who were sacrificing their best 
blood and their accumulated treasure to safeguard the 
ideals to which the United States has always expressed 
fullest allegiance, such claims were totally incomprehen- 
sible and in the extreme irritating. 8 They denoted com- 
pletely divergent points of view and led to estrangement. 
In fact, a little sober reflection would have demonstrated 
that there was no warrant whatsoever for self -righteous- 
ness on the score of neutrality. Neutrality is essentially 
passive in nature and is merely a right or privilege sanc- 
tioned by interstate usage. In no sense, however, is it 
a moral duty. It may even be the very reverse. As 
Mazzini truly said, " neutrality in a war of principles is 
mere passive existence, forgetfulness of all that makes 
a people sacred, the negation of the common law of na- 
tions, political atheism." According to him, the injunc- 
tion to remain passive spectators between good and evil 
was " the word of Cain." 9 In the absence of the effec- 
tive general leadership that American democracy has for 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 135 

some time sorely needed, the issue was, however, not 
quite so clear-cut in the mind of the American people. 
Yet, it is patent that a great Power which, in a crisis that 
is determining the destiny of the world, and hence also 
its own future, deliberately remains passive and refrains 
from actively aiding what, even only in a general way, it 
considers to be the cause of justice and civilization is by 
this inaction placed upon the moral defensive. Its neu- 
trality, instead of being as was generally assumed a priori 
meritorious, requires vindication if it is to escape con- 
demnation. Whether this justification will commend it- 
self to the judgment of the future is another matter. 
Naturally, the comparatively few Americans who saw the 
issue clearly fretted under the restraints of neutrality, 
but in addition the disharmony between creed and deed 
created the wide moral unrest that attends an uneasy 
conscience. 10 Mere vehement, even though sincere, as- 
severations of ideals without the slightest willingness or 
intention to assume any risks or responsibilities is futile 
and demoralizing. It rots the moral fibre of the asser- 
tor, especially when what is lacking is merely the will, 
not the power, to give them effect. 

The overwhelming desire of the American people to 
remain aloof from the war was, however, accompanied 
by a deeper insight into the dynamics of interstate re- 
lations. Hitherto a world war had seemed to the aver- 
age American to be an utter impossibility, something 
with which he was not likely to come into closer contact 
than that vicariously afforded in reading of a barbaric 



136 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

past. The ensuing rude awakening directed the atten- 
tion of America to problems that had formerly seemed 
almost academically remote. It was then generally real- 
ized that a considerable increase in military and naval 
armaments was necessary. At the same time also, all 
plans for securing the future peace of the world received 
an attentive hearing. In fact, the progressive horrors 
of the war in Belgium, Serbia, Poland, and Armenia led 
to a notable growth of pacificism. Simultaneously also, 
American foreign policy was subjected to a critical exam- 
ination. In some, the European agony produced such a 
revulsion that they sought salvation in a Pan-Americanism 
that seemed to them to promise renewed and reinforced 
isolation in the western hemisphere. They were ready 
to relinquish the Philippines, to abandon China to what- 
ever fate the ambitions of others might allot to her and, 
under the spell of a somewhat fetichistic republicanism, 
they desired " to complete and round out the immunity 
from entangling foreign alliances proposed by Washing 
ton and Monroe, by asking our European friends to lib- 
erate all territory in any of the Americas now held by 
them." n Canada, of course, was excepted. Such men 
wished to carry to its logical conclusion Secretary Olney's 
dictum that any permanent political union between a Eu- 
ropean and an American state is " unnatural and inex- 
pedient," and to make real the Pan-American unity that 
John Quincy Adams and Clay had planned and which 
Blaine had energetically fostered. 

But the solidarity upon which this unity is premised 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 137 

is largely fictitious in its spiritual, cultural, political, eco- 
nomic, and even in its geographical elements. The cul- 
tural and economic ties between Europe and America are 
far stronger than are those binding together the Amer- 
icas. 12 English-speaking America and Latin America 
are not mere geographical terms, but express vital his- 
torical and social facts. To ignore this is to court dis- 
aster. Hence while many favoured Pan-Americanism, 
partly because it promised distinct commercial advantages 
and partly also because it is a step in the direction of in- 
terstate co-operation, others again saw in it the assump- 
tion of additional responsibilities without in any way 
adding to the security of the United States. Moreover, 
they deemed it dangerous to the extent that it tended to 
ignore the essential and real interdependence of Europe 
and America. This interdependence had been conspicu- 
ously emphasized by the war. As a consequence, ever 
growing numbers of Americans had rejected the gospel 
of renewed isolation, and had reached the conclusion that 
the policy of aloofness from Europe was obsolete and 
that the United States must in the future assume its share 
of the burden of upholding the public right of the world. 
The policy of the Administration followed the course 
of public opinion closely. The neutrality maintained by 
President Wilson was not only an expression of the pop- 
ular will, but was also a direct continuation of America's 
traditional policy of detachment from European affairs. 
For two and a half years the efforts of the Administra- 
tion were largely devoted to unsuccessful attempts to 



138 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

assert America's rights as a neutral against practices 
that the belligerents claimed were founded upon well- 
established principles of international law, though not 
in accord with all the niceties of previous custom, as well 
as against those rights and pretensions that were exer- 
cised merely in virtue of the recognized principle of re- 
prisal and, at times, in defiance of all humanitarian prin- 
ciples. 13 In addition, after more than a year for 
consideration, measures were adopted to increase ma- 
terially both the army and navy. At the same time also, 
closer relations with the other twenty republics of the 
western hemisphere were assiduously cultivated. But as 
time went on, President Wilson perceived that Europe 
and America had become so interdependent that the des- 
tiny of one could not be separated from that of the other. 
He recognized that the American doctrine of rigid neu- 
trality, to which he had consistently adhered as far as the 
circumstances would permit, was becoming untenable in 
a closely interrelated world and would grow increasingly 
impracticable in the future. Hence, he advocated with 
increasing insistence the future formation of a world- 
wide union of states such as was being actively promoted 
by an unofficial organization known as the League to En- 
force Peace. 14 

The object of this purely private association was to 
advocate the creation of a league of nations, of which the 
United States was naturally to be one, whose members 
should bind themselves to four proposals. Of these, the 
first is that all justiciable questions arising between the 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 139 

signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall be 
submitted to an international judicial tribunal for hear- 
ing and judgment. The second provides that all other 
questions arising between the signatories and likewise not 
settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a council of 
conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommen- 
dation. By the third provision, the signatories agree 
that they will jointly use both their economic and mili- 
tary forces against any member of the league that com- 
mits acts of hostility against any one of the signatories 
before the question at issue shall have been submitted to 
the judicial tribunal or to the council of conciliation, 
according to the stipulations of the first two proposals. 
Finally, provision is made for holding periodic confer- 
ences of the signatory powers for the purpose of formu- 
lating and codifying international law; and, unless some 
member shall dissent within a stated time, the law so 
defined shall govern in the decisions of the international 
judicial tribunal. Apart from this last provision, all that 
is stipulated is the creation of an international council 
of conciliation and an international court, to either one 
of which, as the case may be, a member of the league 
must before having recourse to war submit his dispute 
with another member, on pain of having the economic 
and military forces of all the members used against him. 
Only incidentally and indirectly is it the aim of this 
projected league to establish justice and right; its pri- 
mary purpose is merely the maintenance of peace. Even 
in that respect it is only a minimum programme, for no 



140 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

obligation to accept the judgments of the tribunal or the 
recommendations of the council is incurred. The sub- 
mission of the case to these international agencies and 
the abstention from hostilities during its hearing, absolve 
any member from the league's economic and military 
penalties and leave him in the end free to carry out his 
purposes by means of arms. " We are willing to con- 
cede," said Mr. Taft, " that there may be governmental 
and international injustice which cannot be practically 
remedied except by force." The legitimate presumption, 
however, is that in nearly all instances these judgments 
and recommendations will be accepted. It is also rea- 
sonably assumed that delay, accompanied by a full knowl- 
edge of the facts, will, as a rule, prevent nations from 
being stampeded into Armageddon. 

On its face the project would appear to be one of com- 
pulsory arbitration, with no expressed or even directly 
implied obligation to abide by the recommendation or 
decree. It is, however, considerably less than that. 
The members of the league do not specifically agree to 
submit their unsettled disputes to arbitration, but only 
not to go to war before doing so. The economic and 
military forces of the league are to be used against such 
members only as threaten or commit hostilities against 
a fellow member without submitting their case, but not 
against those who refuse to go before the tribunal or 
council to answer a complaint against them. This is a 
vital distinction. Thus one of the most active exponents 
of this movement has stated : 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 141 

" Under the League a dispute may go on indefinitely without 
any attempt to bring the disputants into Court. ... A people 
may be practising a gross injustice toward another people, may 
refuse the demand of the latter for a hearing, and the dispute 
may even flame up into war without the League having the 
right to interfere. For there is only one act which the League 
punishes, namely, the making of war against a fellow signatory 
without a previous hearing of the dispute or an honest attempt 
to secure one." 15 

Before the effectiveness of this programme can be 
judged, one other point requires elucidation. Much, 
obviously, depends upon the membership of the proposed 
league. As yet no official decision has been reached, 
but the general opinion is clear. It is naturally realized 
that the essential prerequisite is to secure the adhesion 
of as many of the Great Powers as is possible, preferably 
of all. There is also one very considerable advantage 
in restricting the membership to these states. Such 
limitation would obviate the grave difficulties arising 
from the legal doctrine of the equality of all sovereign 
states, which wrecked " The Judicial Arbitration Court" 
planned by the Second Hague Conference. But such 
limitation would violate some fundamental liberal princi- 
ples. Hence, the general intention is to admit all the 
Great Powers and also those minor states that have a 
long tradition of progress and order, as well as consid- 
erable resources in numbers and wealth. This canon 
would make eligible Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Spain, 
Holland, and the Scandinavian countries, but would ex- 
clude such states as Venezuela, Colombia, Serbia, Greece, 



142 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

and Persia, not to mention such pigmies of the inter- 
national family as San Marino and Lichtenstein. 

The effectiveness of such a league can be estimated 
only by submitting its machinery to the concrete tests of 
a known past and of a hypothetical future. In the case 
of continuing injury inflicted by one member upon 
another, apparently very little could be accomplished. 
It would be distinctly in the interests of the party com- 
mitting the injury to refuse a hearing and to remain 
quiescent. Unless the obligation to answer a complaint 
were explicit and unless refusal to do so would bring to 
the support of the complainant the economic and military 
forces of the league, the question would still remain, as 
it now is, a problem of power tempered in varying 
degrees by moral considerations. In such cases, justice 
would be on the side of the apparent aggressor who 
sought his remedy by arms. If Turkey had been a 
member of such a league during the nineteenth century, 
the continued maltreatment of her Christian subjects in 
the Balkans and in Armenia could not without her con- 
sent have come before the league's tribunals, no matter 
how insistent Russia and the other Powers had been. 
Likewise, if such a league had been in existence without 
Turkey having had membership in it, no relief could have 
been afforded by the league's agencies. In all prob- 
ability, however, in this instance the league would have 
proceeded ultra vires and would have acted in much the 
same manner as did the Concert of Europe towards 
Balkan questions. 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 143 

On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that such a 
league could have composed the dispute between the 
United States and Spain about the intolerable condi- 
tions in Cuba, provided both parties had been willing to 
submit the case to the council of conciliation. The out- 
come for all concerned would presumably then not have 
been just what it now is. But if Spain had refused a 
reference of the dispute, then the course of events would 
have been much the same as it was. On the other hand, 
if the United States, not Spain, had been the unwilling 
party and had insisted upon attacking the Spanish forces 
in Cuba, then the league's members would have been 
obligated to join their economic and military forces to 
those of Spain in repelling this attack. 

Leaving this tentatively reconstructed past, it will be 
found instructive to test the league's programme by the 
course of events leading up to the existing war. As 
Serbia presumably would not have been a member of the 
hypothetical league, Austria-Hungary's attack upon her 
would not have concerned this organization until Russia 
had intervened with a complaint to the council of con- 
ciliation. If Austria-Hungary had agreed to allow the 
case to go before the council, this in itself would have 
provided no remedy unless the league had the power, as 
it is proposed it shall have, to enjoin the military proceed- 
ings against Serbia. 16 Otherwise, in trying to prevent 
the military coercion of Serbia by attacking Austria-Hun- 
gary, Russia would have become subject to the league's 
full penalties. But judging by what actually did happen, 



144 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

there is little reason to assume that Austria-Hungary 
would have agreed to a hearing and investigation. In 
that case, the course of events would probably have 
duplicated the actual one, except for one possible con- 
tingency. This arises from the relation of existing 
treaties of alliance to the proposed league. It is scarcely 
conceivable that these alliances will be abandoned until in 
the fulness of time the projected league shall have demon- 
strated its effective vitality. Admitting, solely however 
for the purposes of the argument, that the alliance with 
Germany had been abrogated as a condition of Austria- 
Hungary's admission to the league, in that most unlikely 
event, fear of Russia's teeming millions might have given 
Austria-Hungary pause. As now, it then still would 
have been largely a Machtfrage, a question of relative 
power. The league would in that event, of course, have 
had no right to interfere; for Russia, after having 
offered to submit her case and been denied a hearing, 
would have been at full liberty to attack Austria-Hun- 
gary. But, even if the treaty of alliance had been in 
full vigour, the existence of such a league might have 
considerably altered the course of events. For if Ger- 
many had proceeded exactly as she did, the whole forces 
of the league would probably have been called into action 
against her. On the other hand, this result might have 
been avoided by an adaptation of Germany's military 
strategy to this probability. One thing alone is certain, 
that the situation arising from the conflicting obligations 
to league and to alliances would have been a most intri- 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 145 

cate and puzzling one, not for Germany alone, but for all 
the Powers. 17 Presumably, though by no means as- 
suredly, its outcome would have been an embattled world, 
had " the will to war " dominated Germany and Austria- 
Hungary. 

If, however, we look behind the occasions of the 
present war to its causes, if we leave the incidents of 
a fortnight and concentrate our attention upon the inter- 
national travail of an entire generation, then it would 
appear that the result might possibly have been an alto- 
gether different one. Everything would have depended 
upon the vitality of the league and the assurance that 
every member would have fully abided by his pledge to 
oppose aggression by force. Assuming such circum- 
stances, if a united world in arms had unquestionably to 
be encountered, the aggressive aims of Austria-Hungary 
in the Balkans and the world-wide ambitions of Germany 
would probably never have emerged from their academic 
phases into Realpolitik. The superstate organization 
would probably have hastened the development of an in- 
ternational mind. 

Turning to the unpredictable future, it will be advisable 
to apply the machinery to possible contingencies that 
affect most closely the policies of the United States. 
These concern primarily the Monroe Doctrine and the 
open door in the Far East. Let it be assumed that for 
some more or less valid reason Germany were to pro- 
ceed against Venezuela, Colombia, or any one of the 
backward Latin-American States that had not been 



146 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

admitted to the league. Presumably the United States 
would protest. In that event, an appeal would be made 
to the council of conciliation and an injunction against 
Germany's proceedings would be demanded. It is true 
that this would involve submitting the Monroe Doctrine 
to arbitration; but the United States had already vir- 
tually agreed to this, though it is not generally realized, 
when the Bryan Treaties of 1913 and 19 14, providing 
for the submission of all disputes to an international com- 
mission of enquiry, were concluded. If Germany, how- 
ever, should refuse to submit the case, then no injunc- 
tion could be issued and the United States, as under exist- 
ing arrangements, would have to appeal to the arbitra- 
ment of arms. Even were Germany to consent to a 
submission of the case, the United States would still be 
at liberty to enforce its views, in the event of dissatis- 
faction with the recommendations of the international 
tribunal. Thus it is not apparent that the league pro- 
gramme would weaken the fundamental purpose of the 
Monroe Doctrine, which is to prevent European Powers 
from interfering with the free development of Latin 
America. On the other hand, if Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile were to join the league, it is quite probable that 
Europe might be obligated to interfere in some purely 
American question. In itself, this probably would bode 
no evil. But while the essential purpose of the Monroe 
Doctrine would presumably not be impaired, it is diffi- 
cult to see how it would to any extent be strengthened 
by the establishment of the league. The maintenance of 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 147 

its fundamental purposes would in final analysis have to 
rest upon the same forces as it now does. 

Similarly doubtful would appear to be the efficacy of 
the proposed machinery in securing the principle of equal 
commercial opportunities for all foreign nations in 
China and in maintaining that country's territorial in- 
tegrity and political independence. Much would depend 
upon China's membership in the league. As a member, 
China could appeal to the league against aggressive con- 
duct on the part of her neighbours. But if these refused 
to agree to a hearing, China might not be able to enlist 
the support of the league, as it would not be easy to 
establish the overt act of war in the slow process of 
penetration that has characterized the advance of Russia 
and Japan in Mongolia and Manchuria. On the surface, 
China might even be made to appear as the aggressor. 
On the other hand, if China were not admitted to mem- 
bership, the league could not take cognizance of any com- 
plaints by a member against encroachments upon China, 
unless the offending states should consent to such action. 

Following some previous public expressions manifest- 
ing general approval of the principles for which the 
League to Enforce Peace stands, 18 President Wilson, on 
May 2.J, 1 916, stated that the United States believed in 
the following fundamental propositions : first, that every 
people have a right to choose the sovereignty under which 
they shall live ; second, that the small states have the same 
right to their sovereignty and territorial integrity as the 
great nations ; and third, " that the world has a right to 



148 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its 
origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peo- 
ples and nations." Continuing, he expressed the firm 
conviction that the American people were willing to be- 
come partners " in any feasible association of nations 
formed in order to realize these objects and make them 
sure against violation." The type of international or- 
ganization that, in his opinion, the United States was 
willing to join, he defined as : 

" An universal association of the nations to maintain the 
inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common 
and unhindered use of all nations of the world, and to prevent 
any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without 
warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the 
world, — a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political 
independence." 

In the course of the following weeks, President Wilson 
reiterated these principles 19 and in the middle of June, 
19 16, they were formally included in the platform of the 
Democratic Party on which he ran for re-election. Thus 
these principles became an official part of the Democratic 
creed. In his formal speech accepting the re-nomination, 
on September 2, President Wilson emphasized this fea- 
ture of the platform, stating: 

" No nation can any longer remain neutral as against any 
wilful disturbance of the peace of the world. . . . The nations 
of the world must unite in joint guarantees that whatever is 
done to disturb the whole world's life must first be tested in the 
court of the whole world's opinion before it is attempted." 

Although the principles of the League to Enforce 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 149 

Peace were not embodied in the platform of the Republi- 
can Party, Mr. Hughes endorsed these doctrines un- 
equivocally. 20 He omitted, however, to give them any 
prominence during his campaign. On the other hand, 
President Wilson on several occasions emphatically urged 
the necessity of the United States joining such a league 
of nations to prevent aggression and to maintain peace. 21 
Although popular attention had not turned towards this 
phase of his campaign, President Wilson was to a large 
extent justified in holding that his re-election gave him a 
mandate to carry this plan into effect. It was obviously 
important for the outside world to know this. Accord- 
ingly, it was proposed to inform the belligerents in order 
that they should take this new factor into account in 
determining what territorial re-arrangements were neces- 
sary to give them the desired future security. In his 
eirenicon of December 18, 1916, after referring to the 
fact that some of the opposing belligerents had already 
expressed their willingness " to consider the formation of 
a league of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout 
the world," President Wilson stated that the people and 
government of the United States " stand ready, and even 
eager, to co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends 
when the war is over with every influence and resource 
at their command." 

Some time previously, in discussing this general plan, 
Viscount Grey had pointed out that " it is not merely a 
sign manual of Sovereigns or Presidents that is required 
to make a thing like that worth while ; it must also have 



150 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

behind it Parliaments and national sentiment." 22 The 
American people as a whole were as yet far from ready to 
abandon their traditional isolation and to join a league 
with such unlimited obligations. In addition, the plan 
could be put into effect only by a treaty which would have 
to be ratified by a vote of two thirds of the members 
present in the Senate. Furthermore, Congress alone has 
the right to declare war and the entrance of the United 
States into the proposed league would deprive Congress 
in a general way and in many unpredictable circumstances 
of the right to determine the belligerency of the United 
States. 23 Some of the grave obstacles in the path of this 
project were disclosed by the debate in the Senate on 
President Wilson's Note of December 18. The league 
programme was aggressively assailed, partly on the 
ground that it undermined the Monroe Doctrine and 
partly because it committed the United States to un- 
limited obligations. 

This debate and the discussion in the press directed 
considerable popular attention towards the league plan. 
Partly in order to explain more definitely his own views 
as to the proposed international organization and as to 
the circumstances under which he favoured membership 
of the United States in it, President Wilson, on January 
22, 19 1 7, personally addressed the Senate. He stated 
that, in every discussion of the future peace, it is taken 
for granted that its establishment must be followed by 
" some definite concert of power," which will prevent the 
recurrence of any such catastrophic war. " It is incon- 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 151 

ceivable," he added, " that the people of the United States 
should play no part in that great enterprise." They can- 
not in honour withhold the service to which they are now 
about to be challenged, namely, " to add their authority 
and their power to the authority and force of other 
nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the 
world." This address led to renewed discussion in the 
Senate, during which it was again very apparent that 
grave opposition would have to be surmounted before the 
Senate would be ready to ratify a treaty embodying this 
project. In the midst of the debate came Germany's sud- 
den announcement of her unrestricted submarine cam- 
paign. The ensuing severance of diplomatic relations 
with Germany naturally stopped all further discussion. 

Germany's flagrant disregard of American rights and 
her fixed determination to delimit arbitrarily the high 
seas and to treat all vessels venturing within the barred 
zones of this commonage of all peoples as trespassers to 
be sunk at sight forced the United States to depart from 
the chosen course of neutrality. However unwelcome, in 
general, was this necessity, the other alternative was the 
impossible one of unmistakable national humiliation. At 
first, it was the intention merely to protect American 
rights and to maintain a neutral attitude towards the great 
aim for which the Entente Allies were contending. But 
this very issue was directly involved in the submarine 
controversy, because Germany's defiance of America's 
well-established and unquestioned rights proceeded in 
essence from the non-moral code that animates Germany's 



152 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

entire foreign policy. It was a concrete manifestation of 
the spirit that had led to the invasion of Belgium. Pro- 
tection of American rights meant the vindication of " pub- 
lic right " for which the Entente was fighting. 24 The 
two were inseparable. 

This was further emphasized by Germany's inept 
attempt to embroil the United States with Mexico and 
Japan. The direct challenge to the Monroe Doctrine 
inherent in the offer to Mexico of the " lost " provinces 
of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, disclosed the in- 
sidious nature of the German menace. When Russia 
burst the shackles of autocracy, the situation became even 
more clarified. It was increasingly realized that the fate 
of democracy was involved in the war and that no stable 
or just international future was possible in a world where 
one state arrogated to itself the right to ignore solemn 
treaties, long-established interstate usage, and generally 
accepted principles of morality and humanity, whenever 
they interfered with its imperious will to power. 

The negative policy of " armed neutrality " could not 
be maintained. It was not only ineffective in accomplish- 
ing its purposes, but it ignored the fact that it implied 
also a negotiated settlement. The German proposal to 
Carranza to " make war together and together make 
peace " disclosed the far from alluring prospect of having 
to arrange terms with a Germany unhampered by war 
with the Entente. But, in addition, " armed neutrality " 
falsified the fundamental facts of the situation. It 
degraded a great issue of international morality and right 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 153 

into a relatively paltry question of neutral rights. Doubts 
early began to beset President Wilson and, in his in- 
augural address on March 5, he stated that the United 
States might be drawn by circumstances to " a more im- 
mediate association with the great struggle itself." A 
month later, all doubts had disappeared. In addressing 
Congress on April 2, President Wilson characterized the 
German submarine campaign as " a war against all 
nations " and he frankly admitted that armed neutrality 
was impracticable. He advised Congress to declare that 
the course of the German Government was nothing less 
than war against the United States and to take immediate 
steps " to bring the Government of the German Empire to 
terms and end the war." In addition to the mobilization 
of America's economic and military resources, this will 
involve, he pointed out, " the utmost practicable co-oper- 
ation in counsel and action with the governments now at 
war with Germany." 

President Wilson, however, did not allow the matter to 
rest here, but he again urged his plan for a league of na- 
tions and he definitely aligned the United States with the 
Entente Allies by fully accepting their interpretation of 
the deeper meaning of the war. In ringing words, he 
proclaimed his firm adherence to the programme of an 
organized society of states, renounced the constraints of 
neutrality and arraigned the Prussian-German code. He 
declared that the object of the United States in entering 
the war was : 

" To vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life 



154 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to 
set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the 
world such a concert of purpose and action as will henceforth 
ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no 
longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is 
involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to 
that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic gov- 
ernments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly 
by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen 
the last of neutrality in such circumstances." 

The entrance of the United States into the war for this 
positive ideal is in many respects a transcendent event of 
far-reaching potentialities. Apart from its effect upon 
the war itself, it marks the definite abandonment of the 
policy of isolation and the inception of new traditions 
of international responsibility. It means a clear recog- 
nition of the fact that the peoples of the world constitute 
a society and that each member thereof is responsible for 
order and justice therein. In addition, the full co- 
operation with the Entente Allies in their high purpose 
is equivalent to the practical establishment of a league to 
enforce peace. The paramount aim of the Allies is that 
of pacification. Their purpose is to quell the Germanic 
rebellion against the moral law, the established customs, 
and the liberal spirit of western civilization. In this con- 
nection, the fundamental question has inevitably arisen: 
" Shall this existing league perpetuate itself? " " Shall 
its membership be confined to those engaged in the work 
of pacification with the addition of some of the neutral 
states ; or, shall the rebels against public right be admitted 
as soon as peace is concluded, regardless of whether 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 155 

their spirit be chastened or still remain recalcitrant?" 
In this connection, Mr. Wilson made some significant 
suggestions in his memorable address of April 2. He 
emphasized a fundamental fact that had not escaped the 
attention of American and English critics who had 
pointed out that the success of the projected league of 
nations depended upon reciprocal confidence among its 
members and upon a universal will to co-operation. One 
insincere member could work incalculable havoc with its 
delicate machinery and could use it to delude his fellows 
with a false sense of security. With such thoughts in 
his mind, President Wilson said : 

"A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained ex- 
cept by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic 
government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe 
its covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of 
opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of 
inner circles who could plan what they would and render ac- 
count to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. 
Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honour 
steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to 
any narrow interest of their own." 

Instead of an all-inclusive league of the world's stable 
states, President Wilson here proposed one confined to 
the self-governing democracies. 25 Either alternative has 
its advantages, as well as its concomitant disadvantages. 
In general, the more comprehensive the league, the more 
slowly will it acquire vitality and less positive must be its 
purposes. The programme of " the League to Enforce 
Peace " was especially devised for such an inclusive 
league and it is avowedly only a palliative to lessen the 



156 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

risk of war. Its champions merely claim that it is the 
first step towards world organization. Other proposals 
go considerably further in advocating the compulsory sub- 
mission of disputes and even the enforcement of the 
awards. Such apparently also was Mr. Wilson's pur- 
pose when, on December 18, 1916, he spoke of " a league 
of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the 
world." 

The advantages of an inclusive league, even with only 
the minimum programme, are patent, provided the 
equally obvious dangers are not ignored. Of these the 
gravest is that pacific peoples may too confidingly place 
an undue reliance upon what is confessedly only a pal- 
liative and neglect those other safeguards that will be 
necessary if they are to remain fully secure against ag- 
gressive states. In general, the effect of the comprehen- 
sive plan would be to diminish the risk of war by foster- 
ing recourse to arbitration and thus injecting the factors 
of publicity, delay and reason into situations that are too 
often controlled by panic and passion. Moreover, even 
if war could by no means be eliminated by these agencies, 
force would not as now be predominantly used at the 
discretion of directly interested parties, but would in an 
increasing number of instances be applied under an inter- 
national mandate. Instead of being exclusively national 
instruments, the several and distinct armies and navies 
would tend to become the policing force of a still imper- 
fectly organized society of states. 26 

Concomitantly also, the inevitable friction resulting 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 157 

from the inherent conflict between the rights of belliger- 
ents and those of neutrals would tend towards elimina- 
tion. These disputes have inevitably occurred in every 
great war in which sea power has been an important fac- 
tor. But if such power were exercised under an inter- 
national mandate, there would be no demand for its 
emasculation. In such authorized wars, in which the 
world would be divided between the policing states and 
those engaged in riot and rebellion, neutral rights would 
automatically cease to hamper the application of every 
ounce of pressure of which sea power is capable, pro- 
vided the generally accepted dictates of humanity were 
not violated. Carried to its logical conclusion, the league 
programme implies that the aggressor would be con- 
fronted by a completely belligerent world. But the 
league's machinery is not devised to prevent all wars of 
aggression. In such unauthorized wars, neutral rights 
would still remain fully intact. Furthermore, in such 
instances, a canon would be established for determining 
aggression, upon which, in turn, could be based the at 
present legally questionable right to practise a benevolent 
neutrality towards the injured party. 27 

Finally, such a league of nations will be indispensable 
as a link between the two groups of a disrupted western 
world. Some bridge must be kept open. No one is so 
pessimistic as to assume that western unity has disap- 
peared for all time. But the cleavage in it is very real 
and it cannot be made to vanish merely by ignoring it, 
or by denying its existence. Failure to face facts is the 



158 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

cardinal sin in statesmanship. Unless Germany purge 
herself of her materialistic and non-moral creed, either as 
a result of a democratic upheaval or as a consequence of 
economic and military collapse, the fundamental factor in 
interstate relations for the next generation or so cannot 
but be this abyss between the Allies and the Central 
Powers. It has been created by moral and political forces 
of great potency. Its depths cannot be lessened merely 
by the earnest desire of those who regret its existence. 
Under these conditions, when mutual confidence is lack- 
ing, sincere co-operation between the two groups of states 
will for a considerable time be out of the question. In 
this more or less long interval, the proposed league would 
at least act as a serviceable bridge until ultimately the dis- 
rupted unity be restored. From the very fact that they 
will live in the same world, the two sets of belligerents 
must meet to regulate matters that are common to all. 
However great be the efforts made to lessen it, their inter- 
dependence will still remain an important factor. 

The immediate programme of the inclusive league 
would be essentially the negative one of diminishing the 
chance of war. If carried into effect, it would remain 
for a long time an artificial organization with little in- 
herent vitality. As opposed to such an unlimited union 
with indefinite and negative objects, President Wilson's 
" League of Honour " presents the possibility of a limited 
union with definite and positive aims. In order to render 
either organization effective to any satisfactory extent, it 
would seemingly be necessary to create a code of public 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 159 

right embodied in a series of fundamental treaties to 
which all members were parties. These treaties should 
guarantee in explicit terms: first, the independence, in- 
tegrity, and neutrality of all minor states occupying 
economic and strategic points of vantage, such as Bel- 
gium, Holland, Switzerland, and Serbia; secondly, the 
independence and integrity of China and of other back- 
ward independent countries, with the wide-open door 
there and, possibly also, in the undeveloped dependencies 
of Europe and America ; thirdly, the Monroe Doctrine, in 
so far as it is based upon the foregoing principles and not 
upon either the imperialistic aims or the exclusive eco- 
nomic ambitions of some elements in the United States. 
Finally, it should be realized that, whether it be an 
inclusive league or the limited concert of democracies, 
the project will in either case remain largely an unreality 
if the rigid categories of the current political science are 
not modified. If the world adheres to the accepted theory 
of sovereignty which demands a supreme and undivided 
allegiance to the absolute state, the league will be a victim 
of infantile paralysis. As Sir Frederick Pollock has 
wisely said, an effective league " involves a considerable 
delegation of authority by sovereign States; but those 
who desire the end of effectual concerted action must be 
prepared to grant the means." 28 In order to avoid any 
infringement of sovereignty, " the League to Enforce 
Peace" has specifically made its programme one of 
optional arbitration and of non-enforcement of the judg- 
ments. To go further is to secure increased effective- 



i6o THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

ness at the expense of sovereignty. The dilemma is self- 
evident. Senator Cummins, assuming that Mr. Wilson 
favoured enforcement of the league's decision, attacked 
the project, declaring that it meant the surrender of sov- 
ereignty by the United States to " a new world sov- 
ereignty " and " the formation of a new and supreme 
government which is to command our resources in both 
blood and treasure." To his not abnormally national- 
istic mind, it was a " humiliating reflection that the United 
States will be reduced to a mere principality, pursuing the 
path of obscurity to an ignominious future, doing the 
bidding of a higher power." 29 

It is easy to criticize such sentiments, but it would be 
folly to ignore them as they are held far and wide, not 
only in the United States but throughout the world. 
They are part and parcel of the current political thought 
upon which is based the modern state-system. Hence 
the grave difficulties in the way of the creation of an 
effective superstate authority and the extreme improb- 
ability that, whatever be the type of league formed, it will 
rapidly become an independently robust organization. 30 
The vital factor in interstate relations will be the co- 
operative spirit engendered among the members of the 
two groups by the war. The democratic basis which is 
establishing itself in support of the existing alliances has 
given them a fresh vitality. This is especially true of 
the group with which the United States has thrown in 
its fortunes. Except in the most improbable event of 
military or naval disaster undermining its vitality, this 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 161 

group will continue in existence after the war in some 
form or another. If an inclusive league of nations be 
formed, the members of this group will inevitably tend to 
act in concert within it. If, on the other hand, the league 
be restricted to the world's democracies, its membership 
and that of this group will largely coincide. In either 
case, this group will be a vital fact. It may be bound 
together in one general agreement or its solidarity may 
express itself in a mere entente. In all likelihood, the 
members will be united in a network of separate alliances, 
whose general effect will be to make them a unit in 
defence and to create separate combinations for the attain- 
ment of specific ends. 

Within this group, the relations of each to every other 
member will vary considerably in accordance with many 
factors. Of these the most important will be the more 
or less close approximation of national ideals. But, in 
addition, geographical facts will play a leading part. 
Contiguity cannot be ignored. Similarly, these relations 
will be greatly influenced by the closeness of the economic 
bonds and by the degree of parallelism in policy as re- 
gards common purposes and interests. Hence the rela- 
tions of France and Italy are bound to be very intimate. 
Cultural similarity, juxtaposition, and economic in- 
terests, all favour such an outcome. Thus the Italian 
Deputy, Giuseppe Bevione, significantly said: 

" We, the old Latin races, in whom the historical sense is 
deeply ingrained, have already acquired the feeling that this 
alliance which has been consecrated on the field of battle must 



162 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

continue after the war, if we wish to preserve the fruits of 
victory. Woe to those who find they stand alone after the 
struggle ! France and Italy, by uniting their forces, can con- 
stitute a powerful, uniform and united bloc of 80 millions 
of Latins. ... If the Latin bloc is formed, it will be a factor 
of the first importance in the Europe of to-morrow — a factor 
whose counsels will be respected and whose strength will be 
feared." 31 

It will probably be impossible and it would presumably 
be highly injudicious for the United States to retire after 
the war from this group to its former hermit-like isola- 
tion. America's clearly defined purpose in the war is to 
establish public right and to make the world safe for its 
democracies. A more or less artificial league of nations 
will confessedly not be sufficient to accomplish this. 
Nor, unless an extensive code of right be formulated, will 
it in itself give any added strength to the Monroe Doc- 
trine and adequately safeguard the integrity of China 
and the open door to her undeveloped markets and re- 
sources. Direct co-operation with others is necessary 
and the more explicitly and publicly the basis of this co- 
operation is defined, the more effective will it be. The 
outbreak of the war proved the inefficacy of the policy 
of understandings with ill-defined obligations. If Ger- 
many had faced the positive fact that her attack upon 
France would bring the British Empire into the war, she 
would probably not have drawn the sword. Nor is co- 
operation merely in certain specific questions adequate. 
For instance, it is quite plain, even to the most casual 
observer, that Japan is at present attempting to gain an 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 163 

exclusive and predominant economic and political posi- 
tion in China. The ultimate success of this scarcely dis- 
guised attempt will depend primarily upon whether or 
no England after the war will be in a position that, in 
opposing Japan, she can afford to run the risk of that 
country joining the Central Empires. In the formation 
of this decision, the attitude of the United States in this 
special instance will necessarily count for little ; the main 
consideration will ineluctably be the general balance of 
power and purpose throughout the world, because on it 
will depend the safety of the British Commonwealth. 
The greater need must over-ride the lesser. America's 
co-operation in some isolated case alone with no firm 
assurance of immediate active support if again the greater 
issue be raised, would be no compensation for the possible 
defection of Japan to the Teutonic Powers. Whether or 
no China's fate is to be determined by factors entirely 
extraneous to the problem itself and independent of the 
ethical elements involved in it, rests chiefly with the 
United States. Until the Prussian-German peril is com- 
pletely eliminated beyond possibility of resuscitation, 
many fundamental questions will be decided in the main 
by their bearing upon it to the neglect of their intrinsic 
merits. So long as this fear of military domination 
haunts the world, it will control foreign policy and will 
render full co-operation of its intended victims highly 
essential. 

The post-bellum relations of the United States to its 
associates in the present war are a momentous problem. 



164 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

A general defensive alliance with the group as a whole 
would apparently be highly inadvisable as the United 
States wisely does not want to be drawn deeply into the 
welter of European politics. Nor would such an arrange- 
ment effectively safeguard the two chief American poli- 
cies, the Monroe Doctrine and Chinese integrity. For 
essentially the same reasons, a general alliance with 
France is out of the question, in spite of the depth of 
American sympathy for a harassed sister-republic. The 
future security of France and also that of Italy and Bel- 
gium could be served as well by an alliance of the United 
States with the British Commonwealth. 

Physically, economically, and spiritually the United 
States is in closest contact with the English-speaking 
peoples of this world-wide Commonwealth of Nations. 
The unfortified boundary between Canada and the United 
States was an envied marvel to a Europe armed cap-a-pie. 
The economic ties connecting these kindred peoples are 
ever becoming more extensive and more binding. Their 
common civilization represents a distinctive branch of the 
western type. The success of a league of nations de- 
pends predominantly upon their intimate and genuine 
co-operation within it. Its vitality would be drawn 
chiefly from this source. An alliance of the United 
States with the British Commonwealth on clearly defined 
terms of unquestionable explicitness, made in the open 
light of the day, so that those planning aggression could 
realize clearly the formidable obstacle in their path, would 
effectively, though not absolutely, secure the general peace 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 165 

of the future world. In addition, such an alliance would 
well-nigh guarantee the development of the world along 
progressively democratic lines. It would give nearly- 
absolute security to the English-speaking peoples, and 
relative safety to all Europe. More than anything else, 
it would prevent the persistence of the German menace. 
In it largely lies the hope of curtailing the term of reac-? 
tion towards economic and political nationalism that is 
to be the war's inevitable aftermath and in it lies also the 
prospect of an ultimate better all-inclusive international 
future when the fissure in western civilization shall have 
finally grown together. 



VI 
THE UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 



" The international relationship constituted by the alliances 
and antagonisms known as the Balance of Power, in which the 
factors are governments and armaments, is a social relation- 
ship of a lower order than the Bond of Peoples between the 
United Kingdom and the United States, in which there is a liv- 
ing force." 

— Nationalism and War in the Near East, p. 6. 

" But there were some half-dozen of us who hammered away 
— I dare say we bored our audience at these ideas : that the 
growth of the Colonies into self-governing communities was no 
reason why they should drop away from the Mother Country or 
from one another; that the complete separation of the two 
greatest sections of the English-speaking race was a dire dis- 
aster, not only in the manner in which it came about, but for 
coming about at all; that there was no political object compar- 
able in importance with that of preventing a repetition of such 
a disaster, the severance of another link in the great Imperial 
chain. The greatest local independence, we then argued, was 
not incompatible with closer and more effective union for com- 
mon purposes." 

— Lord Milner, March 29, 1897. 

" The German Emperor has become a great Empire-builder, 
but it is not his Empire that he is building." 

— Mr. Bonar Law, February 7, 1917. 



CHAPTER VI 
The Unity of English-Speaking Peoples 

Modern British Imperialism — The British Commonwealth — 
Imperial Reconstruction — The Dominions and Foreign Policy 

— The Imperial War Cabinet — The United States an English- 
Speaking Country — The Language Factor — The British Stock 

— Anglo-American Relations in the Past and Future. 

While war is certainly not the father of all things, as 
the Greek philosopher sweepingly claimed, it unquestion- 
ably clears away many a mental cobweb and hastens the 
course of many a slowly progressing movement. Daily 
more and more Americans are realizing the perils of 
future isolation and a growing minority are urging the 
necessity of intimate Anglo-American co-operation. 1 
But the war has definitely rendered impossible such an 
alliance as Joseph Chamberlain proposed in 1898. An 
Anglo-American alliance is now out of the question, 
simply because in the future British foreign policy will be 
controlled and directed by organs representative of the 
Empire as a whole, not of Britain alone. An alliance 
with the British Commonwealth, in which not only Great 
Britain, Canada, and South Africa with their systems of 
free government, but also the most advanced democracies 
of the world, Australia and New Zealand, are to have a 

169 



170 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

direct voice in determining foreign policy, is patently 
something quite different from one contracted only with 
the people of the British Isles. For uniting these self- 
governing Dominions and *he United States is not only 
that fundamental identity of civilization which is charac- 
teristic of the Mother Country as well, but also other 
points of likeness arising from their similar evolutions 
under frontier conditions. All these growing democra- 
cies have this great feature in common that they are the 
off-shoots of a little sea-girt isle that only so recently as 
Shakespeare's day contained fewer people than does the 
present city of New York. 

While the United States has severed all political ties 
with the parent country, the other outlying democracies 
have not only kept alive this bond, but in recent years, and 
more especially since the South African War, they have 
been drawing it tauter. This spontaneous and volun- 
tary movement towards closer union is the predominant 
characteristic of modern British imperialism. Its nature 
has been considerably obscured by an inadequate ter- 
minology and by misleading associations inherited from 
a past animated by a different spirit. " Man is a crea- 
ture," said Robert Louis Stevenson, " who lives not upon 
bread alone, but principally by catchwords." From his- 
torical analogies, imperialism is a term that automatically 
suggests the extension of rule by military force over 
unwilling peoples. Similarly, colony conveys a distinct 
concept of inferiority of status and also the idea of 
ownership by the parent community. These misleading 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 171 

implications have not only somewhat alienated sympathy 
from what is essentially a movement towards greater co- 
hesion among kindred peoples, but they have retarded 
progress towards the real goal by keeping alive vestiges 
of the old system. Hence the mischievous nomenclature 
and obsolete labels are being rapidly discarded. Since 
1907, the self-governing democracies are no longer offi- 
cially known as Colonies, but as Dominions. 2 Likewise, 
in order to escape from the tyranny of words, a wide- 
spread effort is being made to substitute for Empire the 
more truly descriptive term, Commonwealth. As Mr. 
Steel-Maitland, the Under-Secretary of State for the Col- 
onies, has said, " the first savours of command, the second 
of service : the one of servitude, the other of freedom." 3 
These words represent the finest spirit of modern Brit- 
ish imperialism and it is this type that is very rapidly 
gaining ground. One of its chief exponents, Lord Mil- 
ner, has defined its temper in the following words : 

" Imperialism as a political doctrine has often been repre- 
sented as something tawdry and superficial. In reality it has 
all the depth and comprehensiveness of a religious faith. Its 
significance is moral even more than material. It is a mistake 
to think of it as principally concerned with extension of terri- 
tory, with 'painting the map red.' There is quite enough 
painted red already. It is not a question of a couple of hun- 
dred thousand square miles more or less. It is a question of 
preserving the unity of a great race, of enabling it, by main- 
taining that unity, to develop freely on its own lines, and to 
continue to fulfil its distinctive mission in the world." 4 

In 1908, five years before these sentences were writ- 



172 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

ten, Lord Milner addressed a Canadian audience as fol- 
lows: 

" I am so intensely conscious of all that the Empire stands 
for in the world, of all that it means in the great march of 
human progress, I am so anxious to give full and yet unexag- 
gerated expression to my sense of the high privilege of British 
citizenship. But there is nothing so odious as cant, and this is 
a subject on which it is particularly easy to seem to be canting. 
Not that I am afraid of falling into a strain of boastfulness. The 
last thing which the thought of the Empire inspires in me is a 
desire to boast — to wave a flag, or to shout ' Rule Britannia.' 
When I think of it, I am much more inclined to go into a 
corner by myself and pray." 5 

The purpose and spirit of such imperialism is closely 
akin to that of Abraham Lincoln. 6 In fact, this move- 
ment has drawn much of its inspiration from American 
statesmen. From Washington's steadfast and noble 
character, from Hamilton's firm grasp of fundamental 
principles, 7 and from Lincoln's passion for freedom and 
union have been gained many valuable lessons. These 
modern imperialists look upon the British Empire as a 
vast Commonwealth of Nations. The bond which unites 
all its citizens and " constitutes them collectively as a 
state is, to use the words of Lincoln, in the nature of 
dedication. ... Its foundation is not self-interest, but 
rather some sense of obligation, however conceived, which 
is strong enough to over-master self-interest." 8 With 
Mazzini, they totally reject the sterile doctrine of rights 
and demand a positive creed. According to their views, 
" it is obligation, not privilege, duties, and not rights, 
which lie at the root of citizenship, and which, in conse- 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 173 

quence, are the foundations upon which every healthy 
and progressive state must build its communal life." 
But this obligation is not to an abstraction, the state, 
but to the whole body of one's fellow citizens, organized 
as a community under a common law. In their eyes, the 
state is based upon the irrevocable dedication of the mem- 
bers to one another for the practical conduct of social 
life. 9 

With obvious qualifications and reservations, for full 
realization still lags, this is a far truer picture of the 
actual British Empire than that visualized by many Eng- 
lishmen, by most Americans, and by nearly all Germans. 
If one thinks of a little island in the North Sea as the 
owner of one fifth of the habitable globe, some doubts 
as to the equity of the distribution must arise. But if 
such a gross and palpable distortion of actuality is dis- 
pelled and one regards Great Britain merely as the head, 
but not as the owner, merely as one member of a world- 
wide Commonwealth of Nations, then the aspect is radi- 
cally different. The latter view is a close approximation 
to reality. In no sense of the word can it be said that 
England owns Canada, Australia, or South Africa; nor 
is such a possessive term truly descriptive of the relations 
to India, Egypt, and the rest of the Dependent Empire. 
The concept of ownership is applicable only in the case 
of Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, and those other outposts 
whose chief function is to secure the safety of communi- 
cations in the far-flung Commonwealth so aptly called 
" that new Venice whose streets are the oceans." 10 



174 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

This fundamental change in the spirit animating Brit- 
ish imperialism did not come over-night. When, during 
the early Victorian period, was established in Canada 
the system of responsible government upon which rests 
the present autonomy of the Dominions, all but a care- 
fully remembered corporal's guard of England's public 
men regarded this step as the logical precursor to the 
Empire's dismemberment. The rest were agreed upon 
this inevitable outcome, though they envisaged it with 
varying attitudes ranging from trepidation through in- 
difference to positive relief. Practically no one contem- 
plated the use of force to prevent it. Even a generation 
later, when imperial federation became a much discussed 
question as a result of Seeley's writings and of Parkin's 
activities, few judged that the Empire's integrity would 
be able to stand the shock of a foreign war. It is not 
surprising that Lord Morley's imagination could not then 
conceive of Australia participating in some future war 
" for the defence of Belgian neutrality," xl but the father 
of the modern imperial movement, Joseph Chamberlain, 
was also at the time somewhat similarly pessimistic. 12 It 
is a far cry from those days to the grim present, when 
Dominion troops are conspicuously active on the plains 
of France and have proven their mettle in the deserts of 
Egypt and amidst the hills of Gallipoli Peninsula. What 
produced this change of temper with its complete trans- 
mutation of imperial values? 

In reality, despite the confident predictions of public 
leaders, there was in the mass of men in Britain and in 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 175 

the Dominions no desire for absolute separation, but each 
community wished to work out its own destiny unham- 
pered by outside interference. Thirty years ago, the in- 
terests common to the various groups were abnormally 
inconspicuous, primarily because the international situa- 
tion was such that Great Britain's supremacy at sea 
seemed unassailable. As a consequence, each of the 
Dominions had apparently before it the prospect of an 
undisturbed development of its own individual life, and 
the dangers from which the British Navy protected them 
seemed scarcely to be real ones. But this calm rapidly 
gave place to a period of keen international rivalry. The 
rise of Japan, to a limited extent also American expan- 
sion in the Pacific, but above all the emergence of Ger- 
many as a world power with alarmingly vague ambitions 
brought the Dominions face to face with the underlying 
facts of international relations. A rude shock was ad- 
ministered by the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger in 1896 
and by subsequent German intrigues in South Africa, 
which greatly aggravated the difficulties of British states- 
men in securing relief from conditions that Lord Bryce 
had accurately described as intolerable. 13 This was fur- 
ther emphasized during the Boer War, not only by the 
bitter animosity of the German people, but also by the 
covert hostility of their government. 14 At the same time 
also, considerable feeling was aroused by Germany's at- 
tempt to penalize Canada for granting preferential treat- 
ment to commodities imported from the United King- 
dom. 15 These and other incidents awakened the Domin- 



176 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

ions from their dream of security, but they were brought 
into even closer contact with the dynamics of inter- 
national politics by the gradual withdrawal of the British 
fleet from the Seven Seas and its concentration in the 
North Sea. As the international tension became more 
and more acute, the desire for a closer union became 
stronger, and a growing number of men, unconsciously 
and consciously, transferred their ultimate dedication 
from the local community to the world-wide state of 
which it constituted merely a member. L' amour du 
clocher was expanding into an imperial patriotism, which 
many found to be entirely consistent with colonial nation- 
alism. 

In the changed international situation, imperial defence 
became a vital problem; and, in facing it, the whole im- 
perial system was subjected to close scrutiny. Accord- 
ing to the strictly legal view, which was based upon 
Roman precedents and analogies, the British Colonies 
were provinces of Great Britain and were subject to the 
sovereignty of Parliament. This legal theory was not 
wholly in accord with the actual political facts even as 
they were in the days of the " Old Colonial System " 
before the schism of the American Revolution, and it had 
become quite untenable towards the middle of the nine- 
teenth century when the Dominions became almost com- 
pletely self-governing entities under the system of respon- 
sible government. The theory of parliamentary sover- 
eignty was, however, still retained, but in recent years 
this legal fiction is being more and more abandoned. 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 177 

Chamberlain called the Dominions " states which have 
voluntarily accepted one crown and one flag, and which 
in all else are absolutely independent of one another." 
According to Mr. Asquith, the United Kingdom and the 
Dominions are ' each master in its own household, a prin- 
ciple which is the life blood of the Empire — articulus 
stantis aut cadentis Imperii.' 16 The Crown is now re- 
garded as the connecting link binding together Great Brit- 
ain, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and 
South Africa; and, in so far as these Dominions are con- 
cerned, the Empire has assumed the outward character 
of a league of autonomous nations. The Dominions are 
no longer regarded as daughter states, but rather as sis- 
ter nations; and loyalty is expressed not to the original 
Mother Country, but to the Empire as a whole. 

In a loosely organized Commonwealth of this charac- 
ter, one of the most difficult problems is to apportion the 
burdens that are common to all — especially that of im- 
perial defence — in such a manner that their weight shall 
fall equitably on each member without at the same time 
doing violence to political principles that underlie free 
government. Hitherto, as in the colonial period of the 
United States, the burden of imperial defence had rested 
almost exclusively upon the taxpayers of Britain. The 
attempt to solve this problem by parliamentary taxation 
brought on the American Revolution, and that experience 
rendered easy the avoidance of the pitfalls then encoun- 
tered. In those days, as Professor Maitland most sug- 
gestively said: 



i 7 8 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

" The State that Englishmen knew was a singularly unicel- 
lular State, and at a critical time they were not too well 
equipped with tried and traditional thoughts which would meet 
the case of Ireland or of some communities, commonwealths, 
corporations in America which seemed to have wills — and 
hardly fictitious wills — of their own, and which became States 
and United States." 17 

There was at that time no statesman in England or in 
America to whom the possible solution occurred. All 
thought in terms of the alternatives : independence and 
imperial disruption, or subjection to Parliament and 
union. Since then the world has had considerable expe- 
rience in federated and federal governments of most 
diverse types. 

When brought face to face by the German menace 
with this problem of imperial defence, the Dominions 
recognized not only that the distribution of the load was 
inequitable, but also that it was totally out of harmony 
with the newer concept of imperial relations, which predi- 
cated " equality of status, though not of stature " between 
them and Britain. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada 
were willing to assume some share of the burden of 
imperial defence, but the question became more than ever 
complicated when adequate means were sought to give 
effect to this desire. While they chafed at the undigni- 
fied immaturity inherent in their position as protected 
communities, they could not, in attempting to emerge 
from it, fail to realize that their deeply cherished and 
much vaunted autonomy was incomplete in that they had 
no control over foreign policy and no voice in the decisive 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 179 

issue of peace or war. Some considerable influence they 
might have, but in final analysis their destiny was not in 
their hands, but was largely determined for them by 
others. Whether, as in Australia, local navies were to be 
created, or, as was proposed in Canada, funds were to be 
granted for strengthening the British Navy, mattered 
not; in both cases the Dominions would have no direct 
voice in deciding why, when, and how these armaments 
that they supplied or supported were to be used. 
Stripped to its essentials, it was the same difficulty that 
had brought about the American Revolution, the impos- 
sibility of a complete reconciliation of liber tas with im- 
perium under the existing political machinery. It was 
the old question of " taxation without representation " in 
a different guise. This gave Canada pause. 

The situation was an exceedingly difficult one, because 
a full and satisfactory solution would necessitate radical 
changes. The new institutions that had been devised to 
meet the demand for greater imperial co-operation were 
not adapted to the purpose. The Imperial Conferences 
at which the Dominion Ministers were to meet their Brit- 
ish colleagues in London every four years, and the occa- 
sional presence of colonial statesmen at the meetings of 
the Committe of Imperial Defence, however admirable 
for the purpose of consultation and mutual enlighten- 
ment, did not meet the situation. Under the system of 
responsible government, the executive of the United 
Kingdom cannot follow the commands of several entirely 
distinct legislatures and electorates. This Cabinet, which 



180 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

controlled the foreign policy of the British Common- 
wealth, had to act in conformity with the views of the 
legislature to which it was responsible, and the Parlia- 
ment at Westminster could in turn embody only the will 
of the people that elected it. The constitutional problem 
is to devise means by which "a British citizen in the 
Dominions can acquire the same control of foreign policy 
as one domiciled in the British Isles." 

The existing war has greatly aggravated the urgency 
of this problem. It has furnished concrete proof of the 
momentous increase of imperial sentiment and of the 
solidity of the Commonwealth's spiritual foundations. 
From all corners of the globe came fervent expressions 
of loyalty and concrete demonstrations of their sincerity. 
The Dominions have manifested the vitality of the new 
conception of imperial partnership by active participation 
in the titanic struggle on a scale and in a manner without 
any parallel or even analogy in the Empire's long history. 
This participation was entirely spontaneous, 18 and the 
motive that prompted it was predominantly, though not 
exclusively, patriotic devotion to the Empire, not loyalty 
to the Mother Country. The very extent of this partici- 
pation and the enormous sacrifices that it involved have 
forcibly emphasized the anomaly in that these free peo- 
ples are engaged to an unlimited extent in a war that was 
the outcome of an international situation over which they 
had no direct control. No attempt has been made to 
burke this vital fact. Early in 1916, Mr. Andrew 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 181 

Fisher, the High Commissioner of Australia, bluntly 
said: 

" If I had stayed in Scotland, I should have been able to 
heckle my member on questions of Imperial policy, and to vote 
for or against him on that ground. I went to Australia. I 
have been Prime Minister. But all the time I have had no 
say whatever about Imperial policy — no say whatever. Now 
that can't go on. There must be some change." 

Similarly, Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of 
Canada, has stated that " it is impossible to believe that 
the existing status (of the Dominions), so far as con- 
cerns the control of foreign policy and extra-imperial 
relations, can remain as it is to-day." As to this there 
is general agreement. It is universally admitted that the 
Dominions must have a voice in determining the peace 
terms and in shaping the future foreign policy of the 
Empire. But as yet no proposal has secured the general 
support of the different peoples concerned. 19 The diffi- 
culty of welding " the stubborn and refractory material " 
of the Empire into indissoluble union is admittedly great. 
This patent fact is reflected in Lord Rosebery's eloquent 
words : 

" I cannot doubt that when the arduous efforts of the peace 
congress are over — an awful task, far surpassing a dozen con- 
ferences of Vienna — there will appear higher peaks behind 
mountain summits, there will appear the almost more gigantic 
task of reorganizing the British Empire." 

In the meanwhile, pending this final comprehensive 
adjustment of institutions to spirit and fact, certain steps 
have been taken that are one further proof of the gulf 



182 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

that separates the England of 1917 from that of 1914. 
In 191 5 and 1916, Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister 
of Canada, and Mr. Plughes, the Prime Minister of Aus- 
tralia, attended meetings of the British Cabinet in Lon- 
don. This was an entirely unprecedented step, and was 
followed, late in 19 16, by an invitation to the Premiers 
of the Dominions and to an official representative of 
India to attend an Imperial War Council in London. In 
this connection, Mr. Lloyd George said: 

" I regard the Council as marking the beginning of a new- 
epoch in the history of the Empire. The war has changed us. 
Heaven knows, it has taught us more than we yet understand. 
It has opened a new age for us, and we want to go into that 
new age together with our fellows overseas just as we have 
come through the darkness together, and shed our blood and 
treasure together. . . . The Empire War Council will deal with 
all general questions affecting the war. The Prime Ministers or 
their representatives will be temporary members of the War 
Cabinet, and we propose to arrange that all matters of first- 
rate importance should be considered in a series of special meet- 
ings. Nothing affecting the Dominions, the conduct of the war, 
or the negotiations of peace will be excluded from its purview^ 
There will, of course, be domestic questions which each part of 
the Empire must settle for itself — questions such as recruiting 
in the United Kingdom, or home legislation. Such domestic 
matters will be our only reservation. But we propose that 
everything else should be, so to speak, on the table." 20 

On this occasion, Mr. Lloyd George prudently re- 
fused to discuss the problems of constitutional recon- 
struction after the war, although he pointed out in the 
following words that things could never be the same as 
they were before: 

" Five democracies, all parts of an Empire, cannot shed their 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 183 

blood and treasure with a heroism and disregard of cost which 
have been beyond all praise, without leaving memories of com- 
radeship and of a great accomplishment which will never die. 
Of this I am certain, the peoples of the Empire will have found 
a unity in the war such as never existed before it — a unity not 
only in history, but of purpose. . . . We stand at this moment 
on the verge of the greatest liberation which the world has 
seen since the French Revolution. And do you tell me that 
the peoples who have stood together and staked literally every- 
thing in order to bring that liberation about are not going to 
find some way of perpetuating that unity afterwards on an 
equal basis ? " 

The convocation of this Imperial Cabinet was a mo- 
mentous step. For the first time India and the Domin- 
ions were called to the councils of the Imperial Govern- 
ment " not merely in an advisory but in an executive 
capacity." 21 The Imperial Conferences that had been 
convened at irregular intervals from 1887 on were purely 
consultative bodies, but these representatives of the Do- 
minions and India, together with the British War Cabi- 
net, constituted a new executive for the Commonwealth 
as a whole. 22 When this Imperial Cabinet met in Lon- 
don on March 20, 191 7, the constitutional position was 
quite unique. It is succinctly described in the following 
words of Sir Robert Borden : 

" For the first time in the Empire's history there are sitting in 
London two Cabinets, both properly constituted and both ex- 
ercising well-defined powers. Over each of them the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom presides. One of them is 
designated as the 'War Cabinet,' which chiefly devotes itself 
to such questions touching the prosecution of the war as prima- 
rily concern the United Kingdom. The other is designated as 
the ' Imperial War Cabinet,' which has a wider purpose, juris- 
diction, and personnel." 23 



184 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

The function of the Imperial Cabinet was to determine 
the policy to be pursued in waging the war and in settling 
the problems arising out of it. Its formation was a radi- 
cally new development in the constitutional machinery of 
the Empire. This experiment worked so successfully 
that the British Government formally proposed to adopt 
it as a permanent constitutional expedient and to make 
the Imperial Cabinet at least an annual institution to be 
held whether the conditions be those of peace or of war. 
This proposed Cabinet, which will be responsible as 
an entity to the whole citizenry of the Commonwealth, is 
to be composed of the Prime Minister of Britain, such 
of his colleagues as deal especially with imperial concerns 
(foreign affairs, defence, and dependencies), the Pre- 
miers of each of the Dominions, and a specially accredited 
representative of British India. The official considera- 
tion of this suggested solution of an exceedingly stubborn 
problem has, however, been deferred until after the con- 
clusion of the war, when an Imperial Conference is to 
be convened for the specific purpose of devising institu- 
tions in which the solidarity of the Commonwealth can 
find expression. 24 

As in the case of the formation of an effective super- 
national authority, probably the most formidable obstacle 
to such a reorganization of the British Empire as will 
bring its institutions into accord with its spirit, consists 
in the rigid concepts of an obsolescent political science. 
The unitary state with central legislative and executive 
organs of the existing type unfortunately suggests the 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 185 

potential coercion of minorities that are concrete entities 
with a definite geographical location and not merely more 
or less coherent groups dispersed throughout the body 
politic. While there is no necessary opposition between 
Dominion patriotism and the larger patriotism to the 
Commonwealth of Nations, while the two may co-exist in 
full vigour, the theory of a supreme sovereignty demand- 
ing an undivided allegiance creates a disharmony between 
two concurrent loyalties and establishes an unreal an- 
tithesis between colonial nationalism and imperialism. 
The problem is to create the political framework for a 
multicellular commonwealth of co-operating nations, unit- 
ing them for their common purposes but allowing full 
scope to the development of their distinctive ideals. In 
this connection, Lieutenant-General Smuts has very sug- 
gestively said : 

" Let me give you one word of warning. In thinking of this 
matter, do not try to think of existing political institutions which 
have been evolved in the course of European developments. 
The British Empire is a much larger and more diverse problem 
than anything we have seen hitherto, and the sort of constitution 
we read about in books, the sort of political alphabet which has 
been elaborated in years gone by, does not apply and would not 
solve the problems of the future. We should not follow 
precedents, but make them." 25 

Although this problem is one of absorbing interest, it 
is not necessary in the present discussion to attempt a 
forecast of either the nature or the details of its solution. 
In this connection, the only important point is that here- 
after British foreign policy will be directed and controlled 
by organs representative of all the English-speaking peo- 



186 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

pies in the Empire and that future alliances will be con- 
tracted by such imperial agencies and not by the Foreign 
Secretary and Parliament of the United Kingdom alone. 
The new situation was explained by Sir Robert Borden 
after his return to Canada in the following words: 

" It is not proposed that the Government of the United King- 
dom shall, in foreign affairs, act first and consult us afterwards. 
The principle has been definitely and finally laid down that in 
these matters the Dominions shall be consulted before the Em- 
pire is committed to any policy which might involve the issues of 
peace or war." 

There is no more important question than the relations 
of the American people to those of the British Common- 
wealth. It is far more important to-day than it was a 
generation ago when "the ideal of English-speaking re- 
union " was the centre of Cecil Rhodes's political aspira- 
tions. 26 Their future relations will be determined by a 
variety of causes, cultural, psychological, economic, and 
political. But the most potent influence of all is the fact 
that English is their common tongue. As a result of this 
alone, whether the relations of the two great branches of 
the English-speaking people are to be those of sympa- 
thetic co-operation or those of antagonistic competition, 
the ties cannot fail to be intimate ones. When asked 
what was the greatest political fact of modern times, Bis- 
marck is reported to have responded, that it was " the 
inherited and permanent fact that North America speaks 
English." 27 Whether the saying be authentic or not, the 
remark is certainly worthy of its reputed author's keen 
insight into political fundamentals. 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 187 

The United States is not only a body politic whose 
structure and cultural life spring from British origins 
that have determined the entire course of its evolution, 
but in addition it has always been and still is an English- 
speaking country with all the far-reaching consequences 
that this vital fact implies. It has been said by an Eng- 
lish historian who was so thoroughly imbued with Ger- 
man political thought as to be conspicuously un-English 
in outlook, that the purpose of the British Empire in the 
past had been " to give all men within its bounds an 
English mind." 2S Such, however, has not been the 
Empire's purpose, nor has such been its general effect, 
except on the self-governing English-speaking peoples in 
the United States, Canada, Australasia, and Africa. The 
spirit of British imperialism is predominantly super- 
national. In this connection, the following sentences of 
Lord Milner may well be quoted. In 1913, he wrote: 

" Do not let me be thought to advocate the ' anglicization ' of 
the non-British races of the Empire, or to wish to force them 
into a British mould. Imperialism is something wider than 
' Anglo-Saxondom ' or even than ' Pan-Britannicism.' The 
power of incorporating alien races, without trying to dis- 
integrate them, or to rob them of their individuality, is char- 
acteristic of the British imperial system. It is not by what 
it takes away, but by what it gives, not by depriving them of 
their own character, language, and traditions, but by ensuring 
them the retention of all these, and at the same time opening 
new vistas of culture and advancement, that it seeks to win them 
to itself." 29 

The American system is just the reverse. It is not 

cosmopolitan or supernational, but intensely national. 

Its success depends upon giving the child an American 



188 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

mind. Despite systematic attempts to emphasize the 
national characteristics of this mind, it is in all essen- 
tials identical with that of the other English-speaking 
peoples in Britain, Canada, Australasia, and South 
Africa. The " melting-pot " fuses the child into an ap- 
proximately uniform type, which is clearly discernible 
despite infinite individual variations. Any radical 
divergence from the normal is regarded askance, and 
hence the immigrant's son is prone to " out-Herod 
Herod " in his Americanism. He resents the slightest 
intimation that he is not as thorough and as good an 
American as is his neighbour. He keeps his father's 
native country in the obscure background, because he 
realizes that such external ties are a bar to success in that 
they establish the existence of differences between him 
and his fellow citizens. Despite the heterogeneous ori- 
gins of America's population, American civilization is not 
an amalgam of the civilizations of various European coun- 
tries. Extreme nationalists are prone to insist that the 
United States had no especial cultural affiliations with 
any one European people. Philosophical idealists, who 
would fain have American civilization be a composite 
of the best of all nations, tend to take the same view. It 
is both contrary to the facts and to the course of social 
evolution. 

Ever since Darwin demonstrated the potential adapt- 
ability of the primitive Fuegian to civilized conditions, it 
has been recognized that race is far more a cultural than 
a physical fact. If the consciousness of outward physi- 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 189 

cal differences could be altogether eliminated, as can to a 
great extent be done in the case of the Caucasian, race 
might even be termed a predominantly cultural fact. 
There is no scientific evidence that those psychological 
and mental traits that are deemed the peculiar attributes 
of Englishmen, Frenchmen, Italians, or Germans are in- 
herited in a physical sense. 30 If a number of German 
new-born were transferred into a purely English environ- 
ment, they would, provided neither they nor any one else 
knew anything at the time about their origin, develop in 
all likelihood into as typical Englishmen as a similar num- 
ber of native-born who had been subjected to the same 
social and educational influences. To a great extent, this 
is what has happened in the United States. That the fu- 
sion has not been perfect is due to the impossibility of en- 
tirely eliminating in the course of the second generation, 
and even later, both the inner consciousness and the outer 
knowledge of external origin. 31 The immigrant brought 
his own standards from Europe, but his children acquired 
the typical American viewpoint from their environment. 
The main agency has been the free-school system, which 
tends to produce uniformity of type and homogeneity of 
outlook. The barriers that cut these children off from 
the civilization of their parents' country are, on the one 
side, social compulsion, because divergence from the typi- 
cal is a handicap ; and, on the other side, differences of lan- 
guage that prevent the English-speaking child from un- 
derstanding his father's original countrymen. The part 
played by language can scarcely be over-estimated, for 



i 9 o THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

" an individual is a mental slave to the tongue he speaks." 
It determines the limits of his intellectual life which can 
be transcended only by the man of extraordinary gifts or 
of exceptional opportunities. The social mind and the 
contents of his language exercise absolute sway over the 
average man. He is slave to " that incalculable potency 
broadly called literature, spoken or written — the ora- 
tory, romance, poetry, philosophy, history, and science — 
which is his daily mental food all the years of his con- 
scious life." 32 

Hence, in spite of the fact that the population of the 
United States is composed of many European strains, 
there is an essential unity in so far as the Caucasian 
native-born elements are concerned. This unity of lan- 
guage has given to these Caucasians born in the United 
States a common mind, and this mind does not differ in 
essentials from that of the other English-speaking peo- 
ples. As has been said by Professor Hart, " the stand- 
ards, aspirations and moral and political ideals of the 
original English settlers not only dominate their own 
descendants, but permeate the body of immigrants of 
other races." 33 The son of the immigrant into the 
United States finds himself at home in Canada, Australia 
or Britain, while he feels himself a detached stranger 
within his own ancestral gates in Continental Europe. 

The efficiency of the "melting-pot" is, however, far 
from perfect, and in recent decades its capacity has been 
sorely overtaxed. In addition, there is a largely uncon- 
scious, but very real, determination on the part of those 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 191 

of British ancestry not to allow the control of affairs to 
pass out of their hands. This is reinforced by no small 
measure of racial and religious prejudice on the part of 
the dominant majority and by an instinctive, though not 
avowed and generally recognized, distrust of those of 
different origin. It is of decided significance that the 
Americanism of neither candidate in the presidential 
campaign of 19 16 was impugned, although Mr. Wilson's 
grandfather came from North Ireland as recently as 
1807, while Mr. Hughes missed a Welsh nativity by only 
a few years. In the case of none but those of British 
ancestry would such close proximity to European ances- 
tors have escaped unchallenged, especially during a world- 
wide war. In 1895, President Wilson said: "The 
common British stock did first make the country, and has 
always set the pace." 34 That there is such a leading 
and dominant majority of Anglo-Saxon descent even the 
most cursory examination of the facts will demonstrate. 
Some twenty years ago, Senator Lodge made a study 
of the distribution of ability in the United States, using 
as his material a well-known cyclopaedia of American 
biography, whose concluding volume had appeared in 
1889. 35 This work aimed to list all Americans who had 
attained eminence as statesmen, soldiers, clergymen, au- 
thors, lawyers, scientists, or in any other capacity, and 
contained 14,243 biographies. Of these 12,519 bore 
British names, 36 659 German and 589 Huguenot. These 
results were confessedly defective in that only the descent 
on the paternal side was traced and there is some reason 



192 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

to believe that ability is more often transmitted through 
the mother. Moreover, eminence is not synonymous 
with ability; other factors are just as influential, and in 
many instances they are even more so. More recent in- 
vestigations have confirmed these general results. 37 The 
patronymics of the President and his Cabinet, of the 
Supreme Court, and of the Senate are overwhelmingly 
British in origin. To a less extent this is also true of 
Congress. In 1915, it was found that out of the 383 
higher officials of the State Governments, no less than 
326 had British names. At that time also, 29 out of the 
32 generals on the active list of the American Army, and 
2^ out of the 27 admirals on the active list of the Ameri- 
can Navy bore family names of the same origin. Simi- 
larly, it has been found that the parents of American men 
of science are predominantly British-American, " with an 
admixture of nearly 8 per cent, of Germans and about 5 
per cent, from other nationalities." 38 

In discussing the results of his tabulations, Senator 
Lodge stated his belief that " in proportion to their num- 
bers the Huguenots have produced more and the Germans 
fewer men of ability than other races in the United 
States." The explanation offered is convincing. The 
Germans settled originally in compact groups in only 
three of the thirteen colonies. Retaining their language 
and customs for approximately a century, they kept them- 
selves more or less separated from the balance of the 
community. As was complained in colonial days, 
" being ignorant of our language and laws, and settling 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 193 

in a body together," they constituted " a distinct people 
from his Majesty's subjects." As an inevitable result, 
they handicapped themselves in competing for those 
prizes of life which depend to a great extent upon the 
support and confidence of the public as a whole. 

These researches prove two things beyond peradven- 
ture : first, the overwhelming predominance of the British 
stock in the upbuilding of the United States and its pres- 
ent ascendancy in directing the affairs of the nation; sec- 
ondly, that those immigrants and their children have best 
succeeded who have become most speedily and most com- 
pletely Americanized, and that only under such an even- 
tuality can they expect a free field for the development 
of their potential abilities. Not only is the United States 
governed by men who are predominantly of British stock, 
but in addition its native-born Caucasian population is 
fully impregnated with the ideals and standards that are 
the common intellectual heritage of all English-speaking 
peoples. These find expression in like political principles 
and institutions. The rule of law and the equality of all 
before it, an untrammelled and compelling public opinion, 
self-government as against autocracy and bureaucracy, 
the absence of a military spirit and caste, and the stress 
laid upon individual rights as against the undue claims of 
the state, are some of the characteristic features uniting 
in one common civilization all the English-speaking peo- 
ples. Over a century ago, before science had revealed 
the effect of language upon thought, Wordsworth seems 
intuitively to have divined this relation when he wrote : 



194 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

" We must be free or die, who speak the tongue 
That Shakespeare spake; the faith and morals hold 
Which Milton held." 

A common literature in the past and to a great extent 
also in the present creates common ideals. Of these the 
most fundamental is that of liberty — the qualified lib- 
erty of self-realization in the ordered freedom of a self- 
governing community. 39 

" An intimate like-mindedness," such as connects all 
branches of the wide-spread English-speaking people is, 
as Professor Dunning has well said, " the indispensable 
factor in permanent international amity." 40 But it does 
not necessarily cause such amity. Until the past two 
decades, the relations between the United States and Eng- 
land constituted a strange series of misunderstandings 
that kept the kindred peoples apart. The War of Inde- 
pendence, which in many of the colonies assumed the 
character of a civil war, left a legacy of bitterness such 
as only conflicts of that nature can generate. Before it 
could disappear, this feeling was implanted in the next 
generation by the War of 1812. As fate willed it, the 
declaration of war was signed by President Madison two 
days after the British Government had announced that 
the Orders in Council constituting the grievance would be 
immediately withdrawn. Within a few days, this repeal 
was actually issued. But as there was no telegraphic 
communication, the news of this action could not arrive in 
time to avert the conflict. 41 Its conclusion ushered in a 
century of peaceful relations, but left outstanding many 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 195 

unsettled matters resulting from the fact that the British 
Empire is an important American Power with great terri- 
torial and economic interests both on the continent and 
in the Caribbean. These differences were all settled 
peacefully, and on the whole equitably, leaving little, 
or no aftermath of ill-feeling. The prospect of sin- 
cerely harmonious relations was, however, again de- 
ferred by the Civil War. The path of a neutral during 
an internecine war, in which both belligerents are firmly 
convinced of the righteousness of their respective causes, 
is beset with grave perils. England did not escape the 
inevitable consequences of her Government's fundamen- 
tally impartial conduct. 42 Both North and South re- 
sented this official neutrality. Moreover, the generally 
unfriendly attitude of the governing classes to the North, 
which was especially marked before the abolition of 
slavery became an avowed issue, obscured the deep sym- 
pathy of a constantly growing majority of the English 
people. The resentment arising from these factors pro- 
foundly influenced Anglo-American relations and is still 
an element that has vitality. 

A marked change in the feelings between England and 
the United States set in after the settlement of the Ven- 
ezuelan dispute in 1896, which had brought home to the 
consciousness of both peoples the tragedy involved in a 
war between them. The gradually increasing friend- 
ship had apparently secured an unassailable foundation 
when the Great War broke out. During the first thirty 
odd months of the conflict, Great Britain and the Do- 



196 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

minions became distinctly estranged from the United 
States. The fundamental cause of this estrangement 
was the neutral course of the Government. If in deed, 
though not in word, the policy of President Wilson was 
one of benevolent neutrality towards the Entente Powers, 
as some contend it was, this good-will was not overt and 
its surreptitiousness deprived it of all moral value and 
of all political advantage. Among sorely tried peoples, 
keenly conscious of fighting for a cause with which the 
United States was closely identified, this apparently rigid 
neutrality of the Government outweighed the openly ex- 
pressed sympathy of the great majority of the American 
people. With the parts reversed, it was much the same 
situation as during the Civil War when Lowell thus 
addressed John Bull : 

" We know we 've got a cause, John, 
Thet 's honest, just, an' true; 
We thought 'twould win applause, John, 
Ef nowheres else, from you." 

Before the entrance of the United States into the war 
on the broad issue for which the Allies were contending, 
there was the gravest danger of a renewed schism be- 
tween the English-speaking peoples. This would have 
been disastrous to them, for their fortunes are really in- 
separable. In 19 1 6, before this menacing probability 
had been removed, an American publicist truly and 
forcibly said: 

" Which will win ? I do not know. Which is best ? I will 
not say. But one thing I do know and will say. Yea, I will 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 197 

proclaim it from the housetops. The British civilisation is ours. 
In it we live and move and have our being. Outside it we 
have no future. Let no man deceive us. Let us listen to no 
specious sophistries about our composite people and our dis- 
tinctive civilization. We speak one language, we cherish one 
literature, we recognize one political principle of temperate cen- 
tral rule and local freedom, and these are the language, the 
literature and ideal of Britain. . . . Our civilization, like our 
language, is the gift of a single people, and the difference be- 
tween here and there is hardly greater in civilization than in 
speech. . . . And this civilization will survive or perish as a 
unit. If it triumphs in the present struggle, we share in its 
triumph. ... If it fails, we shall as certainly see these in- 
stincts and these institutions discredited and ultimately dis- 
carded." iz 

These fundamental facts are more than sufficient war- \ 
rant for the fullest solidarity with the Entente Allies 
during the present war, and for an intimate democratic 
alliance with the other English-speaking peoples after its 
close. 44 It is not a question of mere sentiment based 
upon the inherent unity of these peoples. Like-minded- 
ness, even when accompanied by consciousness thereof, 
does not in itself lead to the voluntary association of 
kindred groups, though it furnishes the essential basis 
for genuine co-operation. 45 Outside pressure is usually 
required to counteract the inertia of peoples bred in tra- 
ditions of isolation. The German menace is emphatically 
supplying the pressure that makes such close and intimate 
co-operation imperative. 46 Upon the outcome of the war 
will depend the survival and future peaceful develop- 
ment of English-speaking civilization. The result may, 
however, not be decisive; and, under all circumstances, 



198 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

constant vigilance demands preparedness against a re- 
currence of the peril, even if it take a somewhat differ- 
ent guise. 



VII 
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 



"As defence, however, is of much more importance than 
opulence, the Act of Navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all 
commercial regulations of England." 
— Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, chapter ii. 

" In the light of experience gained during the War, we con- 
sider that special steps must be taken to stimulate the produc- 
tion of foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured articles 
within the Empire wherever the expansion of production is 
possible and economically desirable for the safety and welfare 
of the Empire as a whole." 

— Resolution of the British Committee on 
Commercial and Industrial Policy, Feb- 
ruary, 19 17. 



CHAPTER VII 
Economic Interdependence 

Economic Determinism — Economics and War — The Monop- 
oly Factor — Tariff Systems of the United States, Germany, and 
Great Britain — Colonial Policies of the United States, France, 
and Great Britain — The Central European Project — The 
Paris Economic Conference — British Economic Policies — 
Economic Interdependence of the British Commonwealth and 
the United States. 

The human mind has an inveterate tendency to seek 
a simple explanation for complex phenomena and to 
select from a multitude of contributing and convergent 
causes one that is hailed as dominant. " Man's instinct 
is to define, to establish some sort of order and sequence 
amid the seeming chaos of the universe. That which 
will not submit itself to reason threatens reason." * The 
choice of such a supreme factor is not infrequently de- 
pendent upon subjective considerations — upon a man's 
interests and purposes in life, as well as upon his moral 
and intellectual qualities. This point of view once firmly 
established, there is in turn a marked tendency to dis- 
regard facts and to twist them into preconceived for- 
mulae. As a result, the visualization of the world is far 
from being in accord with reality. The mental lens 

201 



202 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

produced by the craving for a monistic explanation of 
phenomena gives a distorted picture. 

In their efforts to explain the complex facts of eco- 
nomic life, the classical economists created " the economic 
man," an imaginary being solely influenced by regard 
for his own material interests. This abstraction was 
based upon a false psychology. It failed to take into 
account not only the altruistic and co-operative instincts, 
but also those self-regarding impulses — the craving for 
power, prestige, and prominence — that frequently over- 
shadow the desire for mere wealth and well-being. 
Moreover, this theory assumed not only that man was 
predominantly moved by his material interests, but also 
that he was generally able to recognize what these were. 
The force of ingrained habit and custom, the wide- 
spread ignorance, and the frequent subordination of rea- 
son to emotion were largely overlooked. This counter- 
feit presentment underestimated man's moral nature and 
overestimated his rationality. 

As a result of such destructive criticism, " the economic 
man " was relegated to the dust-bin of discarded hy- 
potheses, only to be resuscitated later in a different guise. 
During recent decades there has been a marked tendency 
among one school of thinkers to explain all historical 
phenomena by purely economic causes. It is a facile 
method of writing history, since it obviates the necessity 
of studying all the facts intensively, and demands merely 
the selection of those that fit in with the preconceived 
theory. Its results, furthermore, have the charm in- 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 203 

herent in a simple explanation of complex phenomena. 
But the fallacy of this purely economic interpretation 
is the same as that of " the economic man." It is based 
upon the same narrow psychology and results in a pic- 
ture of the world that bears only a slight resemblance 
to actuality. That the economic explanation is, as a 
rule, deemed insufficient and incomplete by professional 
historians, whose paramount function is to study all the 
facts of the past and to see them whole, is decidedly 
significant. The chief adherents of economic determin- 
ism are economists and socialists, to whom the past is, 
for the most part, merely a mine for illustrative material. 
The latter, strangely enough, while explaining all past de- 
velopment by a theory that conceives man to be a mere 
self -regarding automaton, yet demand a reorganization 
of society that postulates a far less selfish average man 
than history has as yet evolved. 

While the influence of the economic factors can read- 
ily be exaggerated, their importance can also easily be 
minimized. Economic forces work in two ways, directly 
and indirectly, both as causes and as motives. The con- 
scious motive for a policy may be entirely non-economic 
in character, while economic causes have had considerable 
influence in the adoption of the policy. The crude facts 
of life, the need for nourishment, covering, and shelter, 
are always somewhere in the background. They are the 
fundamental facts in primitive society but, as civilization 
progresses and as nature is mastered, they become less 
prominent though actually no less vital. 



204 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

" To get the whole world out of bed 
And washed, and dressed, and warmed, and fed, 
To work, and back to bed again, 
Believe me, Saul, costs worlds of pain." 

Man is, however, not satisfied with mere subsistence. 
His wants have a capacity of infinite expansion and the 
process of historical evolution is largely one of satisfying 
this demand. Only some of these wants are material; 
others are non-economic. The inner cry for self-realiza- 
tion demands satisfaction for the moral, emotional, intel- 
lectual, and aesthetic faculties, as well as for the baser 
and nobler cravings of ambition. As civilization ad- 
vances, economic forces work in the main silently in the 
background, while man's interpretation of his wants, 
both economic and other, accelerate and retard that work 
and sometimes even deform it. The two processes usu- 
ally go on side by side, seemingly disconnected, but in 
varying degrees always interacting. The great factor in 
modern western civilization was the Industrial Revolution 
that made coal, steam, and machinery man's servant. 
This momentous change was effected in England, silently 
and gradually, during the forty years from 1775 to 181 5, 
of which thirty were years of war. This far-reaching 
economic revolution did not bring about the Anglo- 
French and the Napoleonic Wars, nor in turn were these 
wars either a direct or a contributing cause of the new 
industrial system. Among the factors that pushed Revo- 
lutionary France into a war of conquest against Europe 
were probably some of an economic nature. But they 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 205 

were distinctly subordinate. Similarly, England's pre- 
dominant motive in opposing the French attempt to rule 
a conquered Europe was the desire for security, which 
had negative economic elements in it. To characterize it 
as essentially economic would be equivalent to such an ex- 
tension of the connotation of the term as to make it mean- 
ingless. It would then be synonymous with all of life. 
But the economic revolution, distinct though it was from 
this bitter international struggle, had a bearing upon it; 
and the war, in turn, influenced the progress of the revo- 
lution. The new economic system added to England's 
resources; and the fact that Continental Europe was for 
twenty odd years the scene of constant fighting delayed 
the introduction of the system there, gave England an in- 
valuable advantage and made possible her so-called com- 
mercial supremacy. The economic causes of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were remote, but 
their indirect economic consequences were most impor- 
tant, while the economic resources of the combatants ex- 
ercised an important influence on the ultimate outcome. 

Similar are the factors in the existing world-wide war. 
The connection between economic rivalry and war among 
primitive peoples is patent. Excessive population and 
the need of more land for hunting, grazing, and agri- 
culture led to constant warfare, whose economic advan- 
tages were enhanced by the enslavement of the conquered 
peoples and by the confiscation of their lands and private 
property. 2 This nexus becomes less conspicuous as we 
approach civilized conditions. Other factors, the lure 



206 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

of glory and prestige, the quest of dominion and power, 
the gregarious pride of nationalism, and the dynastic 
interests and ambitions of autocracies play their part in 
producing war. In addition, there is also active, to a 
varying extent, the commercial rivalry of groups segre- 
gated into sharply defined entities under the modern 
state system. The wars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, 
and eighteenth centuries were largely due to conscious 
economic motives. 3 This was especially true of those 
conflicts resulting from the attempts of Portugal and 
Spain to exclude by force all traders of other nationali- 
ties from the East and from America. After much 
fighting, the Dutch, English, and French succeeded in 
breaking these monopolies. Similarly, the Anglo-Dutch 
Wars of the seventeenth century resulted largely from 
the efforts of Holland to exclude Englishmen from com- 
mercial intercourse with the East Indies and with West 
Africa, as well as from friction resulting from England's 
Navigation Acts which curtailed the wide-spread activities 
of the Dutch mercantile marine. Cromwell suggested 
a radical solution of the difficulty when he proposed a 
political union of the two nations which would have 
permitted Englishmen and Dutchmen to share in the 
commercial preserves of each other. 4 The willingness 
to enter such a union is the infallible test for determining 
which group is benefiting by monopolies and privileges 
other than those conferred by nature. 

The economic motive was not quite so predominant in 
the Anglo-French commercial and colonial wars of the 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 207 

eighteenth century, but it was important. Here again 
the element of monopoly entered, since under the old 
colonial system the trade of the colony was largely con- 
fined to the metropolis. Such monopolies were a direct 
cause of war, because force could break them. War 
cannot, however, act so effectively in the case of the 
more normal rivalry between the various groups forming 
the modern state-system, whose political separation was 
in most instances further emphasized by the erection of 
customs barriers. States so protected are frequently in 
active economic strife with their fellows, but their tariff 
wars have rarely caused actual armed conflicts, chiefly 
because force could accomplish little. 

At the present day, conditions have considerably al- 
tered. With the equalization of values throughout the 
world, the inordinate profits that were formerly gained 
in trade with outlying regions have disappeared. Hence, 
the economic inducement to monopolize such trade has 
been greatly diminished. At the same time also, the 
growing interdependence of the world and the increas- 
ing internationalization of commerce and finance have 
weakened the former view that the state, and not the in- 
dividual, is engaged in foreign commerce. There still 
remain, however, important vestiges of the older per- 
sistent attempts to monopolize exclusive sources of sup- 
ply and markets in the East and West which characterized 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the mari- 
time states of Europe sought to create self-sufficient 
commercial empires. 5 National monopolization of co- 



208 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

lonial trade is still widely current. Even to-day, the 
policy of statesmen is influenced by these older ideas 
and public opinion is largely affected by them. 6 It is 
not difficult to demonstrate that with the shrinkage of 
the world and its increasing economic interdependence, 
these ideas are largely, if not wholly, outworn. 7 The 
dramatic terms of neo-mercantilism — invasion, capture 
and loss of markets, commercial supremacy — do not, as 
a rule, convey an accurate picture of the present economic 
process. They tend to give the impression that the for- 
eign trade of the world is a fixed quantity for which the 
commercial nations are fighting as dogs for a bone. But, 
while it is true that the trade of the world has an in- 
finite capacity for expansion, and that one nation's com- 
mercial prosperity does not mean its competitor's de- 
cline, this truth must be generally realized before it can 
fully affect political action. 

Modern mercantilism is far less crude than was its 
prototype and its aims are less predominantly economic 
and are more thoroughly permeated with political objects. 
Its purpose is not so much to increase wealth as to safe- 
guard the nation's economic development. It bases its 
calculations more upon conditions during war than upon 
those of peace. Provided goods in transit are free from 
duties, as they generally are in such instances, it can be 
of slight economic importance to Germany to control the 
mouth of the Rhine or to Russia to acquire the Dar- 
danelles. Only in time of war is such direct access to 
open water important and then its value is entirely de- 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 209 

pendent upon control of the sea. In fact, if the enemy 
control the sea, it is obviously of quite some utility to 
have a neutral interposed between the hinterland and 
the dominant sea power. But lack of control over im- 
portant commercial outlets, while inevitable under exist- 
ing conditions, creates a feeling of insecurity. Similarly, 
under modern conditions, the industrial states are be- 
coming more and more dependent upon foreign markets 
and upon foreign sources of supply. This again results 
in a desire to secure physical control over such markets 
and sources of supply so as to be sure of retaining them. 

This feeling of insecurity is inevitable in an econom- 
ically interdependent world that is politically completely 
unorganized. It was raised to a morbid pitch in some 
quarters in Germany because there the theory of sov- 
ereignty is carried more fully to its logical conclusion 
and limitations upon complete freedom of action to which 
all other states must comply are looked upon as intol- 
erable grievances. The modern state system was not 
devised for industrial states dependent for their very 
existence upon factors outside their borders and beyond 
their control. 

While Germany was not suffering from any economic 
pressure, this state of mind among many of her leaders, 
especially among the captains of industry and the pundits 
of economic lore, greatly reinforced the aggressive tend- 
encies that rested upon non-economic motives. In view 
of the plain facts, it would be incorrect to say that eco- 
nomic conditions impelled Germany to war. Before 



210 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

they are translated into policy and action, economic facts 
must become psychological forces. It was the way some 
Germans interpreted the situation and the future possi- 
bilities inherent in it that added to the aggressive spirit 
of a nation imbued with the idea of an almost sacred 
mission to rehabilitate a " decadent world." 

It is impossible to escape from the conclusion that, 
while the growing economic interdependence of the world 
is a bond of union between the citizens of different states, 
it may be and often is at the same time a source of dis- 
cord between the states themselves. There is an increas- 
ing disharmony between this interdependence and the 
freedom of action and independence that the theory of 
sovereignty attributes to the modern state. This dis- 
harmony produces unrest and leads to international fric- 
tion. The more the theory of sovereignty is pushed to 
its logical conclusion, the more irksome appears to be 
dependence on factors beyond the state's frontiers and 
the more keen is the desire to secure actual control over 
these necessary complements to the national economic 
life. It is largely to lessen such dependence that tariff 
barriers have been erected. Their aim in part is to bring 
the economic system of each state into harmony with the 
legal and political self-sufficiency that sovereignty postu- 
lates. As long as the modern state system remains intact 
and tariffs further divide people from people, economic 
interdependence cannot exert its full strength in the 
direction of international amity. An element of eco- 
nomic discord of varying intensity remains. This dis- 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 211 

cord may be counteracted by other factors, as it has been 
in the case of the relations between England and the 
United States, whose growing friendship has synchro- 
nized with a period when the United States adopted ex- 
ceedingly high tariffs that greatly injured some important 
British industries. Nor did the growing American com- 
petition in neutral markets avail to overcome the friendly 
tendencies. International amities are based largely upon 
other than economic factors. While, on the one hand, 
commercial rivalry may not lead to ill-feeling, on the 
other, a markedly unequal degree of interdependence be- 
tween two states — that is, a clearly one-sided dependence 
of one upon the other — has this tendency. From the 
earliest colonial days to the close of the last century there 
existed towards England on the part of Americans a 
general feeling similar to that of the debtor West to- 
wards the industrial and capitalistic East of the United 
States. When financial independence from British capi- 
tal was all but secured toward the end of the last century, 
this feeling largely disappeared. 

The whole subject of international friendships and 
antipathies is one of such infinite complexity, involving 
so many converging and contrasting factors, that it is im- 
possible to formulate any brief generalization about their 
causes. If, however, the economic factor be segregated, 
it cannot but be recognized that tariff barriers are in 
themselves not productive of international good-will. 
As in the case of military and naval armaments, pro- 
tective tariffs in one state lead to the same fiscal policy 



212 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

in others. Carried to its logical conclusion, the system 
of protection cannot fail to lead to international antag- 
onisms. It is essentially an indirect denial of the unity 
of mankind. Of all the Great Powers, England was the 
only one that steadfastly adhered to free trade and, re- 
gardless of whether her policy was from the purely eco- 
nomic standpoint wise or injudicious, it had an ines- 
timable moral value in fashioning among her leaders 
something that at least approached an international mind. 
Closely connected with the protective system, is the ideal 
of economic self-sufficiency. From the standpoint of the 
state this ideal is defensible, but from a broader stand- 
point it is a denial of economic interdependence and runs 
counter to the integration of the world. Moreover, it 
is not based upon conditions of peace, but contemplates 
a state of war. It is apparently defensive in its nature, 
but it has aggressive implications. By reason of its im- 
munity from some of the perils of war, the diplomacy 
of the self-contained state tends to become aggressive. 
During the century stretching from the fall of Napoleon 
to the present war, England was only once involved in 
war with a European Power. The Crimean War, how- 
ever, was not only an evitable one, but it was due to a 
policy that is now generally regarded to have been a mis- 
taken one. This pacific attitude was due in large part to 
the fact that England is the centre of a widely scattered 
and hence very vulnerable Empire and that her existence 
is dependent upon an extensive foreign trade of which 
two parts in three are with countries under foreign flags. 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 213 

Abuse of power would inevitably have led to the forma- 
tion of a European coalition against England, as did 
actually happen once. Its result at that time was the 
independence of the United States. Napoleon could 
never understand why Great Britain had derived so little 
benefit from the long struggle culminating at Waterloo. 
" In the position of affairs nothing could have been re- 
fused to you," he said, and " your ministers, too, should 
have stipulated for a commercial monopoly in the seas 
of India and China." " You ought not to have allowed 
the French or any other nation to put their nose beyond 
the Cape." 8 Had the great militarist's policy been fol- 
lowed, the British Navy's record from 1815 to 19 14 
would not have been so uneventful a one, nor might the 
British Empire have developed into what it is to-day. 9 

The spirit of international relations in the future will 
depend largely upon the fiscal policies of the various states. 
Cobden was unquestionably correct when he argued that 
free trade made for international good-will and peace. 
Unfortunately, there is no indication that one of the 
war's results will be an immediate step forward towards; 
less restricted trade. In fact, the opposite bids fair to 
be its result and this will become the more inevitable as 
the financial burdens incurred by the belligerents become 
greater. What the future has in store can in a measure 
be estimated by the course of opinion in the leading in- 
dustrial nations. 

There are, in general, three distinct types of fiscal 
policy exemplified by the different practices of the three 



214 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

chief industrial states — the United States, Germany, 
and Great Britain. The American policy is distinctly 
defensive in nature, its main purpose being to protect the 
high standard of life prevailing among the labouring and 
producing classes of the United States by reserving to 
them, as far as is possible and advisable, the American 
market. With this object in view, high tariff walls were 
built to protect not alone the manufacturer but the pro- 
ducer of raw materials and foodstuffs as well. When, 
however, the exportation of manufactured articles began 
to increase rapidly, as happened towards the end of the 
last century, and this foreign trade became an important 
element in the national economy, it was realized that the 
imposition of heavy import duties on raw materials and 
foodstuffs was detrimental. Hence, the Underwood 
Tariff of 191 3, in general either removed or greatly re- 
duced these duties, but it retained the system of high 
protective duties on imported manufactured articles. 
Although this law has been hailed as marking the advent 
of a new commercial freedom, this is true in only a very 
relative sense. The barrier against manufactures was 
distinctly lowered, but not to such an extent as to imperil 
the monopoly of the American market that the domestic 
manufacturer was enjoying. In the ten months ending 
July 31, 1914 — the ante-bellum period of normal opera- 
tion — free goods consisting predominantly of raw ma- 
terials and foodstuffs amounted to 61.5 per cent, of the 
total imports. The remainder, consisting largely of man- 
ufactured goods, paid average duties of 37.1 per cent. 10 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 215 

These rates are very far from low. 11 Nor is there 
manifest any tendency further to decrease them. On the 
contrary, there is very wide-spread the opinion that with- 
out further protection, the American manufacturer's hold 
on the domestic market will be weakened owing to the 
increased efficiency and improved organization of post- 
bellum Europe. Those industries that have been estab- 
lished as a result of the stoppage of the European supply 
insistently demand future security — such provision was 
made in the summer of 19 16 for the dye-stuff industry — 
and the older established trades are likewise clamor- 
ous. Thus, there is slight prospect of a relaxation of the 
commercial restrictions. Free trade, as it was under- 
stood in ante-bellum England, is altogether beyond the 
political horizon. It is the ultimate goal of some reform- 
ers, but only a small and negligible fraction of the elec- 
torate would vote for its immediate introduction. The 
economic results of so sudden and drastic a readjustment 
would be appallingly disastrous. 

While the fiscal policy of the United States has been 
predominantly defensive in character, a wide-spread cam- 
paign is being made to enlist the government's support in 
maintaining and extending the country's foreign trade. 
As has been said by one of the leaders of this movement, 
" governmental policy has been developed for every other 
activity that has made this country great," such as west- 
ward expansion, internal development, railway construc- 
tion, and the growth of industry. 12 Up to the present 
time, however, American foreign trade has been but 



216 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

little aided by the government. This distinguishes the 
policy of the United States from that of Germany. 
While the one is purely defensive, the other is in addi- 
tion also offensive. 

In its purely defensive character the German pro- 
tective system is very much like that of the United 
States. It is more systematic and scientific, but its aim 
is fundamentally the same — that of protecting the home 
market from foreign importations. While in the United 
States the duties on foodstuffs were imposed largely for 
political purposes and had little economic effect, 13 in Ger- 
many, however, agricultural protection was a most im- 
portant element in the system. It was deemed essential 
to national security to preserve in full vigour the agri- 
cultural life. 14 But, in addition, the German Govern- 
ment co-operated actively with the individual in fostering 
the export trade. This was largely conducted by inter- 
locking combinations of producers and manufacturers, in 
some of which the government was even financially in- 
terested and whose operations as a whole it supervised. 
Every facility and assistance, such as exceptionally low 
railroad rates, was given to the exporter. Goods were 
systematically sold for considerably less in the foreign 
than in the domestic market. 15 In addition, the diplo- 
matic resources of the government were used to secure 
advantageous commercial arrangements for Germany. 
The favoured nation proviso in the outstanding commer- 
cial treaties did not stand in the way of such discrimina- 
tion, for it was easily circumvented by the skilful wording 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 217 

of tariff schedules. 16 In addition, Germany's military 
power and the scarcely-veiled threat implied in it was 
used to obtain commercial advantages. It was under 
duress, during the Russo-Japanese War, that Russia 
finally agreed to the unfavourable commercial treaty of 
1904. 17 The German system was essentially a national 
one. 18 The German exporters did not trade so much as 
individuals but as members of a state and their activities 
were carefully supervised by the government. The Ger- 
man Government was waging a systematic economic war 
of an offensive nature against all-comers, but especially 
against Great Britain. 

The prosperity of the two large German shipping com- 
panies, the Hamburg-American and the North German 
Lloyd, was largely dependent upon the European emigra- 
tion to America. With the virtual cessation of emigra- 
tion from Germany during the past twenty years, Italy 
and Eastern Europe have been the sources whence the 
American melting-pot was supplied. The German Gov- 
ernment used all means to secure this passenger traffic 
from Eastern Europe for the Hamburg and Bremen 
lines. Every difficulty was placed in the way of the 
Russian and Polish emigrant who desired to traverse 
Germany unless he had purchased a transportation ticket 
for these lines. Those with tickets for the British and 
French lines were harassed and obliged to return home. 19 
In contrast with this practice, the British Government 
did not impose port dues when the German liners made 
their financially indispensable stop off Southampton, even 



218 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

though the English companies in the American passenger 
traffic had to pay such fees. These contrasting practices 
well illustrate the fundamental difference between Ger- 
man policy and that of Great Britain. While the former 
was intensely and aggressively national, the latter was 
that of governmental non-interference which the theory 
of free trade postulates. As Mr. Bertrand Russell has 
said, " most Germans think of trade in nationalist terms, 
but in England this habit is not very common." 20 

Despite some quite minor and not wholly incidental 
protective features, 21 the British customs tariff was pre- 
eminently designed to raise revenue. It was not a pro- 
tective but a fiscal measure. Under it, the British market 
was open on equal terms to all producers and manufac- 
turers the world over. Not only was the system that pre- 
vailed before the war an almost absolute expression of 
free trade doctrines, but laissez faire principles in other 
respects had in a measure converted it into the positive 
antithesis of a protective system. The railroad rates en- 
couraged the importer at the expense of the domestic 
producer and acted as virtual bounties on imports. 22 

At the turn of the century there was a marked revolt 
against this general policy, but the wide-spread prosperity 
during the decade preceding the outbreak of the war ena- 
bled the traditional free trade doctrines to withstand this 
assault. It is self-evident that a state which admits freely 
everything that others can produce more cheaply, while 
everything in which it has an advantage must overcome 
customs barriers, is not in an advantageous position. 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 219 

Moreover, a policy of free imports leaves a state largely 
defenceless against commercial discrimination. The 
Japanese tariff of 191 1 advanced the duties on British 
goods considerable more than those on imports from 
other countries. The reason for such discrimination 
against an ally is to be found in Count Komura's blunt 
words : " Great Britain has what is called a free-trade 
policy; there is no reason for a convention with that 
country." 23 At the present stage of the discussion it 
is, however, not so necessary to evaluate the relative 
economic benefits and disadvantages to a state of a pol- 
icy of free trade in a world of highly protected com- 
petitors, as to realize that such freedom is a powerful 
force making for international good-will. 

It is impossible fully to understand the economic sys- 
tem of the ante-bellum world without a knowledge of the 
policies adopted in regulating the trade of colonies and 
dependencies. There is considerable variety in practice, 
but the fundamental characteristics will be made evident 
by an analysis of the systems of the United States, 
France, and Great Britain. In general, the policy of the 
United States is to include all territorial accessions within 
the national customs domain. Hawaii and Porto Rico 
are enclosed within the American tariff barriers and, since 
1909, the same system has been applied with some limi- 
tations to the Philippines. With Cuba, a different ar- 
rangement was effected. The reciprocity treaty of 1903 
provides for mutual preferential treatment of imports. 
Thus, the most important articles imported from the 



220 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

United States into Cuba pay there 30 per cent, less than 
the regular customs duties. Largely as a result of this, 
the United States has virtually monopolized the trade 
of Hawaii and Porto Rico and to a less extent also that 
of the Philippines and of Cuba. 24 The total external 
commerce of these islands in 19 13 amounted to the very 
considerable sum of 569 million dollars, 25 of which 392 
millions or 70 per cent, was with the United States. The 
free admission of the products of these islands, especially 
of sugar, has been equivalent to a direct bounty and has 
been of enormous benefit to them. 26 On the other hand, 
largely as a result of this general arrangement, nearly 
two thirds of their imports came from the United States. 
In 1894, merchandise to the value of only $362,878 was 
imported into the Philippines from the United States, 
but twenty years later this insignificant amount had ex- 
panded to nearly 2.J million dollars. 27 

Although France has a colonial domain far vaster in 
extent and far more populous than is that of the United 
States, 28 the aggregate amounts of their respective co- 
lonial trades, provided that with Cuba be included in the 
American total, are virtually the same. 29 The French 
system of regulating colonial trade is likewise similar to 
that of the United States, but it is far more complicated 
and varied. 30 In some of the dependencies, notably in 
Morocco, the open door to all comers on equal terms has 
been guaranteed by international agreement. The same 
freedom of trade prevails also in French India. But in 
some of the most important colonies, such as Algeria, 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 221 

Indo-China, and Madagascar, the policy of tariff assimi- 
lation had been pursued and the colony has been included 
within the customs sphere of the metropolis. In other 
instances, such as the French West Indies, this policy of 
assimilation has been modified to meet special conditions. 
Again, in some instances, fiscal policy has been even 
more adapted to local needs, but with this is generally 
combined preferential treatment of French goods, as well 
as similar advantages to the colonial products in France. 
The general result of this policy is to confine the colonial 
trade largely to the French market. In Algeria, espe- 
cially, other factors, such as proximity and the relatively 
large European population, have the same tendency. It 
is also undeniable that Algeria has benefited greatly from 
the absence of customs barriers between her and France. 
The total over-sea trade of this, the most important of 
French colonies, amounted in 1912 to 1153 million 
francs, of which 969 million or 84 per cent, was with 
France. 31 Similar conditions obtained in Tunis, but to 
a decidedly less marked extent. 32 The remaining French 
colonies, whose aggregate foreign trade is somewhat less 
than that of Algeria and Tunis together, do not, how- 
ever, trade so exclusively with the metropolis. Only 43 
per cent, of their aggregate exports and imports had such 
respective destination and origin in 191 1. 33 

As England is not only the centre of a world-wide 
Empire embracing one quarter of all mankind, but is 
also predominantly an industrial state, her commerce with 
the other parts of this Commonwealth is not only abso- 



222 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

lutely far larger than is that of France with her depend- 
encies, but it is furthermore a more important factor in 
her national economy. In 1913, the total foreign trade 
of the United Kingdom amounted to 1,403.5 million 
pounds sterling, of which 431.7, equivalent to 30.7 per 
cent., was with countries under the British flag or under 
British protection. Of the exports, 34.5 per cent, had 
such destination, and 28 per cent, of the imports had 
such derivation. 34 

These colonial products received no preferential treat- 
ment in the home market but were treated on a parity 
with those of foreign origin. Nor did England impose 
upon those parts of the Commonwealth controlled from 
London a fiscal policy that favoured her products. In 
them the door was left fully open to the goods of all com- 
ers on terms of absolute equality. The self-governing 
Dominions of the Commonwealth had, however, of their 
own accord granted preferential duties to imports from 
the United Kingdom. This system was first inaugurated 
by Canada in 1897, and had subsequently been adopted 
by South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia. 35 The 
general purpose of this policy was to draw closer the 
bonds of imperial union and also to compensate the 
United Kingdom for the inordinate share in the burden 
of imperial defence borne by it. It is usually admitted 
that this arrangement does not violate the principle of 
the open door, since the Dominions and the United King- 
dom are essentially parts of one political aggregate. The 
foreigner, it is contended, has no more justification to 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 223 

complain on this score than he has against the free ad- 
mission of Prussian goods into Bavaria or of Pennsyl- 
vania's manufactures into California. The soundness of 
this argument will, however, become more manifest as 
new institutions are created to express the inherent unity 
of the Commonwealth. 

The total external commerce of the dependent and self- 
governing parts of the British Commonwealth, exclusive 
of the United Kingdom, amounted in 1913 to 1,116.4 
million pounds, of which 475.7, or 43 per cent., was with 
the United Kingdom. 36 The imports and exports were 
about equal and the same proportion prevailed in both 
cases. It should also be noted that this percentage is 
very considerably less than those prevailing in the colonial 
domains and protectorates of the United States and of 
France. 

This trade of the British over-sea countries with the 
United Kingdom naturally divides itself into three parts, 
that of the Dominions, that of British India, and that of 
the remaining widely scattered dependencies. 37 The Do- 
minions contributed somewhat over one half of the total, 
to be exact 56 per cent. Of their aggregate external 
trade, 48 per cent, was with the United Kingdom. 38 
This percentage, which is higher than the general aver- 
age, is due to many factors, such as the large exports of 
gold from South Africa, but an influential element is 
unquestionably the system of preferential duties. 

While the exports from the Dominions to the United 
Kingdom exceeded the imports thence, the reverse is the 



224 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

case with British India. Here also special factors, de- 
spite the full open door, contribute to directing a large 
proportion of this country's trade to the United King- 
dom. Long and intimate commercial intercourse has 
contributed to an adaptation of British production to 
Indian needs and, furthermore, England has certain 
marked advantages in the manufacture of cotton goods, 
which constituted in 191 3 one quarter of the Indian im- 
ports. 39 In that year, the trade of British India with 
the United Kingdom amounted to 143.7 million pounds 
and was equivalent to 30 per cent, of the aggregate com- 
merce of the over-sea British areas with the European 
metropolis. It constituted 42 per cent, of British India's 
total external commerce, but it was very unevenly di- 
vided as to imports and exports. The former were two 
and a half times as large as the latter. 40 

The external trade of the remaining colonies and pro- 
tectorates amounted to 229.2 million pounds, of which 
67.1, or 29 per cent., was with the United Kingdom. 
The proportions in individual cases varied largely, some 
being far above and some considerably below the aver- 
age. Proximity to a large market, such as that of the 
British West Indies to the United States, is an important 
factor among many others of infinite diversity. 41 

Of the total external commerce of the Dependent Em- 
pire, in which free trade rules, somewhat less than 38 
per cent, is with the United Kingdom. It is impossible 
to estimate with any degree of accuracy to what extent 
the political connection is an element in this situation. 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 225 

The percentage is quite in line with the conditions pre- 
vailing in an independent country like China, 41 per cent, 
of whose foreign trade in 1913 was with the British Em- 
pire. 42 Certain general considerations are, however, in- 
contestable. While it is true that the flag tends to fol- 
low trade, the converse is equally a fact. Business is not 
solely an equation of supply and demand or a mere 
question of comparative cheapness and dearness. As in 
all human transactions, there enter here the elements of 
inertia and habit, and the psychological factors of confi- 
dence and distrust, of attraction and aversion. Unques- 
tionably, these forces work in favour of the trade of the 
colonizing or protecting power even under a regime of 
fullest free trade and they somewhat handicap the for- 
eigner. 43 They are naturally more active in the matter 
of governmental contracts and in the granting of con- 
cessions, even when the public authorities have the best 
of intentions. 44 It is easy to overestimate the national 
economic advantage derived from these facts when the 
policy is one of free trade and the door has been hon- 
estly kept open to all, as it has been done, in the main, 
by England. Under such circumstances, it is by no 
means clear that the economic advantage gained counter- 
balances the assumption of the added responsibilities and 
the concomitant expenses of administration and protec- 
tion. 45 

The intricate and inclusive network of international 
commerce was rudely torn to shreds on the outbreak 
of the Great War. The former extensive trade between 



226 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

the two groups of belligerents was immediately cut off, 
and more gradually the commercial intercourse of neu- 
trals with the Central Powers was also in increasing meas- 
ure restricted. The resulting dislocation necessitated an 
extensive readjustment to war conditions, which has, in 
the main, perforce been in the direction of increasing the 
economic self-sufficiency of each belligerent state and in 
general also that of the two allied groups with which 
they have thrown in their fortunes. At the same time, 
likewise, the future was envisaged. Plans had to be 
made betimes for a world again at peace. The war abro- 
gated a vast series of commercial treaties with their 
favoured nation clauses and threw this refractory mat- 
ter into the overflowing crucible of unsettled problems. 
At the same time also, the heavy financial burdens in- 
curred necessitated a reconsideration of the existing and 
future fiscal policies. 

The adjustment of these closely related questions is 
intimately dependent upon the spirit of future political 
interstate relations. Their nature will determine whether 
the reorganized economic systems are to be based upon a 
state of peace as the normal condition of international 
society or shall be shaped to meet the more or less prob- 
able contingency of renewed war. All thought on this 
subject has been profoundly affected by the intensifica- 
tion of national feeling resulting from the internecine 
conflict. An exacerbated nationalism is almost bound 
to find expression in economic policy. The general trend 
of opinion in belligerent and also in neutral countries is 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 227 

towards further increasing in the future the economic 
self-sufficiency of the state with the object of thus ren- 
dering it the better able to withstand the shocks and sur- 
prises of war. Everywhere plans are being formulated 
to decrease the economic interdependence of the ante- 
bellum world. The wide-spread movement in the United 
States during 1916 for the creation of a merchant ma- 
rine proportionate to the country's foreign trade was 
part and parcel of the programme of economic and naval 
preparedness. In the belligerent countries, naturally, the 
movement towards self-sufficiency was at that time even 
more accentuated, but there is in addition, a more or less 
clearly defined tendency to consider the allied groups as 
constituting in themselves somewhat incoherent economic 
units. When Mr. William Massey, the Prime Minister 
of New Zealand, said : " We should aim at a self-con- 
tained Empire, just consideration being given to our 
Allies," 46 he echoed the opinions of many in all belliger- 
ent countries. 

The first and clearest expression of this policy natur- 
ally came from Germany, because the sea power of the 
Allies had largely cut off her foreign trade and had 
made self-sufficiency a dire necessity. The course of 
military events — pre-eminently the Battle of the Marne 
and the subsequent failures to reach the Channel ports — 
together with the apparently unassailable supremacy of 
Britain on the water, had forcibly demonstrated to Ger- 
many that in this war the great goal of over-sea expan- 
sion was not attainable. Hence, attention was diverted 



228 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

from the more radiant West to the inherently less attrac- 
tive East and the plan was devised to create a large Cen- 
tral European economic and political unit, consisting of 
the Teutonic Allies and the lands that they had con- 
quered. 

In its purely economic features, the projected Mid- 
Europe is largely a mere revival of a scheme that ever 
since the middle of the nineteenth century has intermit- 
tently dazzled the imagination of a number of Central 
European statesmen and publicists. 47 There is, however, 
this vast difference, that now its political purposes com- 
pletely dwarf the economic ones. The abortive German 
peace overtures of December 12, 19 16, were designed 
to secure a settlement which would leave Germany dom- 
inant over the regions between Verdun and Riga and 
from Antwerp to Bagdad. As has been tersely said, 
the peace that Germany desired was one that would " en- 
able her to fulfil in the next war the aims she had failed 
to fulfil in this." There is not the slightest indication 
that the major German plan, which most directly threat- 
ened the future of all English-speaking peoples, has been 
abandoned. It has merely been deferred until the times 
be more propitious. Prince von Buelow's significant 
words, that " England was the only country with which 
Germany's account in world policy showed a balance on 
the wrong side," 48 still hold true, except that the United 
States should now be joined to England. 

In the background of the Mitteleuropa project, as in 
that of the more ambitious scheme of world empire to 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 229 

which the narrower plan is to serve as a stepping-stone, 
is the haunting fear that the Germany of the future will 
be dwarfed by the British Commonwealth, the United 
States, and Russia. The great apostle of Central Eu- 
rope, Friedrich Naumann, 49 sees these three aggregates 
as the sole members of " the first class of economic world- 
group Powers," and for him the vital question at the 
moment is the formation of a similar unit in Central 
Europe that by its wealth and resources shall automat- 
ically enter this class. 50 With this object in view, it is 
proposed to create a loosely federated combination of the 
Teutonic Allies with parts, if not with all, of the con- 
quered lands to the West, East and South and to enclose 
this populous area within tariff barriers. But within 
these barriers free trade is not to prevail between the 
members of the confederation. The system is to be 
equivalent to one of mutual preference as against all 
outsiders. 

The economic goal in view is pre-eminently self-suffi- 
ciency. The aim is to liberate Central Europe so far 
as it is possible from dependence on imports by sea and 
to develop the varied resources of this large land area. 
Not only is the production of foodstuffs to be increased, 
but the Balkans and Turkey are to furnish supplies of 
cotton, copper, and wool. 51 From the Elbe to the Per- 
sian Gulf there is to be " a closed economic system by 
the side of those of the other world-Empires," proclaims 
a well-known Socialist member of the Reichstag. More- 
over, this self-contained agglomeration is to exert eco- 



230 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

nomic pressure on all its peripheries and thus gradually 
to draw the smaller neighbouring states within its politi- 
cal orbit. The manufactured products of its political 
rivals are to be rigorously excluded or penalized, while 
those of Central Europe are by the forcible imposition of 
commercial treaties to secure exceptionally favourable 
treatment throughout the entire European Continent. 52 

There are serious internal and external obstacles in the 
way of the accomplishment of this project. Part of it 
apparently has already been frustrated by military events, 
and its future is largely contingent upon the terms of 
peace. Moreover, as a political structure, Central Eu- 
rope would rest on frail fundaments, which the repressed 
national feelings of the subject Slav peoples would be 
constantly undermining. Economically also, it has en- 
countered considerable opposition among Turks, Mag- 
yars, and Austrians, who aim to develop their own in- 
dustries and do not complacently look forward to a state 
of economic dependence on the German over-lord. As 
a result of all these factors, the idea of a close customs 
union is giving way to the less rigid and less obtrusive 
programme of general economic rapprochement, whose 
ultimate political aim is essentially the same. 

As a direct result of these preparations of the Central 
Powers for " a contest on the economic plane " after the 
cessation of armed hostilities, representatives of the Al- 
lied Governments met in Conference at Paris during 
June of 19 16. 53 This assembly devoted itself to con- 
sidering the means of increasing the economic solidarity 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 231 

of the Allies and recommended specific measures for this 
purpose. Some of these were purely for the duration 
of the war; others were transitory expedients to facili- 
tate the post-bellum reconstruction; and finally, some 
were devised to secure permanent collaboration. It was 
proposed that during the transitional period of rehabili- 
tation, the Allied countries should have a prior claim, 
before all others, on all their own natural resources and 
on all available means of reconstruction. With this ob- 
ject in view, the benefit of " most favoured nation treat- 
ment " was not to be granted for a number of years to 
any of their enemies. Furthermore, in order to defend 
their economic life against aggression, the commerce of 
the enemy Powers and goods originating in these coun- 
tries were to be subjected for an indeterminate period 
either to prohibitions or to differential treatment. 

As permanent measures, the Conference recommended 
that the Allies should take immediate steps to render 
themselves independent of the enemy countries as regards 
materials and manufactures " essential to the normal 
development of their economic activities." In order to 
facilitate the interchange of their own products, the Al- 
lies were to improve and cheapen all means of communi- 
cation with one another and also to assimilate, so far as 
might be possible, their laws governing patents, indica- 
tions of origin and trade-marks. 

The general aim of these elastic recommendations was 
to expedite the work of reconstruction, to strengthen 
both the solidarity of the Entente Powers and their eco- 



232 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

nomic independence and also to erect barriers against a 
recurrence of the German state-aided system of economic 
penetration. The defensive character of the proposals 
was especially emphasized. They were not, however, 
purely economic in purpose. In part, their aim was to 
prevent the Central Powers from recuperating more rap- 
idly than the Allies and at their expense, and from then 
being able to resume the military contest under possibly 
more favourable auspices. The scope of this entire pro- 
gramme, as well as the details of the measures to be 
adopted, will finally be determined by the nature of the 
military settlement and by the degree of security which 
the Allies feel that they have attained. 54 

It would be in the extreme difficult, if not quite impos- 
sible, to devise a comprehensive arrangement that would 
satisfy the divergent interests of each of the Entente 
Powers and fashion them into a fairly self-contained 
economic unit. For instance, the agricultural products 
of Russia and those of Italy will still need the Central 
European markets. 55 Such a comprehensive plan was, 
however, never in view. 56 But it is entirely feasible, 
though by no means simple, to develop a system of re- 
ciprocal preferential treatment among these allied coun- 
tries. And, finally, it is to a varying extent a fairly 
simple matter for each one of these states to lessen its 
own dependence upon Germany for basic products and 
to prevent the aggressive invasion of its home market 
through " dumping," export premiums and other devices 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 233 

of the German' Government and the interlocking indus- 
trial combinations known as cartels. 

As a consequence of the resolutions of the Paris Con- 
ference, the British Government appointed a Committee 
to consider: what industries are essential to the future 
safety of the nation and what steps should be taken to 
maintain and establish them; what steps should be taken 
to recover home and foreign trades lost during the war 
and to secure new markets; to what extent and by what 
means the resources of the Empire should be developed 
and could " be prevented from falling under foreign con- 
trol." The chairman of this non-partisan Committee, 
Lord Balfour of Burleigh, was an ardent free trader and 
among its members were others of that school as well 
as pronounced tariff reformers, such as Mr. W. A. S. 
Hewins. On February 2, 1917, in view of the approach- 
ing Imperial Conference, 57 this Committee submitted a 
preliminary report on commercial policy between the 
various self-governing peoples of the Commonwealth, 
stating that they had reached their conclusions chiefly 
because " we think it necessary that for the sake of the 
unity of the Empire a serious attempt should now be 
made to meet the declared wishes of the Dominions and 
Colonies " for the development of closer economic rela- 
tions with the United Kingdom by means of preferential 
treatment of their products. The Committee further 
stated that they intended to submit an additional report 
on the tariff policy of the United Kingdom and on the 



234 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

question of how far the wishes of the Dominions could 
be met " by the granting of subsidies in lieu of tariff 
preferences." 58 The report itself recommended that 
special steps be taken " to stimulate the production of 
foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured articles 
within the Empire," that adherence to the principle of 
preference be officially declared, and that early consider- 
ation be given to " the desirability of establishing a wider 
range of Customs Duties which would be remitted or 
reduced on the products and manufactures of the Empire, 
and which would form the basis of commercial treaties 
with Allied and Neutral Powers." 59 The fact that this 
report received the unanimous support of the Committee 
shows how far England had travelled from the laissez 
faire doctrines that for over two generations had domi- 
nated her fiscal policy. 60 

Just as Germany's colonial and naval imperialism had 
stimulated the movement towards greater imperial unity, 
so German military and economic aggression was lead- 
ing to a somewhat belated recognition of the disadvan- 
tages of a system of unrestricted imports in a world of 
tariff barriers. When the Imperial War Conference 
met in London some six weeks later, the preferential 
principle came up for consideration. After an exhaust- 
ive and favourable discussion in the Imperial Cabinet, the 
Conference unanimously agreed that each part of the 
Empire, " having due regard to the interests of our Al- 
lies," shall give specially favourable treatment and facili- 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 235 

ties to the produce and manufactures of other parts of 
the Empire. 61 

When forwarding their report, the Balfour Committee 
stated that in developing the system of mutual tariff 
preferences, " the special position of India, as well as of 
Egypt and the Sudan, will require consideration." In 
the meanwhile, the Government of India was investigat- 
ing the entire question of that country's future tariff 
policy. 62 For the past fifteen years the Indian National- 
ists had with increasing insistence been demanding a 
protective system that would foster the development of 
India's industrial life. 63 In this connection, the most 
bitter attacks were concentrated upon the excise duty of 
Z X A P er cent - imposed upon cotton goods manufactured 
in India to offset the customs of the same amount col- 
lected on such goods when imported. This question had 
before the war assumed a prominence entirely dispropor- 
tionate to its intrinsic economic importance, unless it be re- 
membered that, in Indian eyes, the excise stood pre-emi- 
nently for the denial to India of an autonomous protec- 
tive system. The cotton excise was the chief fact cited 
to substantiate the oft-repeated allegation of the Nation- 
alists that Indian interests were being deliberately sacri- 
ficed to those of Britain, and it gave a certain plausibility 
to what was on the whole a groundless contention. Its 
imposition in 1896 was most ill-advised and its retention 
in the face of native opposition was unwise in the ex- 
treme. While other manufactures in India were allowed 



236 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

at least a modicum of protection — moderate import 
duties, but no countervailing excises, were levied on virtu- 
ally all other wares — the British Government adhered 
to the free trade principle in the case of cotton goods 
largely because they were convinced of its inherent sound- 
ness and thought that protective duties would merely 
benefit the clamant few at the expense of the inarticulate 
multitude of consumers. The situation would, however, 
alter considerably were England herself to abandon free 
trade. Thus, in 1912, Lord Crewe had said that a pro- 
tectionist Government in England would have no right 
to prevent India from following such a policy. 64 

Accordingly, in the spring of 19 17, the Indian Govern- 
ment, with the approval of the Secretary of State for 
India, proposed to increase the customs on imported 
cotton goods from 3^ per cent, to 7^ per cent, without 
imposing a countervailing excise duty on the products 
of the Indian looms. This decision, which was equiva- 
lent to inaugurating a moderate protective tariff on cot- 
ton goods, aroused a storm of protest from the Lan- 
cashire manufacturers. It also produced misgivings in 
disinterested quarters, where the fear was expressed that 
its effect would be merely that the struggling ryot would 
have to pay tribute to the wealthy Indian millowners. 65 
Despite this opposition, the increase in duties was sanc- 
tioned by the British Parliament, on the understanding 
that the subject was open to reconsideration after the 
war. This action is of considerable significance, not 
only in that it involves the recognition of the fact that 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 237 

Indian fiscal policy must be determined by the weight of 
Indian public opinion, but also because it may point the 
way to a great extension of the protective system in 
India and, possibly also, to the application of the prefer- 
ential system to her trade from and to other parts of the 
British Commonwealth. 

Lord Balfour's Committee had also been instructed 
to consider " to what extent and by what means the 
resources of the Empire should and can be developed." 
This work had in reality been already undertaken by 
others. As a result of the Imperial Conference of 191 1, 
a Royal Commission had been appointed which, in March 
of 19 1 7, published its final report on the economic re- 
sources of the Empire. 66 This influential body, com- 
posed of representatives of the United Kingdom and of 
the Dominions, unanimously urged that it was vital that 
"the Empire should, as far as possible, be placed in a 
position which would enable it to resist any pressure 
which a foreign Power or group of Powers could exer- 
cise in time of peace or war in virtue of a control of raw 
materials and commodities essential to its well-being." 
They divided such commodities into three classes: 1, 
those of which the world's requirements were mainly or 
wholly produced within the Empire; 2, those of which 
the Empire's requirements were approximately equalled 
by its production; 3, those mainly produced and con- 
trolled outside the Empire. The essential commodities 
of the first class, such as nickel, asbestos, and jute fur- 
nished, as they pointed out, " a valuable means of eco- 



238 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

nomic defence and commercial negotiation." As re- 
gards some of those of the second category, such as wheat 
and wool, they suggested the promotion of their exchange 
within the Empire. But in respect to others of this class, 
such as zinc, tungsten, and monazite, they indicated 
" special action in order to secure the control and utiliz- 
ation of Imperial supplies for the Empire's use." As 
regards commodities of the third class, such as cotton, 
petroleum, nitrates, and potash, they proposed investi- 
gations of the possibilities of developing new sources of 
supply and of finding substitutes within the Empire. For 
this purpose, as well as for others, they suggested the 
creation of an Imperial Development Board, containing 
representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, 
the Crown Colonies, and the Protectorates. In conclu- 
sion, this Royal Commission — the first one comprising 
representatives of all the self-governing communities of 
the Empire — expressed the hope and belief that their 
conclusions and recommendations would not " be found 
to conflict with the systems to be evolved by the Allied 
Nations after the war." 

In the meanwhile, an important unofficial committee 
composed of men of wide experience, such as Earl 
Grey, Lord Selborne, Sir Horace Plunkett, and Sir Starr 
Jameson, had been investigating this subject from a 
different angle. Their point of approach was the vast 
increase of the National Debt caused by the war and its 
future burden upon the taxpayers. In order to alleviate 
this burden, they proposed the development of the im* 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 239 

mense latent resources of the Empire " for State purposes, 
under State auspices." With this object in view, they 
advocated the conservation for the benefit of the Empire 
of such natural resources as can be controlled by the 
Imperial, Dominion, or Indian Governments, the devel- 
opment of selected resources " under such conditions as 
will give to the State an adequate share of the proceeds," 
and the appointment of " a Board for the Conservation 
and Development of the Resources of the Empire." 

This organization proposes plans whereby the State 
on its own account should develop some of the unworked 
resources of the Empire, so as to pay both the interest 
and ultimately also the principal of the huge War Debt. 
For instance, it has been suggested in this connection that 
200 million acres of arable land in Western Canada be 
reserved for this purpose. Again another proposal is 
that the State should assume control of some of the 
tropical and sub-tropical products of Africa. This radi- 
cal departure from the British individualistic tradition 
has received considerable support which is qualified, how- 
ever, by the strict injunction that the fundamental prin- 
ciple of British imperialism, " government in the interests 
of the governed," must not in any way be infringed by 
the projected imperial brand of state socialism. 67 

The experiences of the war have also markedly em- 
phasized the danger of relying so predominantly on im- 
ported foodstuffs as does England, and have led to a 
wide-spread demand for the rehabilitation of English 
agriculture. As a war measure, in order to encourage 



240 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

the home production, minimum prices for grain, coupled 
with a minimum wage for the agricultural labourer, have 
already been guaranteed by the Government. In addi- 
tion, the Committee which was appointed by the Govern- 
ment to consider the methods of increasing the agricul- 
tural output " in the interest of national security " have, 
with one dissenting voice, recommended the permanent 
adoption of this policy. 

The greater portion of this official and unofficial pro- 
gramme naturally came up for discussion by the Imperial 
War Conference, when it met in London in the spring of 
1 9 17. In addition to endorsing the principle of imperial 
preference, this body — composed of representatives of 
the United Kingdom, of the Dominions (except Aus- 
tralia), and of India — unanimously agreed upon the 
following economic policies: the establishment of an 
Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau at London ; the devel- 
opment of the Empire's military and naval supplies; the 
encouragement of the development of imperial resources 
so that the Empire should be independent of other coun- 
tries as regards food supplies, raw materials and essential 
industries. 68 

These various projects and plans — Mitteleuropa, the 
Paris Economic Conference, the British proposals — were 
virtually all in an inchoate state, 69 when the United 
States entered the war. Whether or no they crystallize 
in actual policy will be largely influenced by this new 
factor. For the fate of all these proposals will to a 
varying extent be determined by the military outcome of 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 241 

the war and by the degree of interstate security that will 
be attained when peace is re-established. The partici- 
pation of the United States has decidedly lessened the 
possibility of a German victory or even of a stale-mate 
peace, and thus has made highly improbable the inter- 
necine economic war after the war which a few unofficial 
extremists had advocated. But if, in addition, the 
United States should break with the past traditions of 
isolation and should continue to co-operate effectively 
with its present allies to ensure justice and peace in the 
future, the programme of the Entente will probably be 
even further modified in the direction of less restricted 
trade relations. Yet, even under the most favourable 
circumstances of a decisive Allied victory and an un- 
limited guarantee of the settlement by the United States, 
the economic future will not be that of the past. In 
general, it may be assumed that measures will be taken 
to prevent Germany from nullifying the most favoured 
nation principle by the specialization of duties and from 
undermining her neighbours' industries by " dumping " 
and other obnoxious means. In so far as England is 
concerned, it would appear that the days of unrestricted 
imports are gone and that, as in the days before Cobden, 
a national trade policy will be evolved. 70 Even in the 
bitterest days of the struggle there was a very consider- 
able free trade party in England and at no time was it 
proposed to erect tariff barriers of the height of those 
surrounding the United States. Many of these free 
traders, however, without disavowing their firm belief 



242 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

in the economic efficacy of laissez faire doctrines, have 
reached the conclusion that security is more important 
than opulence. With tariff reformers they are in favour 
of stimulating British agriculture either by bounties or 
by protective duties and they approve of the protection of 
certain so-called " key industries," such as the manufac- 
ture of aniline dyes, magnetos and optical glass. More- 
over, the very need for revenue to pay interest on the 
debt and the war pensions will make almost inevitable 
recourse to an extended customs system and attached to 
this will necessarily be some protective elements. And 
again, apart from the prejudice against German goods, 
which will be an important factor for a considerable time, 
positive measures will in all probability be taken to curtail 
their free and unrestricted access to the British markets 
so as to counteract the German system of state-aided 
penetration. Finally, it should be remembered that the 
increased nationalism produced by the war will seek ex- 
pression in economic policy; and that territories which 
have been defended and acquired at the expense of im- 
measurable sacrifices inevitably seem more part and par- 
cel of the body politic than those whose administration 
has been assumed somewhat in the role of trustee for the 
world. Closely associated with such feelings is the 
natural sentiment that those who have defended civiliz- 
ation should have a prior claim, both before those who 
attacked and those who remained neutral during the crisis, 
on all the means of rebuilding their shattered economic 
structures. 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 243 

On the other hand, it is quite clear that if the British 
Commonwealth and the United States were to join in a 
co-operative alliance, there would be very much less like- 
lihood of an application of the preferential principle to 
the dependent or non-self-governing parts of the Empire 
and also that the general arguments in favour of a pro- 
tective policy would lose much of their force. With its 
high protective system and a colonial policy that largely 
excludes foreign goods from its dependencies, the United 
States is not in a position to object to the application of 
these principles by others. Nor, for the same reasons, is 
France. Such questions are, however, pregnant with 
interstate friction. The element of national monopoly 
with respect to the trade of dependent communities should 
so far as it is possible be removed and the principle of 
the wide-open door should be genuinely applied to them, 
as well as to the still independent, but undeveloped and 
backward, countries of the world. A general inter- 
national agreement to this effect backed by an English- 
speaking alliance pledged to this self-denying principle 
would do much to further the peace of the world. 

In normal times, the great bulk of the foreign trade 
of the United States is with the countries now at war. 
In 19 1 3, more than three quarters of its exports went to 
the belligerent countries, while only somewhat less than 
this proportion of its imports came from them. By far 
the greater part of this trade was with the present Allies 
of the United States. To them went 63 per cent, of the 
total exports and from them came 54 per cent, of the 



244 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

imports. On the other hand, the exports to the Central 
Powers constituted only 14.5 per cent, and the imports 
thence only 17.7 per cent, of the respective totals. 7 * The 
aggregate trade with America's Allies was almost four 
times as large as that with the Teutonic group. Military 
events have probably doomed the formation of a Mittel- 
europa extending from Antwerp to the Persian Gulf, but 
even the more limited project of a close economic union of 
the Central Empires is beset by grave difficulties, since 
the various nationalities of Austria-Hungary are looking 
forward to their own industrial development and do not 
relish their assigned part of being mere purveyors of raw 
materials and foodstuffs to the German work-shop. The 
aim of this plan was to increase the economic self-suffi- 
ciency of these countries and to free them from depen- 
dence on America and the whole outside world for un- 
manufactured supplies and grain. Whether or no even 
this limited project be perforce abandoned, in either case 
the United States cannot look forward to an expansion 
of its trade relations with this group. It is true that the 
former commerce with Germany was large. In 19 13- 
14, the exports to Germany amounted to 342 million 
dollars and the imports thence to 190 millions. 72 But 
these exports were composed largely of such supplies as 
copper and cotton, that are indispensable to Germany. 
On the other hand, the imports consisted of fertilizers, 
chemicals, and dye-stuffs, as well as a varied assortment 
of manufactured goods. 73 There is no visible indication 
that either Germany or the United States is prepared to 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 245 

lower the barriers against foreign manufactures in order 
to facilitate an interchange of such goods. In fact, their 
respective industries are not in the main complementary, 
but are markedly competitive, as both have specialized in 
large scale production of cheap goods by machinery 
rather than in the highly finished goods of skilled work- 
manship. 

This trade of the United States with Germany was 
all but completely cut off by the war while, at the same 
time, the normally far more extensive commercial rela- 
tions with the Entente Allies expanded at an unprece- 
dented pace. By far the largest part of this original and 
increased trade was with the British Commonwealth. 
Ever since the establishment of the English Colonies that 
in time developed into the United States, the trade routes 
between England and America were crowded with ships 
carrying merchandise to and fro. In 19 13, nearly one 
half of the exports of the United States went to coun- 
tries under the British flag and somewhat less than one 
third of the imports came from them. 74 The war has 
even further increased this commercial interdependence 
and it has also drawn closer the pre-existing strong finan- 
cial ties. As a result of abnormally large exports at in- 
ordinately high prices, the United States had during the 
first two and a half years of the war accumulated an un- 
precedentedly vast credit balance in foreign trade and was 
able both to buy back the greater part of its securities 
owned abroad and also to loan very considerable amounts 
to the Entente Allies. Before the United States had en- 



246 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

tered the war, these loans amounted to over two billion 
dollars, of which about one half was Great Britain's share. 
Since that event, these financial relations have become 
even closer and are binding the English-speaking peoples 
together by the closest economic ties. Not only has the 
war taken the United States out of the class of debtor 
nations, but in doing so it has completely removed the 
inevitable element of discord between creditor and debtor 
that from the earliest colonial times was a disturbing 
factor in Anglo-American relations. The war has defi- 
nitely established a parity of status, which will, among 
other things, enable the citizens of the United States and 
those of the British Commonwealth to co-operate on 
terms of equality in developing the backward countries of 
the world and in rehabilitating the economic structure of 
the war-harassed nations. 

Everything is tending to draw the English-speaking 
peoples into more intimate economic relations. If their 
present co-operation during the war should lead to future 
close association for their mutual security and for main- 
taining freedom, justice, and right throughout the world, 
these relations should be predominantly harmonious. 
For in that event, the arguments in favour of a policy of 
complete economic self-sufficiency for the British Com- 
monwealth will be discredited. Presumably, a tariff for 
revenue, with duties on a much lower scale than those of 
the United States, will at all events have to be imposed in 
the United Kingdom. To a limited extent, this may 
hamper the increasing sale of American manufactures in 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 247 

England, but before such a tariff could legitimately be 
deemed a grievance, the United States would have radi- 
cally to lower its own tariff walls. Similarly, it is prob- 
able that steps will be taken to revive British agriculture 
and also to give preferential treatment in England to the 
raw products of the Dominions. As a result, there may 
be less demand in England for American foodstuffs, but 
this is quite unimportant, as it is very probable that the 
United States will soon have no agricultural surplus to 
export. Finally, it is quite assured that all of Germany's 
enemies will take means to prevent the unfair competition 
by which their markets have been penetrated. To the 
extent that this is successful, there will be a vacuum in 
these countries which will be supplied by their manufac- 
turers and by those of the United States. The same 
effect will be produced by the sentiments and passions 
aroused in the war. Germany's extremely unscrupulous 
and ruthless conduct has attached a stigma to her citizens 
which for a considerable time will handicap them in dis- 
posing of their wares in foreign countries. The personal 
factor is important in most business transactions. As 
long as this inevitable semi-boycott obtains, it will act 
as a protective measure in favour of all the Allied nations, 
both in their own markets and also in those of sympa- 
thetic neutrals. 



VIII 
COMMUNITY OF POLICY 



" Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth 
on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedi- 
cated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now 
we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, 
or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure." 
— Abraham Lincoln, November 19, 1863. 

" The British Empire is not founded on might or force, but on 
moral principles — on principles of freedom, equality and equity. 
It is these principles which we stand for to-day as an Empire in 
this mighty struggle." 

— 'Jan Smuts, April 2, 1917. 

" We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false 
pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the 
world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples 
included: for the rights of nations great and small and the 
privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of 
obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy." 

— Woodrow Wilson, April 2, 1917. 



CHAPTER VIII 
Community of Policy 

The Need of Co-operation — Sea Power and Its Control — 
The Future of China — Latin America — German Ambitions — 
Militarism — The Necessity of Security — A Positive Policy 
— Conclusion. 

The war has given the death-blow to America's cher- 
ished policy of isolation and has conclusively demon- 
strated that the traditional course of non-intervention is 
impossible in a markedly interdependent world. Like 
Cobden, the typical American was opposed to armed 
intervention and believed in the efficacy of a pacific exam- 
ple to quell the warlike ambitions of other states. In 
Mazzini's eyes, such an aloof course was but " cowardly 
desertion of duty," for to him the final justification of 
national existence was the active part taken in inter- 
national politics. Hence his exhortations to the United 
States to enter into the stream of world affairs some 
sixty years before the logic of events had finally brought 
about this consummation. 1 

The force of this logic in the future will be largely 
dependent upon the extent to which the German menace 
has been eliminated, but under all circumstances it pre- 
sumably will be sufficiently cogent to render most in- 

251 



252 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

judicious a return to the obsolete creed. Intimate co- 
operation with the other English-speaking peoples will 
undoubtedly be found to be more and more essential. 
The closeness of the resulting relation must ultimately 
rest upon the immutable fact that these peoples are cul- 
turally closely akin and have essentially the same political 
ideals and institutions. In both branches of this politi- 
cally separated, but clearly defined, entity, an unfettered 
public opinion, basing its judgments upon the dictates of 
personal morality, as a rule obliges the government in 
its conduct of foreign affairs to conform to standards 
that are far from being so generally recognized elsewhere. 
This cultural solidarity is strongly reinforced by an 
ever increasing economic interdependence, which not only 
necessitates the closest association during the war, but 
also promises to make imperative such collaboration after 
the re-establishment of peace. The absolute diminution 
of the world's shipping as a result of submarine and mine, 
the shortage in foodstuffs throughout the world, the de- 
pletion of Europe's accumulated supplies of raw mate- 
rials, the huge national debts, have produced a most 
serious dislocation and will result in disaster unless the 
process of economic rehabilitation is carefully supervised 
by international agencies. The chief burden of directing 
and controlling this reconstruction will fall upon the 
United States and upon the British Commonwealth be- 
cause of their predominant financial power, their owner- 
ship of the major portion of the world's mercantile 
marine, their vast output of manufactured goods and 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 253 

their exceptional resources in basic raw materials. Con- 
trolling, as they largely do, the world's sources of supply 
of gold, copper, tin, cotton, rubber, and wool, the Eng- 
lish-speaking peoples must in concert devise measures for 
their distribution in the most advantageous, efficacious, 
and equitable manner. 

The complex problems of economic reconstruction will 
demand the closest co-operation between the English- 
speaking peoples. But apart from all cultural and eco- 
nomic ties, these peoples are joined by physical con- 
tiguity and propinquity. Like the United States, the 
British Commonwealth is an American Power with vast 
interests in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. Hence 
intimate relations are inevitable and these relations are 
more likely to be of a co-operative than of an antagonistic 
nature, not only because there is no inherent conflict of 
interests, but also because their common civilization has 
permeated their foreign policies with the same general 
ideals and purposes. It may be confidently asserted that, 
of all the Great Powers, these two are the ones least 
infected with dreams of military glory or with ambitions 
of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of others. 
In the exceptionally advantageous position that they 
occupy on all the continents, it would indeed be very sur- 
prising were it otherwise. But it is an undeniable fact 
that with them peace has been the genuine goal of policy. 
As a result, the general foreign policy of the British Em- 
pire and that of the United States follow parallel lines. 
The fundamental aim of both states was, and perforce 



254 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

must always be, security; for, unless safety is practically 
assured, the more positive purpose of maintaining the 
liberty of others will yield to the imperative immediate 
need. But security, in these days of rapid communica- 
tions and of ever growing economic interdependence, 
means far more than mere immunity from invasion. It 
implies, in addition, the protection of a state's interests 
within the confines of other countries. 

For the United States, security both in the narrower 
and in the broader sense, is obviously contingent, in the 
main, upon sea power. 2 The dependence is not so great 
as in the case of the British Commonwealth, but it is in- 
creasing year by year as foreign commerce is playing 
a larger part in the national economy. Sea power is, 
however, an economic fact that cannot be improvised. 
The British Empire's command of the seas rests, in ulti- 
mate analysis, not upon a navy that any state sufficiently 
rich might duplicate, but upon the fact that its merchant 
marine before the war amounted to approximately one 
half of the world's total tonnage. 3 The efficiency of a 
navy is dependent upon a commensurate auxiliary mer- 
cantile fleet and its trained seamen. Were all warships 
to be discarded and complete naval disarmament to be the 
future dispensation, British sea power would be even 
more predominant than it now is. It is certain that the 
German submarine campaign will oblige the United States 
greatly to increase its mercantile marine, but it is highly 
improbable that this expansion will be sufficient either for 
the needs of American commerce or for a navy that will 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 255 

provide the requisite security if the United States does 
not continue in close association with the British Com- 
monwealth. Before America's participation in the war, 
Admiral Fiske contended: 

"In order to have an effective naval defence (since we are 
precluded by our policy from having European allies and no 
South American country could give us any effective naval help) 
we must have on each ocean a fleet as strong as that of any 
nation on that ocean against whose wishes we may have to 
enforce a policy — or against whose policy we may have to op- 
pose resistance." 4 

Such a naval programme is feasible, but it would be 
burdensome in the extreme. It would be highly inad- 
visable, for the same security and the same ends can be 
attained by joining forces with the British Common- 
wealth. When, nearly one hundred years ago, Canning 
suggested to Richard Rush, the American Minister at 
London, the policy that led to the formulation and enun- 
ciation of the Monroe Doctrine, he said that he did not 
believe that concert of action would be necessary, because 
the knowledge that Great Britain and the United States 
were of the same opinion would by its moral effect pre- 
vent European interference in South America. This 
belief was founded, Canning said, " upon the large share 
of the maritime power of the world which Great Britain 
and the United States shared between them, and the con- 
sequent influence which the knowledge that they held a 
common opinion upon a question on which such large 
maritime interests, present and future, hung, could not 
fail to produce upon the rest of the world." 5 



256 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

Before reaching a definite decision on this far-reaching 
suggestion, President Monroe turned for advice to his 
experienced predecessors in office. In reply, Thomas 
Jefferson stated: 

" Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm 
of any one, or all, on earth; and with her on our side, we need 
not fear the whole world. . . . But I am clearly of Mr. Can- 
ning's opinion that it will prevent, instead of provoking war. 
With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted 
into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not 
undertake such a war." 6 

James Madison fully concurred with Jefferson, writing 
to Monroe that, while such co-operation " must ensure 
success in the event of an appeal to force, it doubles the 
chance of success without that appeal." At the same 
time, he wrote to Jefferson that " with the British power 
& navy combined with our own, we have nothing to 
fear from the rest of the nations." 7 

The situation is essentially the same in 19 17 as it was 
in 1823. The submarine has not fundamentally changed 
the nature of sea power. It has merely re-introduced, 
in an aggravated form, a factor that was removed only 
in 1856 when privateering was abolished. 8 Thanks 
largely to steam and electricity, the command of the 
surface of the sea is more complete than ever before. 9 
While the submarine has been extremely destructive of 
shipping and its cumulative effect may even result in a 
serious disarrangement in the carriage of necessary sup- 
plies, this demolition of merchant vessels cannot directly 
accomplish a positive military purpose. The submarine 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 257 

and mine are essentially defensive weapons. They may 
weaken the enemy commanding the sea and they may 
even disrupt his offensive, but they still leave his shores 
immune from invasion. So long as the British Common- 
wealth and the United States can, with their joint re- 
sources, control the surface of the sea, they will be 
secure from the havoc inflicted upon Belgium, Northern 
France and Serbia. Neither one can unquestionably 
attain this full security alone. Nor is there any definite 
assurance that the control of the sea by the English- 
speaking peoples will in the future be uncontested. This 
depends largely upon the military outcome of the war 
and the future relations of the British Commonwealth 
and the United States. 

If Germany were perchance to emerge from the war 
as mistress of the European Continent, she could readily 
use the added economic resources to build a navy of por- 
tentous size for a renewal of the bid for world dominion; 
and such a policy would be all the more probable, if it 
were not plainly manifest that the maritime resources of 
all the English-speaking peoples would be jointly used to 
thwart her. But while joint action during the war and 
close co-operation after its close will probably be able to 
protect these culturally kindred peoples, sea power in 
itself cannot prevent Germany from dominating Europe, 
though the economic pressure it can exert may mitigate 
the rigours of such hegemony. The freedom of France 
and Italy from enforced subservience to German policy 
— in fact the liberties of Europe, not to mention those of 



258 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

the world — are dependent upon such future intimate 
relations between the British and American peoples. 

In this general connection also, it would be the height 
of folly to overlook the fact that the United States has 
gained the deep hostility of Germany by entering the 
war. Even prior to that event, the Central Powers were 
incensed at the purchase by the Allies of vast supplies in 
America. There is this to be said for their attitude that, 
already before 19 14, they had held that a non-combatant 
state could not become an extensive source of warlike 
stores without violating its neutrality. 10 Furthermore, 
these Powers had constantly protested against the failure 
of the United States to compel the Allies to permit 
American raw materials and foodstuffs to reach Germany. 
Their case, it should be noted, was strengthened by the 
fact that the United States had, to some extent at least, 
accepted their view of the international law applicable in 
these instances. In their opinion, America had been 
grossly unneutral and her final participation in the War 
was but the culmination of a gratuitously partisan atti- 
tude. This has led to a wide-spread feeling of implacable 
resentment. 

When we leave behind us the question of safety from 
invasion and direct our attention to interests beyond the 
state's frontier, it will inevitably be found that the suc- 
cessful and peaceful maintenance of American policies 
towards Latin America and towards China is largely 
dependent upon British support and the sea power that 
goes with it. Since the aims of both states are in funda- 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 259 

mental accord, there is no reason why this support should 
not be forthcoming. The policy of the open door in 
China is essentially Anglo-American in origin. This 
policy has both idealistic and utilitarian phases. The aim 
is not merely to preserve and widen a market for British 
and American wares, but to keep intact the territorial 
integrity and political independence of that backward 
country with its swarming millions feebly groping toward 
the progress of western civilization. Manchuria and 
Mongolia, in large part, have in all probability been 
already irrevocably detached from China, but the fate of 
the rest of this huge country hangs in the balance and 
apparently the only peaceful means of tipping the beam 
in accordance with America's ideals and interests is a 
clearly-defined alliance of the English-speaking peoples. 
Such an explicit engagement would probably give pause 
to those under the spell of imperialistic ambitions. 11 

Similarly, there is no opposition in policy toward 
Latin America. In so far as the Monroe Doctrine is 
concerned, the general interests and political ideals of 
both countries coincide. The strength of the doctrine 
was from the very outset largely derived from British 
sea power. 12 The chief aim of this policy is to safe- 
guard Latin America from foreign domination so that 
the twenty republics included therein may develop their 
characteristic institutions unhampered by European dic- 
tation. Great Britain has no political aims or territorial 
ambitions here, but she has a direct interest in stable 
conditions because of her extensive economic and com- 



260 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

mercial relations with these countries. Before the war s 
imports from the United Kingdom into Latin America 
about equalled those from the United States, in spite of 
the preferential treatment accorded to American goods by 
both Cuba and Brazil. 13 These imports were at that time 
about fifty per cent, larger than those of Germany. 14 

Great Britain naturally places great stress upon this 
extensive trade which has been developed by centuries of 
effort on the part of individuals, who demand as of right 
only the privilege of equal opportunity. There is no 
likelihood of friction here provided the United States 
does not adopt the reactionary policy of using the Monroe 
Doctrine and Pan-Americanism to secure by treaty or 
otherwise special and exclusive privileges that would 
partially shut the door to British commerce. 15 If the 
United States were to agree to a self-denying ordinance 
to this effect and at the same time assumed responsibility 
for an adequate measure of order and justice in the dis- 
turbed parts of Central and South America, British in- 
terests would be amply safeguarded. Under such con- 
ditions, the Monroe Doctrine would unquestionably secure 
the formal and full support of the British Common- 
wealth. 

Nor is there any conflict between an English-speaking 
alliance and Pan-Americanism, which is not a national 
policy of the United States, but an American inter- 
national movement to foster closer cultural, political and 
economic relations between all the Americas. Some 
ninety years ago, when this vision first took hold of men, 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 261 

one of its ardent advocates, the great Liberator Bolivar, 16 
believed that England should take a prominent part in 
any union of all the American states. In fact, at the first 
Pan-American Congress held at Panama in 1826, the 
United States was not represented owing to delay in 
making the appointments, while an accredited British offi- 
cial attended the meeting, though not as a member in full 
standing. 17 A Pan-Americanism of 191 7 that excludes 
Canada, Newfoundland, Jamaica, Barbados, and British 
Guiana, not to mention the other American parts of the 
British Commonwealth, is a strange contradiction in 
terms, and is presumably unwisely and unnecessarily nar- 
row. 

In connection with South America it should be remem- 
bered that the possibilities of German expansion there 
cannot be ignored. The most disturbing feature about 
Germany's much advertised " place in the sun " was its 
apparently deliberate vagueness. It was nowhere and 
everywhere. Whenever in any quarter of the globe the 
political waters became troubled, Germany extemporized 
important interests in whose protection she was ready to 
shake the mailed fist. The policy of Napoleon III in 
demanding compensation for France whenever Prussia 
added to her power, has been justly denounced by Ger- 
man historians, but the same policy was in turn adopted 
by United Germany and kept the world in a continuous 
ferment. Despite the indefinite inclusiveness of Ger- 
many's policy, it is, however, obvious that if ever a " New 
Germany " over the seas is to arise, the most likely, if 



262 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

not the only possible, place is Brazil, in whose southern 
states there is already a considerable German nucleus 
around which to build such a daughter nation. 18 Ger- 
man economists and publicists have persistently painted 
this dream. Against its realization, however, stood as 
insuperable barrier, not alone the Monroe Doctrine, but, 
in first line, the British fleet. The grave danger is that 
after the war, an undisciplined and unbeaten, though not 
victorious, Germany may seek to retrieve her fortunes by 
political expansion in South America. There was con- 
siderable truth in Professor Usher's realistic words writ- 
ten in 19 1 6, that " the easiest concession for the Allies 
to make will be the control of Asia Minor by Germany 
and Austria and a free hand for both in South America, 
leaving Great Britain and France still supreme in Africa 
and Asia." 19 At all times, it was highly improbable 
that the British barrier would be voluntarily raised and, 
since America's entrance into the war, this has become 
almost inconceivable. But the direst of necessities may 
permit of no other choice. Such a state of necessity 
would, however, be extremely unlikely, and such an out- 
come would be well-nigh impossible were the United 
States to contract binding engagements with the other 
English-speaking peoples. But, if the United States 
should after this war retire to its former isolation, or even 
if it should merely join the proposed league of nations 
as the only Great Power bound by no ties of alliance to 
any of its fellow members, such difficulties and others 
of a similar nature in the Far East will in all probability 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 263 

have to be confronted. In the new and in some respects 
intensified nationalism of the near future, it will be 
imperative to form durable bonds with others if American 
interests are to be adequately considered. Rights and 
interests will be fully regarded only if their correspond- 
ing responsibilities are not shirked. 

In addition to the economic and political facts from 
which the imperative urgency of close co-operation 
between the English-speaking peoples springs, there is a 
further most potent argument for such an alliance. 
Hitherto, not as a result of any virtues innate in them, 
but rather by the accident of favoured position, these peo- 
ples have been able to escape the burdens and dangers of 
large military establishments. If in the future they do 
not fully co-operate in protective measures, it is extremely 
improbable that they will continue to be thus fortunate. 
The tendency of every human instrument is to seek occa- 
sion to demonstrate its effectiveness, 20 and the existence 
of a powerful army leads insensibly to an aggressive atti- 
tude towards weaker or more pacific states. It tends to 
breed a spirit that makes might the measure of right. 
Furthermore, it favours the establishment of a military 
caste that is not subject to the civil law. It not infre- 
quently results in the subordination of policy to purely 
strategic considerations, as well as in the eventual control 
of the body politic by the military authorities. These 
evils of militarism are most clearly exemplified in modern 
Germany. 

The notorious Zabern affair 21 was an inevitable 



264 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

manifestation of a system that gives the legislature 
virtually no authority over the army. Such control 
of the German army by the Reichstag would, according 
to Professor Delbrueck, be inconceivable. "Whoever 
has only the slightest feeling with our corps of officers 
and our staff of generals," he writes, " knows that this is 
an impossibility, that our army would first have to ex- 
perience a Sedan in an inverse sense in order to permit 
that to befall it." 22 Thus, in 1906, Colonel von Deim- 
ling bluntly told the Reichstag that its decision counted 
for naught and that he would never withdraw a single 
soldier from South Africa, " unless my Emperor issues 
a command to that effect." 23 But, in addition, the army 
was regarded as a means of quelling political opposition. 
Prince von Buelow calmly discussed the use of force " as 
the very last resource " against the rising tide of Social 
Democracy. "If the means which law and justice 
place at our disposal fail," he wrote, " the last resource 
still remains." 24 Equally significant is the fact that, had 
the German Foreign Office been so inclined, it would have 
been powerless to prevent the invasion of Belgium after 
it had become apparent that such action would bring 
England into the war. On August 5, 19 14, the German 
Under-Secretary of State informed the departing Bel- 
gian Minister at Berlin that the Foreign Office was im- 
potent. Since the order of mobilization had been issued 
by the Emperor, he said, all power was vested in the 
military authorities; they had determined that the in- 
vasion of Belgium was an indispensable military oper- 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 265 

ation. 25 The following words of Prince von Buelow 
embody a grim and sober historical fact : 

" The history of Brandenburg-Prussia, which achieved its 
first, but not its last, German triumph in founding the German 
Empire under Prussian leadership, is the history of the Prussian 
army ; with its ups and downs it is the history of Prussia's vary- 
ing fortunes in war." 26 

It is scarcely necessary to point out that militarism is 
not synonymous with preparedness. But the menace of 
the former is inherent in the latter. One of the greatest 
advantages of an English-speaking alliance is that its 
main protective bulwark would be a most formidable, and 
presumably an invincible, sea power. Except to a very 
minor and almost negligible degree, no one of the in- 
sidious dangers of militarism is to be feared from naval 
armaments. Even in the most powerful navies, com- 
paratively few men are required and its spirit cannot per- 
vade a whole people. The British navy, abnormally en- 
larged as it was already before the war by the German 
peril, included then only 150,000 men. Hence, its politi- 
cal influence must be relatively slight. Moreover, a fleet 
is essentially a defensive weapon. Sea power can pre- 
vent an opponent from being victorious and is thus fre- 
quently the decisive factor in hostilities, but in an offen- 
sive war it is merely the adjunct of the army. 

It is almost axiomatic that the military and naval 
forces of any state should be commensurate not only with 
its location and policies, but also with its alliances, under- 
standings and friendships with the other members of the 



266 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

family of nations. It is evident that if the United States 
should revert to its isolation or even if it should entirely- 
trust its future to an untried league of nations, the extent 
of its military and naval armaments must be far greater 
than if it were intimately allied with the British Common- 
wealth. England, Canada, Australasia and South 
Africa are in a similar position. In any eventuality, the 
old days of light military burdens will in all probability 
not return for some considerable time. But the weight 
of the future load, and its exact nature also, will largely 
depend upon the establishment of such close and binding 
ties. Apparently only in this way can security be safe- 
guarded with armaments of such extent as not to endan- 
ger the political institutions typical of English-speaking 
peoples. With the aid of comparatively small standing 
armies recruited from a manhood extensively trained to 
arms, their joint navies should be able not only to protect 
them but to ensure, as far as this is possible, the general 
peace of the world. Local wars in Europe, as well as 
elsewhere, may still occur, but as in the case of the exist- 
ing conflict, so also in all probability in future inter- 
national difficulties tending toward world wars, the fun- 
damental causes will lie in extra-European conditions. 
When there is no hope of gaining command of the sea, 
ambitious designs of aggression in transmarine areas 
must remain innocuous in their chrysalid state. 

For the United States and for the British Common- 
wealth future peace and security are pre-eminently essen- 
tial. The democracy of the English-speaking peoples 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 267 

may emerge safely from the present ordeal by battle, but 
much yet remains to be done to make it an adequate sys- 
tem of political and social organization. The less secure 
from outside attack the body politic is, the more atten- 
tion will be diverted from social reconstruction and the 
less smoothly, quickly, and fully will be realized the ideals 
of liberty and social justice towards which these democra- 
cies are insistently advancing. In addition, each branch 
of the English-speaking community has its distinctive 
problems whose solution demands concentrated effort. 
The United States must seriously undertake the laborious 
work of Americanizing a vast multitude of foreign-born 
and of overcoming a distinct sectionalism. The process 
of spiritual, intellectual and economic integration needs 
the quickening of positive ideals so that the American 
state may acquire a distinctively national character and a 
unified purpose. 

Similarly, the other English-speaking democracies have 
their urgent problems. First and foremost, is the crea- 
tion of an organization that will provide for the con- 
tinuous expression of their distinct solidarity and that 
will give to the self-governing citizens of the British Com- 
monwealth outside the British Isles a direct control over 
the vital issue of peace or war. This means a voice in 
foreign policy and in imperial defence, together with an 
equitable distribution of their burdens. But far more 
important and far more complex even than this refrac- 
tory problem is the recognized obligation to develop the 
character and mind of the politically backward millions in 



268 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

the Dependent Empire so that ultimately they too may 
become fit for self-government. As this fitness is never 
acquired except empirically and is always accompanied 
by a measure of disorder and a large share of blunders, 
the rate of progress will be intimately connected with the 
degree of pressure from without the body politic. The 
less this pressure, the more the reins of British authority 
will be relaxed. But disorder within the house will not 
be tolerated, if the entire structure is endangered. An 
English-speaking alliance would not be directly concerned 
with the internal affairs of India. If British statesman- 
ship could not conciliate the growing spirit of Indian 
nationalism, America would not be concerned, however 
much the outcome might be deplored. But such an 
alliance would presumably give the British Common- 
wealth sufficient security to render comparatively harm- 
less the inefficiency and disorder that must inevitably ac- 
company the progressive transfer of authority in India 
into the hands of natives. This process has been pro- 
ceeding slowly; the rate was dependent upon consider- 
ations of safety, and its future progress will be deter- 
mined by post-bellum conditions. It is literally true that 
the future of self-government in India will be largely con- 
ditioned by America's future foreign policy. 

While security and the peace that accompanies it are 
essential to the English-speaking peoples, these are but 
negative aims, and a foreign policy based merely upon 
them has no moral value. It is, however, incontestable 
that upon the closest co-operation between the English- 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 269 

speaking peoples largely depend the future freedom of 
Latin America from European domination, the inde- 
pendence and integrity of China, and the rapidity with 
which self-government will be established in India. 
Thus, indirectly, the negative policy of security will make 
for liberty. This ideal has been the historic goal of all 
English-speaking peoples and, with many aberrations, it 
has been constantly, though somewhat gropingly and er- 
ratically, pursued. 27 It must be the key-note of the pro- 
posed association, if the alliance is to work its fullest good 
in the world. Such an alliance can and should be the 
bulwark of free government not only within their own 
frontiers and in Latin America and China, where the 
material interests of the English-speaking peoples are 
directly involved, but also wherever the doctrines of 
ascendancy threaten the liberties of the world. Its 
available military strength may not always be able to 
cope expeditiously with the situation, but its combined 
naval and economic resources will be able to give pause 
to the stoutest of militaristic hearts bent upon subjugat- 
ing and exploiting its European neighbours. No matter 
what the military outcome of the war may be, even if 
Germany should in the end succeed in adding to her 
European area, the future freedom of France and Italy, 
as well as that of Belgium, Holland and the Scandina- 
vian countries, is dependent upon a close association of 
the English-speaking peoples and upon their readiness 
to continue to use their combined strength against the 
projected hegemony of Europe by the Central Empires. 



270 THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

Even in the East of Europe, where their sea power can- 
not directly intervene, it can be effective, at least in miti- 
gating the hard lot of suppressed and exploited nationali- 
ties, if not in securing their complete emancipation. The 
English-speaking peoples have in their joint grasp naval 
and economic weapons which those who depend upon sea- 
borne commerce must in the long run respect, even if 
military exigencies have led to their temporary defiance. 
These combined maritime and economic resources can- 
not but provide the essential basis of any league of 
nations that may be formed after the war. The effec- 
tiveness of the proposed league will be directly commen- 
surate with the vitality of the English-speaking alliance 
which should form its corner-stone. There are, however, 
various kinds of alliances. A dynastic one, of course, is 
out of the question. One merely of governments would 
be ineffective. It must be a popular association, based 
upon mutual sympathy and good-will, together with a 
genuine desire for co-operation. Only such an associa- 
tion offers the hope for a better future, because it con- 
tains ultimate potentialities unknown to a political science 
based directly upon the sovereign state of the modern era. 
When one surveys the entire course of historical evolu- 
tion, it becomes clear that the only way in which law and 
justice have been established in the relations of man to 
man and of group to group has been by the integration 
of ever larger and larger political aggregates. When 
this process is voluntary, it distinctly spells progress. 
The world is just beginning to realize that the state is not 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 271 

unicellular and that there can co-exist within it many and 
varied concurrent loyalties. The nineteenth century 
ideal of the national state — the co-terminous state and 
nation — is still quite vigorous, but the British Common- 
wealth of Nations is concretely demonstrating that a 
higher type of political association can exist in which law 
and justice rule over a congeries of widely scattered 
peoples to each one of which is assured the free and full 
development of its own ideals. 28 The outlook for the 
eventual reign of law and the rule of reason throughout 
the world would indeed be black if the future did not 
hold in store even more comprehensive political organi- 
zations permitting the fullest freedom to the nations and 
states within them, but uniting them in a common pur- 
pose for mankind as a whole. A mere alliance of the 
English-speaking peoples, were it to imply no more than 
did such arrangements in the past, would not in itself be 
so alluring. But one can dimly perceive in it the vague 
outlines of some new, unprecedented form of political 
association which, though preserving to each part its full 
freedom, will permanently unite them, not only for the 
defence of their own common civilization and its ideals, 
but also in support of the liberty of all threatened by the 
sword of those who worship at the shrine of organized 
power. 



NOTES 



NOTES 

NOTES TO INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 

1. " Liberty and Law are interdependent ; the weak state can only 
be secure of its liberty under the guardianship of law. In this 
aspect, again, the Great War appears as the last struggle of the forces 
hostile to the spirit of western civilization : the forces that repudiate 
the possibility of international law, deny the claims of weak states 
to the liberty that law alone can give them, decline to admit the moral 
basis of Law, and claim the right to return to the practices of the 
jungle in inter-state relations." Ramsay Muir, Nationalism and In- 
ternationalism, p. 34. 

2. " In all centuries of the Middle Age Christendom, which in des- 
tiny is identical with Mankind, is set before us as a single, universal 
Community, founded and governed by God Himself. Mankind is one 
' mystical body ' ; it is one single and internally connected ' people ' or 
'folk'; it is an all embracing corporation (universitas) , which con- 
stitutes that Universal Realm, spiritual and temporal, which may be 
called the Universal Church (ecclesia universalis) , or, with equal 
propriety, the Commonwealth of the Human Race (respublica generis 
humani). Therefore that it may attain its one purpose, it needs One 
Law (lex) and One Government (unicus principatus)." Gierke, 
Political Theories of the Middle Age, p. 10. 

3. C. Delisle Burns, Political Ideals, p. 103. 

4. W. A. Dunning, A History of Political Theories, Ancient and 
Mediaeval, pp. 230, 231. Dante's De Monarchia "rests on the funda- 
mental conception that the world, being a thought of God, is designed 
for unity, the attainment of which is the chief aim of man." J. Hol- 
land Rose, Nationality in Modern History, p. 7. See also Ramsay 
Muir, Nationalism and Internationalism, pp. I24ff. 

5. John Neville Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, 1414-1625, p. 63. 

6. Ibid., p. 13. " With all reservations, there remains a broad dif- 
ference between the self-sufficing unit of International Law, and the 
spoke in the wheel of Mediaeval Christendom," Ibid., p. 20. 

7. A. L. Smith, Church and State in the Middle Ages, pp. 134, 135. 

8. Figgis, op. cit., p. 88. According to Grotius, " all mankind, or 
at least the great part of it, constitutes a society of peoples for which 
the rule of a general law is indispensable." W. A. Dunning, A His- 

275 



276 NOTES 

tory of Political Theories, from Luther to Montesquieu, pp. 174, 175. 

9. " Grotius and his successors recurred to the Law of Nature as 
being, according to the theory of the ancient Roman jurists, a law 
grounded in reason and valid for all mankind." Bryce, Studies in 
History and Jurisprudence, p. 602. 

10. Pollock, Oxford Lectures, pp. 18, 19; Cambridge Modern His- 
tory XII, pp. 712, 713. Recently, this distinguished authority has 
stated that " the law of nations has never professed to restrain sover- 
eign states from being judges in their own cause in the last resort"; 
and he concludes his re-examination of the subject with the significant 
words that the near future " may see the foundations of an authentic 
international law, protected by organized international justice." 
" What of the Law of Nations ? " in The Living Age for January 27, 
1917. 

11. In interstate relations, "there is no Law, in the strict modern 
sense because (there is) no superior authority capable of adjudicating 
on disputes and enforcing rules." Bryce, op. cit., pp. 546, 547. Cf. 
p. 554. " The term ' law ' when applied to the rules and principles 
that prevail between independent nations, is misleading because such 
rules depend for their entire validity upon the forbearance and con- 
sent of the parties to whom they apply, and are not and cannot be 
legally enforced by any common superior." W. W. Willoughby, The 
Nature of the State, p. 200. On the English, and also the American, 
conception of law, see A. Lawrence Lowell, The Government of 
England, II, pp. 471-488. 

12. Oppenheim, International Law, I, p. 4. 

13. Figgis, op. cit., p. 215. 

14. "Before The Hague Conference, international legislation in 
Conferences had taken as its most important subject the Laws of 
War, and again, at The Hague Conferences, if one expects arbitra- 
tion, the only question really discussed and the only results arrived at 
concerned the conduct of nations during war. . . . What should we 
think of a State in which there were no laws to prevent riot and mur- 
der and violence, and no police to enforce the law, but yet there were 
very detailed and complicated laws governing the conduct of persons 
engaged in riots, murder, and violence? . . . The Laws of War 
should not be the first, but the last, to be made in the Society of 
Nations." L. S. Woolf, International Government, pp. 28, 29. 

15. Edmond Kelly, Government or Human Evolution, I, p. 360. 

16. As any and every dispute may be deemed to involve these fac- 
tors, the effect of these treaties is greatly weakened. 

17. Russia, largely at Bismarck's instigation, denounced during the 
Franco-Prussian War the clauses of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 neu- 
tralizing the Black Sea. Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences, 
II, p. 115. This high-handed act led to the declaration of the Con- 



INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 277 

ference of London of 1871 that it was " an essential principle of the 
law of nations that no Power can repudiate treaty engagements or 
modify treaty provisions, except with the consent of the contracting 
parties by mutual agreement." 

18. To reduce this to its inherent absurdity, if Monaco or Lichten- 
stein were parties to a war and had not ratified a Hague Convention, 
it would not be binding on the other belligerents. 

19. Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire, VI, pp. 201 ff. ; Die 
Begriindung des Deutschen Reiches, VI, pp. i68ff. 

20. Sanger and Norton, England's Guarantee to Belgium and Lux- 
emburg, pp. 15-21, 77ff. 

21. Gladstone's Speeches in the House of Commons on August 5 
and 10, 1870; Morley's Gladstone, II, p. 342. 

22. Sanger and Norton, op. cit., pp. 93ff. 

23. Hans Wehberg, Capture in War on Land and Sea, pp. 4, 5 ; T. 
Baty and J. H. Morgan, War: Its Conduct and Legal Results, pp. 
i66ff. 

24. P. S. Reinsch, Public International Unions; L. S. Woolf, In- 
ternational Government, pp. i53ff; Oppenheim, op. cit. I, pp. 5i2ff, 

6l2ff. 

25. W. A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, contains an ex- 
haustive account of this attempt. An excellent short account is avail- 
able in An Introduction to the Study of International Relations by 
Grant, Greenwood, Kerr, and others, pp. iff. 

26. L. S. Woolf, International Government, p. 24. On the inter- 
vention in Greece during the present war, see Leon Maccas, Ainsi 
Parla Venizelos, pp. 2gsff. 

27. For a full account of this development, see T. E. Holland, The 
European Concert in the Eastern Question. 

[28. British White Book, Nos. 2, 6, 9, 90, 97, 99, 120. 

29. B. E. Schmitt, England and Germany, pp. 306-314. 

30. "And again in 'foreign politics,' as we provincially call it, we 
suppose always that something corresponding to a ' Balance of 
Power ' should be maintained. For if any one State were to become 
too powerful, even though it were still theoretically equal with the 
others, it could so influence the development of the others as not to 
leave them free. Theoretical independence is valueless unless it in- 
volves a real power to carry out one's own will; and were any one 
State to become supreme in military or economic power, no other 
State would be really able to govern itself in its own way. Quite 
apart from actual invasion or conquest, a preponderant influence in 
Europe would check local differentiation." G Delisle Burns, Political 
Ideals, pp. 124, 125. 

31. British White Book, No. 101. 

32. In 1907, at the Congress at Stuttgart, Jaures stated the incon- 



278 NOTES 

trovertible truth : " Si une nation, en quelque circonstance que ce fut, 
renongait d'avance a. se defendre, elle ferait le jeu des gouvernements 
de violence, de barbarie, et de reaction. . . . L'unite humaine se real- 
iserait dans la servitude, si elle resultait de 1'absorption des nations 
vaincues par une nation dominatrice." Romain Rolland, Au-Dessus 
de la Melee, p. 158. 

33. Hans Delbrueck, Regierung und Volkswille, p. 123. 

34. Pitt and his colleagues in England " verteidigten die Zukunft 
Englands, und sie hatten ausserdem recht, wenn sie zugleich verkuen- 
deten, im englischen Lager sei die Freiheit Europas. England hat 
damals in einem zwanzigjaehrigen Kriege das Seinige getan, um die 
Zukunft der Welt vor der Gewaltherrschaft der Napoleonischen Mili- 
taerdespotie zu bewahren." Paul Rohrbach, Zum Weltvolk hin- 
durch !, p. 71. 

35. In 1894, France and Russia formed an alliance to counteract the 
military predominance of Germany which had been further assured by 
alliances with Austria-Hungary, Italy and Rumania. A distinguished 
French historian regarded this arrangement as equivalent to a league 
to safeguard peace. Both groups, Seignebos said, " ayant le meme but 
declare, le maintien de la paix, leur opposition a produit en Europe 
le meme effet pratique qu'une entente generale." Seignebos, Histoire 
Politique de l'Europe Contemporaine, p. 789. 

36. Imperial Germany, by Prince von Buelow (new edition by 
J. W. Headlam), p. 325. 

37. An article in The Round Table for December of 1915 called 
" The Harvest of the War," ably outlines this plan. Lord Salisbury 
held that the concert is "the embryo of the only possible structure 
of Europe which can save civilization from the desolating effects 
of a disastrous war." 



NOTES TO NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 

1. F. H. Giddings, " Sovereignty and Government " in Political 
Science Quarterly, XXI, pp. iff.; J. M. Mathews, " Duguit's Political 
Theory," ibid., XXIV, pp. 284ff. ; J. N. Figgis, From Gerson to 
Grotius, pp. 52 et passim; Maitland and Gierke, Political Theories 
of the Middle Age, passim; J. A. Murray Macdonald, European In- 
ternational Relations, pp. 94ff . ; Harold J. Laski, Studies in the Prob- 
lem of Sovereignty, pp. 1-25. 

2. C. Delisle Burns, The Morality of Nations, passim; L. S. Woolf, 
International Government, passim. 



NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY 279 

3. See J. W. Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 237ff. ; 
Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, pp. 503ff. 

4. Romain Rolland, Au-Dessus de la Melee, pp. gj&. 

5. See especially F. S. Marvin, The Unity of Western Civilization 
and the same writer's The Living Past. " The nations of the West 
are far more alike than they are unlike, and their points of likeness 
are much more important than their points of unlikeness. Not only 
materially but spiritually every nation is poorer by breach of contact 
with any other. The sole point in which the nations are inde- 
pendent is that of government." G. Lowes Dickinson and others, 
Towards a Lasting Settlement, p. 26. " Religion, law, manners, cus- 
toms, education — are at bottom the same in all ; and in respect of 
them, the essential things of our life, Europe is virtually one great 
commonwealth of nations." J. A. Murray Macdonald, European In- 
ternational Relations, p. 77. In his cosmopolitan period, before the 
disaster of Jena had aroused his German national consciousness, 
Fichte said : " The Christian Europeans are essentially but one 
people ; they recognize this common Europe as their own true Father- 
land ; and, from one end of it to the other, pursue nearly the same 
purposes and are ever actuated by similar motives." J. Holland 
Rose, Nationality in Modern History, p. 41. 

6. Similar influences were quite active even before the modern era. 
Witness the effect of the Huguenot immigration upon England, that 
of the Palatines into the American Colonies and the wide-spread in- 
fluence of the dispersion of the Spanish Jews under the goad 
of religious persecution. 

7. For American democratic influence in the Balkans, see National- 
ism and War in the Near East, pp. xviff. ; 379. 

8. Laveleye, Le Socialisme Contemporain, pp. xxxiiff. (7 ed. 1892). 

9. L. S. Woolf, op. cit., p. 165. 

10. In so far as the Universal Postal Union is concerned, " the 
theoretical right of the State to refuse ratification to the Convention 
and Reglement as voted at a Congress in practice hardly exists. The 
Administrations, adhering to the Union, never wait for formal rati- 
fication before putting the new regulations into operation, and the 
decisions of a Postal Congress are acted upon whether they are rati- 
fied or not." L. S. Woolf, op. cit., p. 195. " The adherence of a State 
to the Postal Convention results in a surrender of its independence 
and sovereignty in the realm of postal communications, in its volun- 
tary submission to International Government." Ibid., p. 197. 

11. "When the interdependence of States is recognized, it will fol- 
low that the philosophical idea of the State will no longer be that of a 
single, self-sufficient organism, but rather that of a functioning organ 
in a grouping more or less organized." C. Delisle Burns, The Mor- 



280 NOTES 

ality of Nations, p. 53. See also A. H. Fried, The Restoration of 
Europe, pp. 11-14. 

12. " Now the process of change which we call civilization means 
quite a number of things. But there is no doubt that on its political 
side it means primarily the gradual substitution of a state of peace 
for a state of war. This change is the condition precedent for all 
the other kinds of improvement that are connoted by such a term 
as ' civilization.' " John Fiske, American Political Ideas, p. 106. 

13. P. H. Kerr's lecture, " Commonwealth and Empire," in The 
Empire and the Future, p. 86. See also his essay, " Political Rela- 
tions Between Advanced and Backward Peoples," in International 
Relations, by Grant, Greenwood, and others, pp. 141-179. 

14. For an excellent and full account of these problems, see Arnold 
J. Toynbee, Nationality and the War. 

15. Henry Sidgwick, The Development of European Polity, p. 26. 

16. C. Delisle Burns, Political Ideals, p. 174. 

17. W. E. H. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, I, p. 488. See also 
Letters of John Stuart Mill, I, pp. 276-281. 

18. J. F. Rhodes, History of the United States, III, p. 342. 

19. John W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitu- 
tional Law, I, p. 4. 

20. Cf. Ramsay Muir, Nationalism and Internationalism, pp. 47, 48. 

21. For an admirable account of this development, see C. D. Buck, 
"Language and the Sentiment of Nationality," in the American Po- 
litical Science Review, X, pp. 44ft. 

22. Pierre Mocaer, La Question Bretonne. See also " The Small 
Celtic Nations " in The New Statesman for April 14, 1917. 

23. W. E. H. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, I, p. 502. 

24. This is especially true when nationalism, as in Germany, is 
based upon the firm conviction of blood superiority and degenerates 
into what has been well termed, " racialism." Ramsay Muir, Nation- 
alism and Internationalism, pp. 84-86. 

25. Towards a Lasting Settlement, ed. by C. R. Buxton, p. 26. 

26. Arnold J. Toynbee, The Destruction of Poland. 

. 27. R. A. Reiss, How Austria-Hungary Waged War in Serbia. 

28. " In point of material force I held a union with Russia to have 
the advantage. I had also been used to regard it as safer, because I 
placed more reliance on traditional dynastic friendship, on community 
of conservative monarchical instincts, on the absence of indigenous 
political divisions, than on the fits and starts of public opinion among 
the Hungarian, Slav, and Catholic population of the monarchy of the 
Habsburgs. Complete reliance could be placed upon the durability 
of neither union, whether one estimated the strength of the dynastic 
bond with Russia, or of the German sympathies of the Hungarian 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 281 

populace." Bismarck's Reflections and Reminiscences, II, p. 256ff. 

29. J. Holland Rose, The Development of the European Nations, 
II, pp. 15-18; A. Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe, 1878- 
1914, I, pp. 4iff. 

30. This treaty of 1883 was only a personal undertaking of King 
Carol ; it was not binding on Rumania, since it had not been ratified 
by Parliament as is required by the Constitution. Mitrany, in The 
Balkans, by Forbes, Toynbee, Mitrany, and Hogarth, p. 301. 

31. " The conclusion of this Alliance came, not so much from our 
fear of Russia, as from the fact that our other neighbour made our 
life intolerable, and that we found no other means except the Alliance 
to make our existence tolerable." " The Policy of National Instinct." 
Speech delivered by M. Take Jonesco in the Rumanian Chamber of 
Deputies, December 16 and 17, 1915, p. 83. 

32. Ibid., pp. 84, 85. 

33. Pierre Albin, L'Allemagne et la France, 1885-1894, p. 384. As 
a result of this alliance, " l'ere de Bismarck est cette fois definitive- 
ment close. L'equilibre rompu est retabli." Ibid., p. 378. 

34. For a clear account of England's relations with the Triple Al- 
liance, see Ernst zu Reventlow, Deutschlands Auswaertige Politik, 
pp. 8-17, 25-38. 



NOTES TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 1914 

1. "Your first Duties — first, at least, in importance — are, as I 
have told you, to Humanity. You are men before you are citizens or 
fathers. If you do not embrace the whole human family in your 
love, if you do not confess your faith in its unity — consequent on 
the unity of God — and in the brotherhood of the Peoples who are 
appointed to reduce that unity to fact . . . you disobey your law of 
life, or do not comprehend the religion which will bless the future." 
Mazzini, The Duties of Man (Everyman's Library), p. 51. 

2. Figgis, op. cit., p. 217. As early as 1713, in his Projet de iraite 
pour rendre la paix perpetuelle, the Abbe de St. Pierre argued that 
" Christianity has given to the nations of Europe, in religion, morals, 
and customs, and even in laws, the impress of a single society — to 
such a point that those peoples which, like the Turks, have become 
European in a geographical sense without becoming Christians, have 
been regarded as strangers ; and between the members of this Chris- 
tian commonwealth the ' ancient image of the Roman Empire has 
continued to form a sort of bond.' " W. A. Phillips, The Confedera- 



282 NOTES 

tion of Europe, pp. 20, 21. For a succinct synopsis of this project, 
see Ramsay Muir, op. cit., pp. 139-143. 

3. If the prevalent view of the meaning of freedom and inde- 
pendence entertained by the states of Europe be a true theory, " then 
the binding force of the engagements which nations enter into with 
each other must always be weaker than the alleged necessities of the 
life of any one of them; and wars between them must always be 
inevitable." J. A. Murray Macdonald, op. cit., pp. 41, 42. 

4. The ill-repute of diplomacy is not due to the character of diplo- 
mats but to the fact that the international anarchy places them at 
times in a false situation. The diplomatic code of honour, however, 
varies greatly in the different states. An especially crude and cynical 
disregard of truth was evinced, on one occasion at least, by Baron 
von Aehrenthal, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, who in 
private life was presumably a man of honour. Just before the an- 
nexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, he categorically lied in 
his official capacity to the British Ambassador at Vienna about the im- 
pending proclamation of Bulgarian independence, although the full 
truth was bound to be revealed in two days. H. W. Steed, The 
Hapsburg Monarchy, pp. 250-253. 

5. Baron von Hiigel describes the contents of a letter received by 
him a few days before the outbreak of the war from a highly culti- 
vated and deeply religious German scholar who knew England well. 
"It was a long, touchingly earnest, plea in favour of the justice of 
the German claims, especially of a cultural kind, and centred in the 
strange assertion and argument that German culture had by now, as 
a sheer matter of fact, fully assimilated all that deserved to live in 
the several civilizations of Greece and Rome, Italy, France, and Eng- 
land; and hence that the spreading and the substitution, by means 
even of the force of arms, of this German culture, now thus become 
the legitimate heir (because the actual quintessence) of all those 
other cultures, was both no more than justice on the part of Ger- 
many towards herself, and no kind of loss, but rather a great gain 
in fruitful concentration, for Europe and humanity at large." Baron 
Friedrich von Hiigel, The German Soul, pp. 7, 8. This quotation is 
made, not because it is unique, but because it expresses exceedingly 
well the thoughts dominating many influential Germans. 

6. Luther " paves the way for the exalted theory of the State enter- 
tained by Hegel and his followers. He is as much the spiritual an- 
cestor of the high theory of the State, as the Jesuits and their allies 
are of the narrower, utilitarian theory." Figgis, op. cit., p. 67. " In 
bringing to an imaginative synthesis what might have remained an 
immense diversity of enterprises, Kantianism has helped formulate a 
sense of a national mission and destiny." John Dewey, German 
Philosophy and Politics, p. 29. 



AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 283 

7. For a useful summary of the various theories of the organic 
nature of the state, see J. W. Garner, Introduction to Political 
Science, p. 56ff. 

8. There are, Maitland says, permanently organized groups of men, 
of which the state is a " highly peculiar group-unit." According to 
Gierke, such a German Genossenschaft or Fellowship " is no fiction, 
no symbol, no piece of the State's machinery, no collective name for 
individuals, but a living organism and a real person, with body and 
members and a will of its own. Itself can will, itself can act ; it wills 
and acts by the men who are its organs as a man wills and acts by 
brain, mouth and hand. It is not a fictitious person." Gierke-Mait- 
land, Political Theories of the Middle Age, pp. ix, x. 

9. Hans Delbrueck, Regierung und Volkswille, pp. 131-133. Ac- 
cording to Friedrich Naumann, another German publicist of wide- 
spread influence, " the State grows up upon the will to make others 
subservient to oneself. All constructions which attempt to explain 
the State from brotherly love to our neighbour are, considered his- 
torically, so much empty talk. The State can, when it perfects itself, 
be impregnated with the motives of brotherly love, at least one can 
attempt it; but according to its nature, the State is not love, but con- 
straint." Baron Friedrich von Hugel, op. cit., pp. 54, 55. 

10. According to a somewhat idealized view, the state of English- 
speaking peoples " is a community claiming an unlimited devotion on 
the part of each and all of its members to the interest of all its other 
members, living and yet to live." Lionel Curtis, The Problem of the 
Commonwealth, p. 91. For further elaboration of this concept of 
the state, see The Round Table, Nos. 23 and 24, pp. 39iff., 688ff. 

11. The same is true of Austria. The English and American ex- 
pression " civil service " is not a synonym for " bureaucracy." The 
English and American service has not acquired a consciousness that it 
is not a service, but a government. In Austria and in Germany this 
consciousness exists and is assiduously cultivated. The Austrian 
bureaucracy " conceives itself theoretically as the executive instru- 
ment of the will of the Crown, and practically as invested with a 
mission to govern the public." The same is true of the German 
officials. " That the State exists for the service of the public is a 
conception foreign to the bureaucratic mind which is moulded on the 
principle that the community exists for the State and derives its well- 
being from and through the State." H. W. Steed, op. cit., p. xxxi. 
Cf. Delbrueck, op. cit., p. 141. See also some very pertinent remarks 
in Norman Angell, The World's Highway, p. 78. 

12. Cf. Conrad Gill, National Power and Prosperity, p. 85. 

13. It is significant that Professor Paulsen selected this dictum of 
Treitschke in order to contrast the modern German spirit with that 
of Kant. Friedrich Paulsen, Immanuel Kant, p. 359. It is not con- 



284 NOTES 

tended that every German holds such views, but they are unquestion- 
ably predominant among those determining policy and deed. Oppos- 
ing views might be cited, but they have as little political significance 
as have the sporadic utterances of English-speaking neo-Odinists. 
For instance, in his Elements of Folk Psychology, published in 
1912, Wilhelm Wundt writes : " The ideal which is at present pro- 
posed for the distant future involves not the extension of any single 
State into a world State, but rather the dissolution of existing States 
and the establishment of a society of universal peace among nations, 
such as would render entirely superfluous any instruments of power 
on the part of the State itself." 

14. W. F. Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, I, pp. 20off. 

15. Henry Adams, History of the United States, I, p. 203. 

16. Ibid., I, p. 214. 

17. Ibid., IV, p. 342. 

18. John W. Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy, pp. 440, 
441. As early as 1814, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, Pozzo di 
Borgo, recognized that the United States was " aiming at a complete 
revolution in the relations of the New World with the Old, by the de- 
struction of all European interests in the American continent." 
W. A. Phillips, op. cit., p. 90. 

19. F. J. Turner, Rise of the New West, p. 203. For details of the 
naval and military aid given by British subjects to the revolting col- 
onies, see Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, VIII, pp. 
332-335- 

20. The most complete accounts of the genesis of Monroe's famous 
message are : Worthington C. Ford, " John Quincy Adams and the 
Monroe Doctrine," in the American Historical Reviezv, Vols. VII and 
VIII ; The Writings of James Monroe, edited by S. M. Hamilton, VI, 
pp. 346ff. The best account of the European situation that led to its 
formulation is in W. A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, pp. 
256-291. 

21. Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, October 24, 1823. 

22. James Madison to James Monroe, October 30, 1823. 

23. James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1823. Like 
Jefferson, he thought that the time had arrived " when G. Britain 
must take her stand, either on the side of the monarchs of Europe, 
or of the U States, and in consequence, either in favour of Despotism 
or of liberty." 

24. Henry Clay's plan was to draw the nascent South American 
republics, both commercially and politically, into the orbit of the 
United States. W. F. Johnson op. cit., I, pp. 326ff; Carl Schurz, 
Henry Clay, I, pp. 165-171. 

25. Cf. C. R. Fish, American Diplomacy, pp. 208-211. 

26. The confidence with which the bold declarations were made in 



THE BACKGROUND OF WAR 285 

Monroe's Message " rested more on the efficiency of the British navy 
than on our own strength. . . . Thus to use for one's own purposes 
the resources of a rival power, while yielding nothing to her rivalry, 
is daring; but, if justified, it is the highest manifestation of the diplo- 
matic art." Ibid., pp. 212, 213. 

27. James Monroe to John Quincy Adams, November 21, 1823. 

28. For the subsequent interpretations and extensions of this pro- 
tean policy by Polk, Olney, Roosevelt, Lodge, and others, see H. 
Kraus, Die Monroedoctrin, and A. B. Hart, The Monroe Doctrine: 
An Interpretation. 

29. The Letters of Daniel Webster (ed. Van Tyne), p. 104; H. C. 
Lodge, Daniel Webster, pp. 132-135. 

30. J. B. McMaster, History of the People of the United States, 
VIII, pp. I44ff ; J. B. Moore, American Diplomacy, pp. 136-139. 

31. J. B. Moore, op. cit., pp. 131, 132. This of course did not debar 
the United States from acquiring large portions of Mexico and the 
principle was never held to apply strictly to Cuba. Cf. W. F. John- 
son, op. cit, II, p. 237. 

32. D. R. Dewey, National Problems, p. 305. 

33. J. H. Latane, America as a World Power, pp. 278ff. 

34. Charles G. Washburn, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 91. 

35. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution, 
II, p. 285. Twenty years ago, Prof. John W. Burgess took American 
historians to task for passing over " our partiality for the French 
in the struggle to place a Napoleonic despotism over all continental 
Europe, which Great Britain was using all her powers to prevent." 
Political Science Quarterly, XI, p. 64. See also Richard Olney's re- 
marks in the Atlantic Monthly for March of 1900. 

36. Woodrow Wilson, A History of the American People, III, pp. 
216, 217. See also Edward Channing, A History of the United 
States, IV, pp. 453, 454. 

37. W. R. Thayer, Life and Letters of John Hay, II, p. 369. 



NOTES TO THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 

1. On this phase of German policy, see especially G. W. Prothero, 
German Policy before the War, and Lewis B. Namier, Germany and 
Eastern Europe. On the Balkan corridor, see Syud Hossain, " Tur- 
key and German Capitalists " in Contemporary Review for April of 
1915, and Evans Lewin, The German Road to the East. 

2. John Fiske, American Political Ideas, pp. 143-145. 

3. Britannic foreign trade was 27.4% ; that of the United States 



286 NOTES 

9.6%. Statistisches Jahruch, 1915, p. 65* The Britannic percentage 
would be reduced were the duplications resulting from inter-imperial 
trade eliminated ; but, on the other hand, a large proportion of Ger- 
many's over-sea trade is with Britannic countries and the United 
States. 

4. Two other large aggregates, a Chino-Japanese and a Latin 
American, were at times also foreseen by those predicting the future. 

5. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1915, pp. 11, 42, 416; I. A. Hourwich, 
Immigration and Labor, pp. i8off. 

6. See especially J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany (4th ed.) Chap- 
ters III and V. 

7. Buelow, Imperial Germany (ed. Headlam), p. 159. 

8. Naumann, Central Europe, p. 91. See for details Chapter III. 
As has been tersely said, " German Kultur cannot absorb ; it can only 
supplant." A. D. McLaren, Germanism from Within, p. 12. 

9. Sir Harry Johnston, " The German Colonies," in the Edinburgh 
Review of October, 1914. See also Dr. Dernburg's sanguine esti- 
mates quoted in W. H. Dawson, The Evolution of Modern Ger- 
many, pp. 367ff. 

10. Rohrbach, German World Policies, p. 5. 

11. Zukunft, July 1, 191 1, quoted in Charles Andler, Pan-German- 
ism, p. 53. See also other excerpts from the Zukunft in the same 
writer's Le Pangermanisme Continental, pp. 395, 396, and Le Panger- 
manisme Colonial, p. 281. 

12. Charles Andler, Le Pangermanisme Colonial, p. 186. 

13. Cf. Otfried Nippold, Der Deutsche Chauvinismus, p. 21 et 
passim. Considerable extracts from this work are available in Eng- 
lish in Alexander Gray's The True Pastime. 

14. See likewise " Vigilans sed yEquus " (Thomas Arnold), Ger- 
man Ambitions as They Affect Britain and the United States (1903), 
and G. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany (4th ed.) Chapter VI. 

15. W. H. Skaggs, German Conspiracies in America, p. 105. 

16. Gustavus Ohlinger, Their True Faith and Allegiance, p. 29. 
Since the war, the National German-American Alliance has been very 
active and has officially stated that it " is waging war against Anglo- 
Saxonism." Ibid., p. 43. See also passim. The entrance of the 
United States into the war has not stopped these efforts. 

17. G. Lowes Dickinson in Towards a Lasting Settlement, ed. 
by C. R. Buxton, p. 21. 

18. See Goethe's remark in 1828 on the young Englishmen at 
Weimar. Eckermann, Gespraeche mit Goethe (ed. Kroeber), p. 663. 

19. On this Anglo-American policy, see W. F. Johnson, America's 
Foreign Relations, II, pp. 28sff. 

20. When, some thirty years ago, the federation of the British 
Empire became a live question, the English historian, Edward A. 



THE BACKGROUND OF WAR 287 

Freeman, rejected the scheme largely because, in his opinion, it would 
alienate the United States. Would imperial disintegration be too 
dearly bought, he asked, if it carried with it " a greater chance than 
we now have of keeping the lasting good will of the United States of 
America ? " Freeman, Greater Greece and Greater Britain, p. 143. 
Such sincere feelings pervaded broad circles in England. 

21. On April 5, 1898, Hay wrote to Senator Lodge : " If we wanted 
it — which, of course, we do not — ■ we could have the practical as- 
sistance of the British Navy — on the do ut des principle, naturally." 
W. R. Thayer, John Hay, II, p. 164. 

22. Hay to McKinley, April 4, 1898. C. S. Olcott, William McKin- 
ley, II. p. 130. 

23. W. R. Thayer, op. cit., II, p. 169. 

24. See e. g., John R. Dos Passos, The Anglo-Saxon Century and 
the Unification of the English-speaking People (New York, 1903) ; 
Franklin H. Giddings, Democracy and Empire, pp. 285, 289. For a 
discussion of this question in 1894, see Mahan, The Interest of Amer- 
ica in Sea Power, pp. I07ff. 

25. W. R. Thayer, op. cit., II, 234. 

26. See especially Lionel Curtis, The Commonwealth of Nations, 
Part I ; Philip H. Kerr's " Commonwealth and Empire " in The Em- 
pire and the Future, pp. 69ff ; " The British Imperial Problem " in 
The New Republic for February 12 and 19, 1916. 

27. 

Germany's foreign trade Germany's exports 

(In Millions of Marks) 

1914 22,545 10,891 

1903 12,276 5,565 

Gain 10,269 5,326 

Great Britain's foreign trade Great Britain's exports 
(In Millions of Marks) 

1914 28,632 12,950 

1903 18,809 7,568 

Gain 9,823 5,382 

Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1915, p. 61* These figures were to no degree 
alarming, in fact they were decidedly encouraging when the disparity 
in population was considered and also the rapid development of 
British shipping and banking. For a study of this question, see B. E. 
Schmitt, England and Germany, Chapter V. 

28. W. H. Dawson, What is Wrong with Germany?, p. 159. 

29. Cf. Nationalism and War in the Near East, pp. 104, no, 214, 
215. 



288 NOTES 

30. For an illuminating analysis of this fundamental problem, see 
Philip H. Kerr's " Political Relations between Advanced and Back- 
ward Peoples " in An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations by Grant, Greenwood, Hughes, Kerr and Urquhart, pp. 141- 
182. Compare also A. J. Macdonald, Trade Politics and Christianity 
in Africa and the East. 

31. Evans Lewin, The Germans and Africa, pp. 232ff. See also 
Louis Maurice, La Politique Marocaine de lAllemagne, pp. 4-15. 

32. On May 16, 1891, Lord Salisbury instructed Sir Charles Euan- 
Smith, the Envoy-Extraordinary to Morocco, as follows : " You will 
observe that it has been the constant aim of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment and of your predecessors at Tangier, to preserve the inde- 
pendence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Morocco, while 
neglecting no favourable opportunity of impressing upon the Sultan 
and his Ministers the importance and advantage of improving the 
government and administration of the country." E. D. Morel, Ten 
Years of Secret Diplomacy, p. 7. 

33. " Frankreich befand sich zu Marokko in einer ganz anderen 
Stellung wie Grossbritannien zu Aegypten. Die Englaender herrsch- 
ten dort schon laengst, in jedem Sinne des Wortes und waren de 
facto auch international als Herren anerkannt. Mit den Franzosen 
stand es umgekehrt : sie wollten alles, aber sie besassen nichts — als 
die Grenznachbarschaft durch Algerien." Ernst zu Reventlow, 
Deutschlands Auswaertige Politik (2d ed.), p. 222. Cf. C. Seymour, 
The Diplomatic Background of the War, p. 157. 

34. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, II, pp. 593, 594. 

35. Sir Valentine Chirol, The Middle Eastern Question (1903), p. 

397- 

36. According to a far from lenient critic, " Russia's work in the 
Caucasus has been the most brilliant triumph of pacification in the 
nineteenth century." Arnold J. Toynbee, Nationality and the War, p. . 
389. See also pp. 394, 395, and Chapter XL An equally favourable 
judgment of the Pax Rossica is given by Sir Harry Johnston in 
Common Sense in Foreign Policy, pp. 71, 72. See likewise pp. 62-67. 

37. E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, p. 193. 



38. 



Area in square miles Population 

British sphere 137,000 690,000 

Russian sphere 305,000 6,900,000 

Neutral sphere 188,000 1,910,000 



630,000 9,500,000 

These figures are more or less approximate. Statesman's Year-Book 
1915, p. 1210. 



THE BACKGROUND OF WAR 289 

39. Gilbert Murray, The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, pp. 
83-102. 

40. It was the official understanding of both Russia and England 
that neither Power would " interfere in the affairs of Persia unless 
injury is inflicted on the persons or property of their subjects." 

41. The best criticism of Mr. Shuster's activities is contained in the 
following sentences of an American publicist. Mr. Gibbons writes : 
"One day in the summer of ion, I was walking along the Galata 
Quay in Constantinople. I heard my name called from the deck of 
a vessel just about to leave for Batum. Perched on top of two boxes 
containing typewriters, was a young American from Boston, who was 
going out to help reform the finances of Persia. I had talked to him 
the day before concerning the extreme delicacy and difficulty of the 
task of the mission whose secretary he was. But his refusal to admit 
the political limitations of Oriental peoples made it impossible for 
him to see that constitutional Persia was any different, or should be 
treated any differently, from constitutional Massachusetts. From the 
sequel of the story, it would seem that the chief of the mission had 
the same attitude of mind as his secretary." H. A. Gibbons, The 
New Map of Europe, p. 91. 

42. W. Morgan Sinister, The Strangling of Persia, pp. 53, 54, 253- 
261. 

43. Reventlow, op. cit., pp. 163-169 ; B. E. Schmitt, England and 
Germany, p. 151 ; B. L. Putnam Weale, The Re-Shaping of the Far 
East, I, pp. 352, 373, 465. 

44. The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi, ed. by A. M. Pooley. 

45. S. K. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, 
passim; W. W. McLaren, A Political History of Japan during the 
Meiji Era, pp. 290-298, 311-323; T. J. Abbott, Japanese Expansion and 
American Policies, pp. 66-71 ; J. O. P. Bland, "The Future of China" 
in the Edinburgh Review for October, 1914; Price Collier, The West 
in the East, pp. 3-22, 437-440. Mr. Pooley, a critic so decidedly un- 
favourable to British policy as only a Briton can be, summed up his 
country's policy as follows: "The only justification of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance is that existence in Europe outweighs interests in 
Asia." Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi, (ed. Pooley), p. 71. 

46. Belgische Aktenstuecke, 1905-14, p. 105. 

47. For an authoritative account of these negotiations, see Sir 
Edward Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, 1898-1914. 

48. Delbrueck in the Atlantic Monthly, April, 1915, p. 531. At the 
outset of these negotiations, before the Balkan Wars, there was un- 
officially suggested on the part of England a re-arrangement of the 
map that would have made Germany supreme from the North Sea 
to the Persian Gulf. The most significant thing about this episode is 
that the leading German newspapers were forbidden to review the 



2 9 o NOTES 

book in which these suggestions were embodied, " on account of the 
proposed retrocession of Metz." Sir Harry Johnston, " The German 
Colonies " in the Edinburgh Review for October, 1914, p. 303m The 
book referred to is his more than generous " Commonsense in For- 
eign Policy." 

49. See " The Anglo-German Negotiations in 1914," in The New 
Republic of December 18, 1915; The New Europe of December 14, 
1916, pp. 257-259; Fullerton, Problems of Power, (ed. 1915), pp. 306, 
307 ; B. E. Schmitt, England and Germany, pp. 368-373 ; Evans Lewin, 
The German Road to the East, pp. 69-74; S. S. McClure, Obstacles to 
Peace, pp. 39-45- 

50. For a valuable account of England's time-honoured connection 
with the Persian Gulf — it dates from the victory over the Portu- 
guese at Ormuz in 1622 — and of the little known incidents of recent 
Anglo-German rivalry there, see "The Invasion of Chaldea" in 
London Times History of the War, III, pp. 81-120. 

51. Hansard 64, pp. H5ff. 

52. This settlement had been preceded by similar ones between 
France and Turkey and between France and Germany. Nationalism 
and War in the Near East, pp. 329, 330, 333, 334; Belgische Akten- 
stuecke 1905-1914, pp. 128-130. 

53. The agreement covered many additional points. Thus England 
agreed to an increase in the Turkish customs without which the 
revenue could not have been raised to make valid the exorbitant 
guarantees demanded by the German company before building the 
railroad. " We could not agree to a 15 per cent. Turkish Customs 
Duty," Grey said, " if the increase of revenue was going, directly or 
indirectly, to facilitate the making of the Bagdad Railway, and if 
that were to be continued to a port on the Persian Gulf, and upset 
the status quo there, without any agreement with us. On that ac- 
count, therefore, we had to oppose it, and that brought us into 
diplomatic opposition with Germany. It was a very disagreeable 
position." 

54. Paul Rohrbach, Germany's Isolation, pp. 130, 131. 

55. In the spring of 1914, the German Foreign Secretary suggested 
to the French Ambassador at Berlin the advisability of an agreement 
between France, England, and Germany about future railroads in 
Africa. When Cambon replied that Belgium was also planning such 
construction and that the conference should be held in Brussels, von 
Jagow dissented, " car c'est aux depens de la Belgique que notre 
accord devrait se conclure." He further developed the thesis that 
the Congo was too heavy a burden for so small a country as Belgium. 
According to his views, only the Great Powers were in a position to 
colonize and, furthermore, he claimed that in the future the small 
states of Europe could not enjoy their former complete inde- 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO WAR 291 

pendence. "Us etaient destines a. disparaitre ou a graviter dans 
l'orbite des grandes Puissances." Cambon rejoined that these were 
not the opinions of France nor, so far as he knew, of England either. 
Royaume de Belgique, Correspondance Diplomatique 1914-1915, II, 
no. 2, pp. 2, 3. 

56. Rohrbach, Zum Weltvolk hindurch !, pp. 47, 48 ; Germany's Iso- 
lation, pp. 130, 131. 



NOTES TO AMERICA'S REACTION TO THE WAR 

1. Hans Delbrueck, Regierung und Volkswille, pp. 133-139. See 
also " The German Polity " in The New Republic for September 18, 
I9IS. 

2. Arthur J. Balfour to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, January 13, 1917. 

3. J. W. Headlam, The Issue, pp. 38, 39. Cf. also T. Veblen, The 
Nature of Peace. 

4. For attempts to do this, see "American Public Opinion and 
the War" and "America's Reaction to the War" in The Round 
Table, respectively for September, 1915 and March, 1916. 

5. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Failure of German-Americanism," 
in Atlantic Monthly for July, 1916; H. P. Fairchild, "Americanizing 
the Immigrant," in Yale Review for July, 1916. 

6. See Charles G. Washburn, Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 43-56. 

7. Enforced Peace, p. 125. 

8. When so ardent an advocate of peaceful international co-opera- 
tion and so sympathetic a friend of the United States as Baron 
d'Estournelles de Constant was asked about the future part of Amer- 
ica in international politics and conferences, he replied : " It will be 
long before any American again will be in a position to lead any 
really great movement — there are those who would not even like to 
have him follow, unless at the eleventh hour — ." Interview by Ed- 
ward Marshall in the New York Sun of August 20, 1916. 

9. Bolton King, Mazzini, p. 305. 

10. This did not escape foreign observers. In his speech of De- 
cember 16 and 17, 1915, the Rumanian statesman, Take Jonesco said : 
" How is it the conscience of the United States of America has 
become uneasy? Out of love for England? Nothing of the sort, 
gentlemen. To attack Great Britain has always been recognized as 
a safe and popular note by orators in the United States. ... If the 
German soldier were to win to-day, the first result would be that the 
same military force, which is the greatest in the world, would also be 
the greatest naval force, and there would be no more independence, 



292 NOTES 

no more liberty for any one in the world, not even for the great 
American democracy." 

11. Charles H. Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, p. 139. 
Since America's entrance into the war the ignoble suggestion has 
been made that advantage be taken of the needs of her Allies and 
that the cession of the American lands under the French and British 
flags [Canada excepted] be the price of full co-operation. 

12. Cf. Ernesto Nelson, " Efficient Pan-Americanism " in Report of 
Lake Mohonk Conference 1916, pp. i87ff; Bryce, South America, 
chapter XIV; F. Garcia Calderon, Les Democraties Latines de 
l'Amerique, passim. 

13. Munroe Smith, " American Diplomacy in the European War " 
in Political Science Quarterly for December, 1916 ; " The German- 
American Submarine Controversy" in The Round Table for June, 
19 1 6. 

14. For details of this organization, see Robert Goldsmith, A 
League to Enforce Peace; Enforced Peace; "The United States and 
the Future Peace" in The Round Table for March, 1917. For a 
parallel English scheme, consult L. S. Woolf, International Govern- 
ment. See also H. N. Brailsford, A League of Nations. 

15. Address of Mr. Theodore Marburg before the American 
Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, December 
8, 1916. 

16. This power of injunction to stop continuing injuries under 
adjudication or hearing, backed by the full force of the league, is an 
essential part of the League to Enforce Peace programme. " It would 
doubtless be necessary when some issues arise," Mr. Taft said, "to 
require a maintenance of the status quo until the issues were sub- 
mitted or decided in one tribunal or the other." 

17. Mr. H. N. Brailsford has suggested that " no treaty of alliance, 
past or future, shall bind any state adhering to the League to support 
an ally who had engaged in war without submitting his case to a 
court or council of the League." This, however, does not solve the 
inevitable conflict of obligations. 

18. E.g., on May 8, 1916, before the Union against Militarism. 

19. At Arlington on May 30 and at West Point on June 13. 

20. Speech of Acceptance, July 31, 1916. 

21. At Omaha, on October 5; at Indianapolis, on October 12; at 
Cincinnati, on October 26. 

22. Speech to the Foreign Press Representatives, October 23, 1916. 

23. This difficulty has been emphasized by an English critic, who 
writes : " Until the doubt as to whether the American Government 
could legally commit itself beforehand to go to war, if necessary, 
under the conditions of a League of Peace, it would appear that 
American participation in such a league might be an actual danger to 



AMERICA'S REACTION TO WAR 293 

its other members by seeming to promise a help in case of need that 
might not be forthcoming." Ramsay Muir, in The New Europe, 
for February i, 1917, p. 73. Although a constitutional amendment 
has been proposed to overcome this objection, the difficulty is not 
primarily legal in nature. It is quite easy to traverse the argument 
of unconstitutionality, but the political fact stated in the text remains. 
Without such unquestioning popular support as is accorded to the 
Monroe Doctrine, the entrance of the United States into the proposed 
league would be futile. 

24. A generation ago, Gladstone proclaimed that " the greatest 
triumph of our time has been the enthronement of the idea of public 
right as the governing idea of European politics." The content of 
this concept has been admirably summarized by Mr. Asquith who, in 
memorable words declared that public right means : " An equal level 
of opportunity and of independence as between small States and great 
States, as between the weak and the strong; safeguards resting upon 
the common will of Europe, and I hope, not of Europe alone, against 
aggression, against international covetousness and bad faith, against 
the wanton recourse in case of dispute to the use of force and the 
disturbance of peace ; finally, as the result of it all, a great partnership 
of nations federated together in the joint pursuit of a freer and fuller 
life for countless millions who by their efforts and their sacrifices, 
generation after generation, maintain the progress and enrich the 
inheritance of humanity." Speech at Queen's Hall, August 4, 1916. 

25. There is very little reason to assume that even a democratic 
Germany would soon be purged of aggressive ambitions. The cult of 
power numbers too many devotees. Cf. the following work by a 
Danish theologian, Dr. J. P. Bang, Hurrah and Hallelujah, passim. 

26. For a clear-cut and sound distinction between the functions 
of the army and the police of any state, see Norman Angell, The 
World's Highway, pp. 309, 310. 

27. Failure to arbitrate or even to accept the judgment would be 
such criteria of aggression. In these cases, non-belligerent states 
might be permitted to assume an attitude of benevolent neutrality and 
waive their rights in favour of the attacked party. Under existing 
conditions a grave difficulty arises from the fact that rigid insistence 
upon neutral rights and all the precedents of international law may 
defeat international justice and morality. What is needed is a flex- 
ible code of neutral and belligerent rights, for their respective im- 
portance to mankind as a whole varies with the extent and nature of 
wars. 

28. The Living Age, January 27, 1917. 

29. Speech of Senator Cummins, January 30, 1917. Congressional 
Record 54, no. 43 pp. 252off. 

30. "A beautiful treaty for world-organization could be made in 



294 NOTES 

twenty-four hours, if only the will were there to give it life and to 
enforce it." A. H. Fried, The Restoration of Europe, p. 104. 

31. Lecture at the Sorbonne, January 20, 1917 in The New Europe 
of March 8, 1917. 



NOTES TO THE UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 

1. E. g., Charles W. Eliot, Darwin P. Kingsley, Sinclair Kennedy 
in "The Pan-Angles," Walter Lippmann, Herbert Croly, Roland G. 
Usher in " The Challenge of the Future," H. H. Powers in " The 
Things Men Fight For," etc. 

2. A. B. Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp. 564, 565. 

3. The Empire and the Future, p. xiii. 

4. Lord Milner, The Nation and the Empire, p. xxxii. 

5. Ibid., pp. 329, 330. 

6. " Even at the present day, many Americans do not clearly see 
that the fundamental issue in the Boer War was essentially the same 
for the British as the fundamental issue in our great Civil War, the 
issue between the higher unity of the whole and disruption by a 
part. . . . Fortunately, however, by a kind of sure instinct, the ma- 
jority in the Empire did recognize that here was a test of unity and 
of the right and power to survive. ... It needed only the sharp test 
of attempted disruption, supported by a historical argument no better 
than but perhaps as good as that of the Southern States, to give it 
clearness and convincing force." George Burton Adams, " British 
Imperial Federation," in the Yale Review for July, 1916, pp. 69iff. 

7. See F. S. Oliver, Alexander Hamilton. 

8. Lionel Curtis, The Commonwealth of Nations, Part I, p. 8. 

9. " The Imperial Dilemma," in The Round Table for September, 
1916, p. 691. " For men who are fit for it, self-government is a ques- 
tion not of privilege but rather of obligation. It is duty, not interest, 
which impels men to freedom, and duty, not interest, is the factor 
which turns the scale in human affairs." Lionel Curtis, The Problem 
of the Commonwealth, pp. 123, 124. 

10. See Colonel A. M. Murray, Imperial Outposts. 

11. Morley, Miscellanies, III, p. 315. 

12. In 1886, Chamberlain said : " There are very many people who 
believe that the result would be, if we ever got into a war, that the 
relations between us and our colonies would be so strained that they 
would break adrift altogether, and I think it is not altogether impos- 
sible. My point is this, that these colonies are connected with us by 
ties which are really very loose, and if we got into war or anything 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 295 

of that kind practically they would break adrift and become separate 
countries." Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches, I, p. 278. 

13. Bryce, Impressions of South Africa, chapter XXV. 

14. Despite the assertion of the Kaiser in his famous Daily Tele- 
graph interview of 1908, that the Government's attitude was friendly, 
there is every reason to believe Sir Valentine Chirol's categorical 
statement that Germany tried to form a coalition consisting of her- 
self, France, and Russia for diplomatic action against England. The 
Quarterly Review for October, 1914, pp. 425, 426. See also the official 
account of the German Government's attitude in Prince von Buelow, 
Imperial Germany (ed. Headlam), pp. 30-32. 

15. See J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany, Chapter VII. 

16. For some actual qualifications to these generalizations, see A. B. 
Keith, Imperial Unity and the Dominions, pp. 14, 505, 5i6ff. 

17. Maitland-Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, p. x. 

18. " They did not know in Berlin and in Vienna that when peace 
still hung in the balance, when the British Cabinet itself was divided 
and hesitating, the Governments of Canada and other Dominions had 
cabled to the Home Government asking anxiously for immediate 
advice how they could best help if the war-cloud should break over 
England. Four days before England was at war, Canadian Ministers 
hurried back to Ottawa from holiday resorts and went into emer- 
gency council to plan for Canada's direct participation should Eng- 
land become involved. As a result, the Canadian Government of- 
fered at once, even before England was driven into the conflict, to 
send ' a considerable force ' as Imperial troops, Canada making her- 
self responsible for their pay, maintenance and equipment. . . . From 
Australia there came, four days before war broke out, the pledge of 
the Prime Minister that the Commonwealth would stand beside Eng- 
land ' to the last man and last shilling.' ... A similarly urgent desire 
to help animated the Governments and peoples of New Zealand, New- 
foundland, and other parts of the Empire." Percy and Archibald 
Hurd, The New Empire Partnership, pp. 239, 240. On July 31, 1914, 
the Prime Minister of New Zealand telegraphed to London offering 
an expeditionary force. Quarterly Review for January, 1917, P- I 3°- 

19. The most logical solution is that elaborated by Mr. Lionel Cur- 
tis in " The Problem of the Commonwealth." This is based upon the 
firm conviction that anything less than organic union is a dangerous 
make-shift. Such also is the solution consistently advocated for 
years by Lord Milner. For an exposition of the solution by alliance, 
see Richard Jebb, The Britannic Question. For a programme of 
most moderate change, see A. B. Keith, Imperial Unity and the 
Dominions. For a Canadian proposition, see Z. A. Lash, Defence 
and Foreign Affairs. For authoritative accounts of the opinion of 



296 NOTES 

Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada on these projects, 
consult The Quarterly Review for January and April, 1917. 

20. Interview with Mr. Lloyd George in the London Times (weekly 
ed.) of February 2, 1917. Five days later, Mr. Bonar Law stated in 
the House of Commons : " The invitation which has now been given 
is that in the questions which specially concern them — and most 
questions do — they should have continuous sittings as members of 
the Cabinet. . . . That is an immense step forward. . . . Under the 
stress and strain of this war the difficulties, the dangers, and the ter- 
rible losses which have been borne in common, the whole British 
Empire has been brought together with a degree of rapidity and 
strength which nothing but this war could have brought about." 

21. "The War Conference of the Empire" in The Round Table 
for March, 1917. 

22. On account of the political crisis at home, Australia was not 
represented. 

23. Speech before the Empire Parliamentary Association, April 
2, 1917. After his return to Canada, Sir Robert Borden described the 
development as follows : 

" We sat on alternate days in the Imperial War Cabinet and in 
the Imperial War Conference. On days when the Imperial War 
Cabinet did not sit the war did not wait; therefore it was necessary 
that the British Cabinet itself should sit on those days to deal with 
questions arising out of the war. This result, therefore, very early 
obtained : that the Imperial War Cabinet was differentiated from the 
British War Cabinet ; that the Imperial War Cabinet sat for the 
purpose of dealing with matters of common concern to the whole 
Empire, and the British War Cabinet sat for the purpose of dealing 
with those matters which chiefly concerned the United Kingdom." 
Canadian Hansard, May 18, 1917. 

24. Simultaneously, under the presidency of the Colonial Secretary, 
the representatives of the Dominions and of India assembled in an 
Imperial Conference. Although its membership was very largely the 
same, this body was quite distinct from the Imperial War Cabinet. 
It devoted itself to the same matters that had been discussed in 
former Imperial Conferences. This Conference reported early in 
May that: "The readjustment of the constitutional relations of the 
component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a sub- 
ject to be dealt with during the war, and that it should form the sub- 
ject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as 
possible after the cessation of hostilities. 

" It deems it its duty, however, to place on record its view that any 
such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers 
of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should 
be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous 
nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important 



UNITY OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES 297 

portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions 
and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign rela- 
tions, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous con- 
sultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and 
for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the 
several Governments may determine." 

25. Speech before the Empire Parliamentary Association, April 2, 
1917. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lloyd George said : " When the re- 
construction time comes I hope and pray that we will not dive into 
dusty pigeon-holes in searching for precedents for our programmes. 
There is a great need for revision of our ideas and our attitude to- 
ward that great Commonwealth of Nations called the British Em- 
pire." Speech at the Guildhall, April 27, 1917. 

26. Sinclair Kennedy, The Pan-Angles, p. 190. 

27. William H. Skaggs, German Conspiracies in America, pp. 68, 69. 

28. J. A. Cramb, Germany and England, p. 127. 

29. Lord Milner, The Nation and the Empire, p. xxxviii. 

30. Cf. Franz Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man, p. 116. 

31. A well-known French psychologist holds to a contrary view, 
saying " si les vivants peuvent f ondre leurs langues et leurs moeurs, 
l'ame des morts qu'ils portent en eux reste rebelle a de semblables 
fusions." Gustave Le Bon, Premieres Consequences de la Guerre, p. 
259. The established fact that musical and artistic gifts, as well as 
other aptitudes, may be inherited to no extent derogates from what 
has been said in the text. 

32. D. J. Brinton, The Basis of Social Relations, p. 167. 

33. A. B. Hart, National Ideals Historically Traced, p. 46. 

34. New Jersey Historical Society Address, quoted by H. J. Ford, 
Woodrow Wilson, pp. 62, 63. 

35. H. C. Lodge, Historical and Political Essays, pp. 138 et seq. 
36. 

English 10,376 

Scotch-Irish 1,439 

Scotch 436 

Welsh 159 

Irish 109 



12,519 

37. John R. Dos Passos, The Anglo-Saxon Century (New York, 
1903), pp. 105-108; Sinclair Kennedy, The Pan-Angles (New York, 
1914), p. 37. 

38. J. McKeen Cattell, "The Families of American Men of 
Science," in The Popular Science Monthly, vol. 86, p. 505. 

39. On this subject, see especially L. March Phillipps, Europe Un- 
bound. 



298 NOTES 

40. W. A. Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, 
p. 352. This is by far the best and most judicial account of Anglo- 
American relations. 

41. W. F. Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, I, p. 280. 

42. J. F. Rhodes, History of the United States, IV, pp. 337-394; 
W. A. Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, pp. 199- 
264; W. E. H. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, I, pp. 485-490; C. F. 
Adams, Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity, pp. 87-129. 

43. H. H. Powers, The Things Men Fight For, pp. 374, 375. 

44. This, of course, has for some time been plainly apparent to for- 
eign observers. Thus, Count Reventlow said : " To base plans for 
future empire for Germany on the possibility of future conflict be- 
tween Great Britain and the United States would be terribly dan- 
gerous, an almost unparalleled piece of Utopian folly. In future the 
Anglo-Saxon nations, perhaps marching independently, will stand op- 
posed to the German Empire and people." New York Sun, August 
13, 1916. Since April 6, 1917, the German papers have contained a 
number of articles to this effect. 

45. " Given two democracies, speaking the same language, familiar 
with the same literature, having frequent and easy commercial in- 
tercourse with one another, and above all, able when they choose to 
make their will avail with the governing classes to whom they dele- 
gate their authority, it would be strange if they could not rise above 
selfish futilities of bureaucratic foreign policy, and strike up a for- 
mula of concord which they knew to be in the common interest of 
all." H. S. Perris, Pax Britannica (London, 1913), p. 296. In 1917, 
Professor F. H. Giddings said in a similar vein: 

" The English-speaking people of the world are together the 
largest body of human beings among whom a nearly complete in- 
tellectual and moral understanding is already achieved. They have 
reached high attainments in science and the arts, in education, in 
social order, in justice. They are highly organized, they cherish 
the traditions of their common history. To permit anything to en- 
danger the moral solidarity of this nucleus of a perfected internation- 
alism would be a crime unspeakable." International Conciliation, 
April, 1917, p. 9. 

46. " A second plausible union — under some form, no matter how 
loose — is that of the United States and the British Empire. Their 
separation was the tragedy of English history, though inevitable and 
wholesome in its reaction upon both. There is no possible union 
of major powers for which sentiment speaks so strongly, but senti- 
ment does not form such unions, nor can it alone preserve them 
when formed. If the Anglo-Saxon world is ever united — a condi- 
tion essential to its ultimate success — it will be through the pres- 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 299 

sure of a common danger. That pressure is likely to be forthcom- 
ing." H. H. Powers, op. cit., p. 304. 



NOTES TO ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 

1. L. March Phillipps, Europe Unbound, p. ix. 

2. Cf. J. A. Hobson, The Open Door, in Towards a Lasting Set- 
tlement (ed. by C. R. Buxton), pp. 8sff. 

3. See E. V. Robinson, " War and Economics " in Political Science 
Quarterly, XV, pp. 58iff. ; Walter E. Weyl, American World Policies, 
Chapter II; Gilbert Slater, Peace and War in Europe, pp. 1-22. 

4. " Cromwell's Policy in its Economic Aspects," in Political 
Science Quarterly, XVI, pp. 19, 20. 

5. In Germany, where the neo-mercantilist doctrines have taken 
firmest hold, this goal dominated the colonial policy of Dr. Dern- 
burg whose " ultimate ideal is, in fact, the economic terra clausa, the 
self-contained Empire." W. H. Dawson, The Evolution of Modern 
Germany, p. 380 and chap. XIX. This idea is also present in modern 
British thought. Cf. Milner, The Nation and the Empire, pp. xvi, 
xxi, 463; Chamberlain's Speeches, II, p. 333. 

6. Conrad Gill, National Power and Prosperity, pp. 1 i6ff ; Norman 
Angell, The World's Highway, pp. 248, 249n. 

7. A. S. Johnson, " Commerce and War," Political Science Quar- 
terly, XXIX, pp. 47ff. 

8. Lord Rosebery, Napoleon : The Last Phase, pp. 195, 196. 

9. Those who figure always in terms of force and neglect the 
moral factors forget that force begets force in opposition and that 
pride of power has its nemesis. In this connection, another militar- 
ist's criticism of British policy is instructive. According to Bern- 
hardi, " since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from 
her point of view, of not supporting the Southern States in the 
American War of Secession, a rival to England's world-wide Em- 
pire has appeared on the other side of the Atlantic in the form of the 
United States of North America, which are a grave menace to Eng- 
land's fortunes." F. v. Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, p. 94. 

10. H. R. Mussey, "The New Commercial Freedom" in Political 
Science Quarterly, XXIX, p. 616. 

11. For instance, the London Chamber of Commerce in 1916 sug- 
gested a future rate of 30% on wholly manufactured goods and 
one of 15% on semi-manufactured goods, imported from present 
enemy countries. The proposed duties on importations from allied 
and neutral countries were to be respectively one third and two 



300 NOTES 

thirds of these rates. J. A. Hobson, The New Protectionism, p. 153. 

12. Robert H. Patchin, The Need of a National Foreign Trade 
Policy, p. 3. 

13. F. W. Taussig, Some Aspects of the Tariff Question, p. 4. 

14. Prince von Buelow, Imperial Germany (ed. Headlam), pp. 
274-298. 

15. On this entire subject, see Henri Hauser, Les Methodes Al- 
lemandes d'Expansion Economique; Maurice Millioud, The Ruling 
Caste and Frenzied Trade in Germany; Ezio M. Gray, l'lnvasione 
Tedesca in Italia; J. Ellis Barker, Modern Germany; Daniel Bel- 
let, Le Commerce Allemand ; Josef Grunzel, Economic Protection- 
ism, pp. 220-231 ; Luciano de Feo, La Lotta Economica del. Dopo 
Guerra, pp. 8-22. 

16. The easiest method is by the specialization of duties, which was 
employed in the German tariff of 1902 and in subsequent commer- 
cial treaties. H. Hauser, op. cit., pp. 188, 189. " In order to favour 
Swiss cattle rather than French, the former were included in a spe- 
cial category consisting of those reared at an altitude of 300 metres 
and having brown heads and tails." Millioud, op. cit., p. 143. 

17. Leo Pasvolsky, " The Situation in Russia," in The New Re- 
public for November 11, 1916. 

18. " What is deeply resented, however, is that the German com- 
petition is a disciplined state-aided competition, that it is collective 
rather than individual. The Belgian, Italian or Dutch manufacturer 
feels that behind his German competitor stand the gigantic power 
and resources of the whole German nation. It is not individual Ger- 
mans who compete, but Germany." Walter E. Weyl, American 
World Policies, pp. 117, 118. For some instances of this in the 
trade of the Far Pacific, see C. B. Fletcher, The New Pacific, chapter 
XVI. 

19. Henri Hauser, op. cit., pp. 168-171. 

20. Bertrand Russell, Justice in War-Time, p. 27. " It is said on 
the Continent — not only by Germans — that jealousy of Germany's 
economic development was an equal cause of hostility; but I be- 
lieve this to be an entire mistake. America's economic development 
has been quite as remarkable as that of Germany, but it has not 
produced the slightest ripple of political hostility. The government 
in power, as free traders, do not believe that the prosperity of one 
country is economically injurious to that of another, and in this 
opinion a majority of the nation agree with them." Ibid., p. 71. 

21. Josef Grunzel, Economic Protectionism, pp. 138, 139. 

22. "As matters stand, nevertheless, our railways, which so far 
dominate our whole internal distribution, are the greatest system of 
protection in favour of the foreigner that the world has ever seen." 
H. M. Hyndman, "The National Railways after the War," in The 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 301 

Nineteenth Century for February, 1916, p. 462. See also J. Ellis 
Barker, Modern Germany (4th ed.), pp. 524ff., 563ff. 

23. Price Collier, The West in the East, pp. 439, 440. 

24. Year 1913 

(In hundred thousands of dollars) 

Total Total Exports to Imports from 

Exports Imports United States United States 

Philippines 47,773 53,3 12 i6,434 26,676 

Porto Rico 49,104 36,900 40,538 33,155 

Cuba 164,309 140,064 131,270 75,3i6 

Hawaii (1913-4) 4 I »594 35,550 40,679 29,268 



302,780 265,826 228,921 164,415 

Report of Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1915, pp. 8, 15; Statesman's 
Year-Book 1915, pp. 630, 821. 

25. In 1912-3, the total foreign trade of British India with her 
315 million people amounted only to £338,172,451. Statistical Ab- 
stract relating to British India (1915), p. 149. 

26. F. W. Taussig, op. cit., pp. 59-79. 

27. Report of Bureau of Insular Affairs, 1913, pp. 7, 54. 

28. Josef Grunzel, op. cit., pp. 48-51. 

29. General Commerce of France in 1912 

(In millions of francs) 

Imports Exports 

Foreign countries 9,354-8 7,8oi 

Algeria, Tunis and Colonies 938.8 1,022.9 



10,293.6 8,823.9 

The trade with Morocco is not included in this table. Arthur 

Girault, The Colonial Tariff Policy of France, pp. 165, 167. 
30. Arthur Girault, op. cit.; Sir Harry Johnston, Common Sense 

in Foreign Policy, pp. 24, 25. 

31. 

Over-sea Trade of Algeria in 1912 
(In millions of francs) 

To or 
Total From France Per Cent. 

Exports 499 400.5 80.1 

Imports 654 568.4 87 



1,153 968.9 

Girault, op. cit., pp. 255-260. 
32. Ibid., pp. 268, 269. 



302 



NOTES 



33. External Commerce of the French Colonies, Exclusive of 

Algeria and Tunis, for 191 i 
(In millions of francs) 

Imports from France 261.3 Exports to France ... 273.4 

Imports from French col- Exports to French col- 
onies 16.5 onies 10.4 

Imports from foreign Exports to foreign coun- 
countries 3234 tries 357-2 

601.2 641. 

Girault, op. cit.; p. 169. Cf. Daniel Bellet, op. cit., pp. 129, 130. 
There are marked discrepancies between the statistics of France and 
those of the colonies. See Girault, op. cit., pp. i6iff. 

34. External Commerce of the United Kingdom in 1913 

(In millions of pounds sterling) 

To and from 
Total British Countries 

Exports 634.8 218.8 

Imports 768.7 212.9 



1,403.5 431-7 

These statistics include Egypt and all the Protectorates. States- 
man's Year Book, 1915, pp. 73-77- 

35. J. Ellis Barker, op. cit., pp. 148-173 ; Josef Grunzel, op. cit., p. 
44 ; P. and A. Hurd, op. cit., pp. 228, 229. In addition, these Domin- 
ions give preferential treatment to one another ; and Canada and the 
British West Indies have effected a similar arrangement. 

36. Imports 1913 

(In millions of pounds sterling) 

From the United Kingdom 240 

From British Possessions 79 

From Foreign Countries 243.6 



Exports 

To the United Kingdom 235-7 

To British Possessions 7 J -9 

To Foreign Countries 246.2 



562.6 



553-8 



1,116.4 
These figures do not include Egypt, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, and 
some of the Protectorates. Statistical Abstract for the British Self- 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 303 

Governing Dominions, etc., 1915, pp. 55, 61, 404fL It should be noted 
that, as in the case of the French statistics, those furnished by the 
Dominions, etc., do not agree with those compiled by the customs au- 
thorities in England. The causes of these discrepancies are obvious. 

37- 1913 

(In millions of pounds sterling) 

The Self-governing Dominions Imports 106.6 

Exports 158.3 



56 per cent. 264.9 

British India Imports 102.5 

Exports 41.2 



30 per cent. 143-7 

The Colonies, Dependencies, Protectorates, etc.: Imports 30.9 

Exports 36.2 

Ibid., pp. 59, 65. 14 per cent. 



38. 1913 

(In millions of pounds sterling) 

United Kingdom 

Australia Imports 41.3 

Exports 34.8 



New Zealand Imports 13.3 

Exports 18. 1 



Union of South Africa Imports 23.8 

Exports 59. 



Canada and Newfoundland Imports 28. 

Exports 46.3 



Ibid., pp. 217, 223, 226, 249, 253. 

39. Ibid., p. 69. In 1914, Great Britain has 56 million cotton 
spindles, as against 31.5 in the United States, 11.4 in Germany, and 





67.1 




475-7 


om 


Total 




79-7 




78.5 


76.1 


158.2 




22.2 




22.9 


31-4 


45-1 




42.7 




66.6 


82.8 


109.3 




133-4 




101.4 


74-3 


234.8 


264.6 


5474 



3 04 NOTES 

6.4 in India. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1915, p. 30* See also F. W. 
Taussig, op. cit., pp. 279, 294. 
40. 1913 

British India 
(In millions of pounds sterling) 

United Kingdom Total 

Exports to 41.2 23^ per cent. 176.2 

Imports from 4 102.5 62^ per cent. 163.6 



143.7 42 per cent. 339.8 

Statistical Abstract as ante, pp. 199-205. 

41. For details, see Ibid., pp. 198-273. For self-evident reasons 
the trade of Egypt was not included in the foregoing statistics. 

Egypt 1913 
(In millions of Egyptian pounds) 

United Kingdom Total 

Exports to 13-6 43 per cent. 31-6 

Imports from 8.4 30 per cent. 27.8 



22. 37 per cent. 59.4 

Statesman's Year-Book, 1915, p. 259. 

42. Ibid., p. 790. 

43. The German colonial system is one of free trade, but unques- 
tionably such forces, combined with the military and bureaucratic 
spirits, have kept foreigners from trading with the German col- 
onies. Excluding that of Kiau-Chau, their total external commerce 
in 1912 amounted to 263.5 million marks, of which approximately 
two thirds was with Germany. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1915, pp. 463ff. 
Cf. C. B. Fletcher, The New Pacific, pp. 59, 258ff. 

44. In 1892, Lord Milner wrote : " So far from unduly favouring 
the commercial interests of their own countrymen, the British ad- 
ministrators in Egypt err, if anything, on the other side; so intense 
is their anxiety, that in the position of trust which they occupy they 
should be above the least suspicion of partiality. Neither directly nor 
indirectly has Great Britain drawn from her predominant position 
any profit at the expense of other nations." Milner, England in 
Egypt (7th ed.), p. 215. England's share in the trade of Egypt be- 
fore the occupation was 57 per cent.; in 1891, it was only 54 per 
cent. In 1913, it had fallen to 37 per cent. Yet some charges are 
current that favouritism is shown to British contractors. Josef 
Grunzel, op. cit., p. 188. 

45. This question is entirely distinct from the special benefits de- 
rived by some industrial and financial groups from such sources. 

46. London Times (weekly ed.), November 3, 1916. 

47. Charles Andler, Le Pangermanisme Continental, pp. xxixff; 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 305 

Gustav Schmoller, Umrisse und Untersuchungen (1898), p. 685; 
Josef Grunzel, Economic Protectionism, pp. 3off; German Ambitions 
(1903), p. 25. 

48. Imperial Germany (ed. Headlam), p. 59. 

49. Naumann, who is of a deeply religious nature, cannot reconcile 
his Christian ethics and his Realpolitik, but he retains both despite 
their disharmony. " The State," he says, " rests upon entirely differ- 
ent impulses from those which are cultivated by Jesus. . . . The State 
grows up upon the will to make others subservient to oneself." He 
accepts the world in which he lives and contends that it " is organ- 
ized according to the principle ' Thou shalt covet thy neighbour's 
house ! ' " He cannot say that Bismarck's preparation for the Schles- 
wig-Holstein War was ethical, but he does not lament it. " Bis- 
marck did his duty, for his avocation was the cultivation of power. 
But such a duty and its fulfilment are not directly an imitation of 
Christ." " We either dare," he concludes, " to aim at being without 
a State, and thus throw ourselves deliberately into the arms of an- 
archy; or we decide to possess, alongside of our religious creed, a 
political creed as well." The latter creed in interstate relations di- 
vorces ethics from politics and is completely non-moral. Baron 
Friedrich von Hiigel, The German Soul, pp. 52-58. 

50. Friedrich Naumann, Central Europe, pp. 182, 194 and Chapter 
VI. On this project see also "The New German Empire" in The 
Round Table for March, 1917 ; T. F. A. Smith, " German War Liter- 
ature" in the Quarterly Review for January, 1917; "German Eco- 
nomic Policy after the War " in The New Europe for February, 1917. 

51. On the possibility of securing copper and cotton in Asiatic 
Turkey, see " Germany in Asia Minor " in Blackwood's Magazine for 
February, 1916. 

52. See " German Tariff Plans " in The New Republic for March 

31, J9I7- 

53. Recommendations of the Economic Conference held on June 
14-17, 1916. (Cd. 8271.) 

54. In November of 1916, Signor Giuseppe Canepa wrote that if the 
victory were an incomplete one, the conclusion of peace would lead to 
a most severe economic conflict. Luciano de Feo, La Lotta Eco- 
nomica del Dopo Guerra, p. xi. 

55. J. A. Hobson, The New Protectionism, pp. 42ft ; L. de Feo, op. 
cit., pp. 3 iff. 

56. Thus M. Clementel, the French Minister of Commerce said : 
" There never was any question at the Conference of adopting a 
customs policy for all ; each ally will remain wholly independent. 
Each product will be the subject of separate negotiations between 
the countries interested in the matter, and an infinite variety of com- 
binations may be made." 



3 o6 NOTES 

57. On July 24, 1916, Mr. Asquith stated in the House of Commons 
that this Conference was "to consider the commercial policy to be 
adopted after the war." 

58. It was suggested in The New Statesman of February 24, 1917, 
that the British Government should pay the freight on shipments 
from the Colonies or should give a bounty on all colonial products 
consumed in the British Isles. 

59. White Paper (Cd. 8482). 

60. While endorsing the principle of Imperial Preference, two 
Irish members refused to subscribe to any report that did not deal 
with the special case of Ireland. In their opinion, " the same fiscal 
liberty which is at present enjoyed by the self-governing Dominions 
should be extended to Ireland." 

61. Simultaneously at the Guildhall, Mr. Lloyd George stated that 
"the system of preference can be established without involving any 
addition to the cost of our food." Sir Robert Borden threw some 
light on how this was to be accomplished. This resolution, he said, 
" does not necessarily purpose, or even look to any change in the 
fiscal arrangements of the United Kingdom. It does not involve 
taxation of food; it does not involve taxation of anything. As far 
as the fiscal system of the United Kingdom is concerned, I followed 
when in England precisely the same course that I have carried out 
in this Parliament and in this country — I decline to interfere in 
matters which are the subj ect of domestic control and concern in the 
United Kingdom. I declined to invite them to change their fiscal 
policy. These matters are within their control, as our fiscal policy 
is within ours. And I would go further and say that the people 
of Canada would not desire the people of the United Kingdom to 
change their fiscal policy for the purpose alone of giving a preference 
to the producers of this country, especially, if the proposed fiscal 
changes should involve any proposed injustice, should be regarded 
as oppressive by a considerable portion of the people of the United 
Kingdom. But what this proposal looks to, as I understand it, is 
this — that we can within this Empire get better and cheaper facil- 
ities of communication than we have enjoyed up to the present time. 
That, I believe, is the line along which the change indicated will pro- 
ceed." Canadian, Hansard, May 18, 1917, p. 1604. 

62. London Times (weekly ed.), January 12, 1917. 

63. Sir Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest, pp. 274ff. ; Lajpat Rai, 
Young India, pp. 1676°. ; R. Mukerjee, The Foundations of Indian 
Economics, pp. 342ff. 

64. J. Grunzel, Economic Protectionism, pp. 21, 22. 

65. E.g., The Spectator for March 10, 1917, and The New States- 
man for March 17, 1917. This was denied by the London Times 
(weekly ed.), March 9, 1917. 

66. Blue Book, 1917. (Cd. 8462.) 



ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 307 

67. The Spectator for February 24, 1917; The New Statesman for 
February 3, 1917. 

68. The pertinent resolution runs as follows : 

" The time has arrived when all possible encouragement should be 
given to the development of Imperial resources, and especially to 
making the Empire independent of other countries in respect of food 
supplies, raw materials, and essential industries. With these objects 
in view, this Conference expresses itself in favour of : — 

(1) The principle that each part of the Empire, having due re- 
gard to the interests of our Allies, shall give specially favourable 
treatment and facilities to the produce and manufactures of other 
parts of the Empire. 

(2) Arrangements by which intending emigrants from the United 
Kingdom may be induced to settle in countries under the British flag. 

Having regard to the experience obtained in the present war, this 
Conference records its opinion that the safety of the Empire and 
the necessary development of its component parts require prompt 
and attentive consideration, as well as concerted action, with regard 
to the following matters : — 

(1) The production of an adequate food supply and arrangements 
for its transportation when and where required, under any condi- 
tions that may reasonably be anticipated. 

(2) The control of natural resources available within the Empire, 
especially those that are of an essential character for necessary na- 
tional purposes, whether in peace or in war. 

(3) The economical utilization of such natural resources through 
processes of manufacture carried on within the Empire. 

The Conference commends to the consideration of the Govern- 
ments summoned thereto the enactment of such legislation as may 
assist this purpose. 

That it is desirable to establish in London an Imperial Mineral 
Resources Bureau, upon which should be represented Great Britain, 
the Dominions, India, and other parts of the Empire. 

The Bureau should be charged with the duties of collection of in- 
formation from the appropriate departments of the Governments con- 
cerned and other sources regarding the mineral resources and the 
metal requirements of the Empire, and of advising from time to 
time what action, if any, may appear desirable to enable such re- 
sources to be developed and made available to meet the metal re- 
quirements of the Empire. 

That the Conference recommends that his Majesty's Government 
should, while having due regard to existing institutions, take im- 
mediate action for the purpose of establishing such a Bureau, and 
should as soon as possible submit a scheme for the consideration of 
the other Governments summoned to the Conference. 



308 NOTES 

That the Imperial War Conference welcomes the proposed in- 
crease of the Board of Trade service of Trade Commissioners and 
its extension throughout the British Empire in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Dominions Royal Commission, and recom- 
mends that the Governments concerned should co-operate so as to 
make that service as useful as possible to the Empire as a whole, 
especially for the promotion of inter-Imperial trade." 

The scope and purpose of these proposals were lucidly explained 
by Sir Robert Borden in the Canadian Parliament on May 18, 1917. 
Canadian Hansard, 51, pp. i6o3ff. 

69. The restrictions on importations into the United Kingdom since 
the war, either by duties or prohibitions, were not protective in pur- 
pose, their object being to restrict the consumption of luxuries, to 
lessen the demands on shipping and to maintain the parity of ex- 
change. The only real departure in policy was the imposition dur- 
ing the war and for five years thereafter of an export duty on palm- 
kernels shipped from Africa to foreign countries. 

70. See the resolutions of the Association of the Chambers of 
Commerce of the United Kingdom of March 1, 191 6, and the report 
of the London Chamber of Commerce of June 25, 1916. European 
Economic Alliances (New York, 1916), pp. 65-68. For a significant 
instance of conversion from free trade, see Lord George Hamilton, 
Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections. 

71. European Economic Alliances, p. 84. 

72. Annual Report on Commerce and Navigation for 1915, no. 5, 
p. 746 ; do. for 1914, no. 3, p. 296. 

73. Statistisches Jahrbuch, 191 5, pp. 286, 287. 

74. Exports were 1,131 million dollars and imports were 574 mil- 
lions. European Economic Alliances, pp. 8, 84. According to the 
British statistics, the exports from the Empire to the United States 
amounted in 1913 to 133 million pounds, as opposed to imports of 
268 millions thence. The Statesman's Year-Book, 1915, p. xlix. 



NOTES TO COMMUNITY OF POLICY 

1. John MacCunn, Six Radical Thinkers, pp. i99ff., 2o8ff. ; Morley 
Cobden, pp. 527ff. ; Bolton King, Mazzini, pp. 105, 151, 170, 198; J. 
Holland Rose, Nationality in Modern History, pp. 74ff. 

2. In 1894, Mahan wrote: "To Great Britain and the United 
States, if they rightly estimate the part they may play in the great 
drama of human progress, is intrusted a maritime interest, in the 
broadest sense of the word, which demands, as one of the condi- 
tions of its exercise and its safety, the organized force adequate to 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 309 

control the general course of events at sea; to maintain, if necessity- 
arise, not arbitrarily, but as those in whom interest and power alike 
justify the claim to do so, the laws that shall regulate maritime 
warfare." A. T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, 
p. in. 

3. It should be noted in addition that, before the war, the share 
of the United Kingdom in the world's ship-building was about 60 
per cent. American Whitaker 1916, pp. 74, 2i5ff. ; Statesman's 
Year-Book 1915, pp. lv, 8iff. ; Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1915, pp. 50*ff. ; 
The New Europe II, pp. 208-216. 

4. Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine. 

5. Writings of James Monroe (ed. Hamilton) VI, p. 362. 

6. Ibid., pp. 391, 392. 

7. Ibid., pp. 394, 395. 

8. The comparative loss inflicted upon British trade during the 
Napoleonic wars was apparently about the same as that caused by 
submarines and mines during the spring months of 1917. The risk 
of capture in the former era was, however, greater than is the 
present risk of destruction, in so far as each separate voyage is con- 
cerned. But as a steamer makes many more voyages a year than 
did the wind-driven ships of Nelson's day, the relative loss in ton- 
nage is now far greater. During the Napoleonic period that loss 
was much more than made good by new construction and captures. 
Whether this can be done at present is problematical. Mahan, 
Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution II, pp. 206-227; 
Cambridge Modern History IX, pp. 241-243; W. R. Scott in Scot- 
tish Historical Review for April, 1917. 

9. During the Civil War, one vessel is reported to have run the 
blockade successfully 44 times and others eluded capture during as 
many as 16 to 21 voyages. At one time it was estimated that, in this 
contraband trade between Nassau and Wilmington, there was on 
the average but one capture in 4^ voyages. J. F. Rhodes, History 
of the United States V, pp. 399ff. 

10. The German Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege states this explicitly. 
See J. H. Morgan, The German War Book, p. 148. This contention 
was the basis of the Austro-Hungarian protest of June 29, 1915. 
Department of State, European War No. 2, p. 193. See also the 
German Memorandum of April 4, 1914. Ibid., No. 1, pp. 73, 74. 

11. A Japanese educator contends that, if the Allies win, then 
liberalism is assured of an unhindered growth in Japan; otherwise, 
German Kultur and military despotism will acquire added prestige 
there. In December of 191 6, he asked a Senator in Washington who 
inquired why Japan was in this war, " how he would like — in view 
of his expressed desire for the premature ending of the war and" 
for a league of peace — the sight of a powerful military empire 



3 io NOTES 

rising up in the Far East, which in all probability would work hand- 
in-hand with the Central Empires of Europe in the carrying out of 
their imperialistic ambitions." Tokiwo Yokoi, " Japan's Stake in the 
War" in The New Europe III, p. 6. 

12. See ante Chapter III and also W. S. Robertson, " South Amer- 
ica and the Monroe Doctrine " in Political Science Quarterly, XXX, 
pp. 82-92. In 1824, Bolivar wrote : " England and the United States 
protect us. You know that at present these two nations are the 
only two maritime powers of the world, and that no aid can come to 
the Spanish royalists but by sea." 

13. Under the Brazilian budget law for 1917, "the preferential is 
a 30 per cent, reduction on wheat flour and a 20 per cent, reduction 
on condensed milk, certain manufactures of rubber, clocks and 
watches, paints and inks (not including writing fluids), varnishes, 
typewriters, scales, refrigerators, pianos, windmills, cement, dried 
fruits, furniture for schools, corsets and desks." 

14. Trade of Latin America in 1913 

(In millions of dollars) 

Total Imports: 1322 Total Exports: 1553 

of which from: of which to: 

United States 331 478 

United Kingdom 323 330 

Germany 219 192 

France no 124 

It was only in 1913 that the imports from the United States took 
the first place. Pan American Union, General Survey of Latin- 
American Trade in 1915, p. 591. 

15. See Sir Harry Johnston, Common Sense in Foreign Policy, pp. 
IS, 16, 88ff. 

16. Bolivar's Code of Pan-Americanism, in New York Times 
Magazine of March 26, 1916. 

17. The British representative was not to take part in the de- 
liberations, but to give his advice when it was requested. Holland 
was represented in the same manner. Vidal Morales y Morales, 
Iniciadores y Primeros Martires de la Revolucion Cubana, p. 62. 

18. L. E. Elliott, Brazil : To-day and To-morrow ; F. Garcia 
Calderon, Les Democraties Latines de l'Amerique, pp. 269-273; 
Andre Cheradame, Le Plan Pangermaniste Demasque, pp. 171-173, 
294-301 ; Evans Lewin, The Germans and Africa, pp. 51-55. 

19. R. G. Usher, The Challenge of the Future, p. 231. See also pp. 
314-315. For similar English statements, likewise made before 
America's entrance into the war, see J. H. Rose, The Origins of the 
War, p. 188; Moreton Frewen, "The Monroe Doctrine and the 



COMMUNITY OF POLICY 311 

Great War," in the Nineteenth Century and After of February, 1916, 
and the London Morning Post of November 27, 1916. 

20. " To all war preparations we can apply the broad sociological 
principle that a social need creates a social organization, and that 
the social organization, once it is created, acquires an independent 
life of its own, which struggles for existence even at the expense 
of the well-being of society. ... It is continually looking for evi- 
dence that its services will be required and its existence justified." 
Gilbert Slater, Peace and War in Europe, p. 72. 

21. W. H. Dawson, What is Wrong with Germany?, pp. 124-130. 

22. Hans Delbrueck, Regierung und Volkswille, p. 136. 

23. Evans Lewin, The Germans and Africa, p. 123. 

24. Bemhard von Buelow, Imperial Germany, p. 213. His diatribes 
against the Social Democrats were excised from the new edition 
published during the war. 

25. Royaume de Belgique, Correspondance Diplomatique 1914- 
1915, II, p. 45; Baron Beyens, L'Allemagne avant la Guerre, p. 112. 
On this general subject, see Munroe Smith, " Military Strategy 
versus Diplomacy," Political Science Quarterly, XXX, pp. 37ff. 

26. Prince von Buelow, Imperial Germany (ed. Headlam), p. 129. 
The two chapters eulogizing militarism were added since the war. 

27. For two valuable studies of this ideal in its various vicissitudes 
and manifestations, see Ramsay Muir, Nationalism and Internation- 
alism; L. March Phillipps, Europe Unbound. 

28. " Whatever may be the shortcomings of our rule in India and 
Egypt, it remains our object, while securing for the populace such 
practical securities as may add to their material welfare and pros- 
perity, to respect at the same time to the utmost their ways of 
thought, customs, and faiths; that is to say, it remains the object 
of our government to secure for the governed the right to live 
freely. Moreover, if or when they develop a capacity for self- 
government, self-government will be granted them." L. March 
Phillipps, op. cit., p. 104. 



INDEX 



Adams, John Quincy, influence 
of, on America's traditional 
foreign policy, 78-79. 

Africa, division of, by peaceful 
negotiations, 17 ; settlement be- 
tween Great Britain and Ger- 
many concerning (1914), 117- 
119. 

Agriculture, measures for stimu- 
lating British, 239-240, 242, 247. 

Algeciras Treaty, 21, 22; posi- 
tion taken by America in sign- 
ing, 84. 

Algeria, trade arrangements be- 
tween France and, 220-221. 

Algeria, trade of, with France 
and with other countries, 221, 
298. 

Alliances, necessary to freedom 
and security of states under 
modern system, 24-25; effect- 
iveness of system of, against 
various military despots, 25-26 ; 
change in character of, result- 
ing from War of 1914, 58-63; 
the future of existing, 62-63. 

Ambiguity of international law, 

13-14- 

America, selfish political philoso- 
phy of, 70; contrasted with 
Germany, 70-72 ; domination of 
political life of, by concepts of 
independence, union, and the 
Monroe Doctrine, 72; origins 
of fundamental features of 
foreign policy of, 73-80; policy 
of non-intervention in Eu- 
ropean affairs determined up- 
on, 79; obligations forced upon 



by Monroe Doctrine, 80-82; 
extension of interests in Far 
East and assumption of posi- 
tion as a world-power, 82-83 ; 
renewed assertions by, of pol- 
icy of non-intervention in Eu- 
ropean affairs, 83-84; foreign 
policy one of expedience, but 
devoid of moral value, 84-85 ; 
ineffectiveness of policy of, 86- 
87; degree of negative re- 
sponsibility of, for present war, 
87; proposals made at time of 
Spanish-American War for an 
alliance between England and, 
102-103; lukewarm attitude in, 
toward Anglo-American al- 
liance, 103-104; neglect of 
duty in international affairs, 
120-121 ; relation of present war 
to, 129-131 ; public opinion in, 
131-133 ; neutrality in, 133-134 ; 
growth of pacifism in, 136; 
preparedness and Pan-Ameri- 
canism in, 136 ; obstacles! in way 
of Pan-American ideal, 136- 
137; promulgation of League 
to Enforce Peace in, 138-151 ; 
compelled by German disre- 
gard of American rights to de- 
part from course of neutrality, 
I 5 I-I 53 1 impossibility of main- 
taining " armed neutrality " 
policy, 152-153; object in en- 
tering war as defined by Presi- 
dent Wilson, 153-154; post- 
bellum policy of, a momentous 
question, 162-163 ; arguments 
against a general defensive al- 
liance with a group of nations 



313 



3H 



INDEX 



and in favour of an alliance 
with the British Common- 
wealth, 163-165 ; importance of 
question of relations of, to Brit- 
ish Commonwealth, 186; sys- 
tem in, intensely national 
rather than supernational, 187- 
188; predominance of British 
stock in upbuilding, and in di- 
recting affairs of nation, 188- 
193 ; relations between Great 
Britain and, in the past and in 
the future, 194-198; defensive 
character of tariff system of, 
214-215; efforts to secure 
government support of foreign 
trade, 215-216; policy of, re- 
garding trade of dependencies, 
219-220; effect of entrance in- 
to the war upon economic 
plans and projects of Allies 
and of Central Powers, 240- 
242; future of trade between 
Central Powers and, 244-245; 
economic interdependence of 
British Commonwealth and, 
245-247; importance of sea 
power to security of, 254; se- 
curity to be attained by, by join- 
ing forces with British Com- 
monwealth, 255; present deep 
hostility of Germany toward, 
258; future peace and security 
pre-eminently essential for, 
266-267. 

American statesmen, indebted- 
ness of spirit of modern impe- 
rialism to, 172. 

Anarchy, international, war due 
to present state of, 7; respon- 
sible for balance of power sys- 
tem, 24. 

Anglo-American alliance, early 
proposals for, 102-103; prob- 
able change in course of his- 



tory which would have re- 
sulted from, 104-105; proposal 
for, superseded by plan for al- 
liance of English-speaking 
peoples, 169. 

Anglo-German settlement of 
1914, 115-119. 

Anglo-Saxondom, duel between 
Germanism and, 99. 

Arbitration, settlement of inter- 
national disputes by, 17; ex- 
tent of part played by, 17-20. 

Armaments, necessity of, under 
modern state system, 24-25. 
See Preparedness. 

Armed neutrality, impossibility 
of America's maintaining pol- 
icy of, 152-153. 

Asquith, Herbert, issues at stake 
in War of 19 14 defined by, 127. 

Azerbaijan, province of Persia, 
no; occupation of, by Russia, 
112. 

Bagdad Railway, no; settlement 
between Great Britain and 
Germany concerning (1914), 
116-117. 

Baker, Newton B., remark by, 
quoted to show supposed moral 
quality inherent in neutrality, 

134. 

Balance of power, system of, the 
outcome of system of sover- 
eign states, 23-24. 

Balfour Committee, work of, 
233-236. 

Belgium, views of British states- 
men concerning treaty guar- 
anteeing neutrality of, 14; 
treaty effecting neutrality of, 
21 ; impression made in Amer- 
ica by violation of, 132-133. 

Bodin, theory of state sovereign- 
ty held by, 8. 



INDEX 



315 



Borden, Sir Robert, quoted, 181. 

Brazil, German colonization of, 
261-262. 

British Commonwealth, factors 
which worked for creation of, 
40 ; significance of, 41 ; tend- 
ency of, toward greater co- 
hesion due to pressure of out- 
side forces, 48; the nearest ap- 
proach to the ideal of a world- 
state, 54; world-wide develop- 
ment of, 91-93 ; foreign policy 
of, as dictated for fifteen years 
by German menace, 105-120; 
arguments in favour of alliance 
between United States and, 
164-165; growth of the spirit 
underlying the present-day, 
171-178; representatives of 
Dominions of, at Imperial War 
Council in London, 182; meet- 
ing of Imperial Cabinet a mo- 
mentous step in history of, 
183; effect of Imperial Cabinet 
on relations of Dominions to 
United Kingdom, 184-185 ; im- 
portance of question of rela- 
tions of American people to, 
186; economic interdependence 
of America and, 245-247; fu- 
ture peace and security pre-em- 
inently essential for, 266-271. 

Buelow, Prince von, quoted, 26; 
on the failure of Germany to 
make moral conquests, 95. 

Burgess, John W., quoted, 49. 

Burns, C. D., cited on doctrine of 
nationalism, 46. 

Canning, George, quoted, 20; co- 
operation between England 
and America suggested by, 76. 

Central European project, 227- 
230; difficulties in way of, 244. 

Chamberlain, Joseph, proposals 



of, looking to Anglo-Ameri- 
can alliance, 102-103. 

China, British policy toward, 
113-114; future of, as affected 
by proposed League to Enforce 
Peace, 147; post-bellum prob- 
lems concerning, 162-163; how 
future of, is dependent on al- 
liance of English-speaking peo- 
ples, 258-259. 

Civil War, doctrine which caused 
liberal Englishmen to side with 
South in, 47; effect of, upon 
Anglo-American relations, 195. 

Collective guarantee, a phrase of 
doubtful meaning, 14. 

Colonial trade, policies of United 
States, France, and Great Brit- 
ain regarding, 219-225. 

Colony, wrong implications of 
the word, 170; "Dominion" 
substituted for, 171. 

Commercial interdependence of 
western world, 35-36. 

Commissions for administration 
of international interests, 16- 

17. 

Concert of Great Powers, de- 
velopment of system of, 18-19 '» 
reasons for breaking down of 
system, 19-20; question of re- 
turn to system, after present 
war, 26-27. 

Conferences, international, 18-22. 

Congresses, for handling inter- 
national affairs, 18-22; causes 
of failure of system, 22 ; meet- 
ing of international, 36. 

Cuba, trade arrangements of 
United States and, 219. 

Curzon, on Russia's position in 
Persian quest ; on, no. 

Dante, on the desirability of gen- 
eral peace, 7. 



3i6 



INDEX 



Delbrueck, Hans, analysis of 
German militaristic system by, 
127-128. 

Dickinson, G. Lowes, quoted, 53, 
101. 

Dominions, self-governing Brit- 
ish democracies called, instead 
of Colonies, 171 ; development 
of change of status of, 172- 
182; representatives of, attend 
Imperial War Council in Lon- 
don, 182; trade arrangements 
between Great Britain and, 
222-225. 

Dual Alliance, reasons for, 60. 

Economic Conference at Paris 
(1916), 230-232. 

Economic factors, school of 
thinkers which explains all 
historical phenomena by, 202; 
importance to be assigned to, 
203-205 ; in the existing world- 
war, 205. 

Economic interdependence, ef- 
forts under way to decrease, 
227. 

Economic self-sufficiency, effect 
of ideal of, on unity of the 
world, 212-213. 

Educational Alliance for Pres- 
ervation of German Culture in 
Foreign Lands, organization 
of, 99- 

Empire, substitution of " Com- 
monwealth " for, 171. 

England. See Great Britain. 

English-speaking peoples, world- 
wide spread of, 91-93; why 
regarded by Germany as the 
chief obstacle to progress of 
German power and prestige, 
97-100; fate of, at stake in 
present war, 129-130; argu- 
ments for an alliance of, 162- 



165; unity of, 169-198; trend 
toward more intimate eco- 
nomic relations among, 246- 
247; future of China depend- 
ent on alliance of, 259; advan- 
tage to Latin America from al- 
liance .of, 259-260; peace and 
security to be gained from al- 
liance of, 266-267 ; liberties of 
other countries dependent upon 
alliance of, 268-270. 
Entente group of nations, possi- 
bility of league between, to 
maintain peace, 160-163. 

Fear, element of, in alliances be- 
tween nations, 58-60. 

Fiscal policies of America, Ger- 
many, and Great Britain, 213- 
219. 

Fisher, Andrew, quoted, 181. 

Fiske, Admiral, quoted on Amer- 
ica's need of a navy, 255. 

Fiske, John, quoted, 39; on the 
growth of English-speaking 
peoples, 91-92. 

Foreign policy, selfish character 
of national, under system of 
state sovereignty, 68; of Ger- 
many and of England con- 
trasted, 68-70; characteristics 
of American, 7off. ; of British 
Commonwealth, 105-120; of 
America after the war, 162- 
165. 

Foreign trade, efforts to enlist 
government aid for American, 
215-216. 

France, policy of, concerning 
trade with colonies, 220-221 ; 
how freedom of, may depend 
on future intimate relations of 
English-speaking peoples, 257- 
258. 

Free trade, productive of good- 



INDEX 



317 



will and peace, 210-213; sys- 
tem of, in Great Britain, 218- 
219. 

German civilization, inability of, 
to compete with other ad- 
vanced types of civilization, 95. 

Germany, unification of, due to 
nationalism, 47 ; selfish foreign 
policy of, 69; America's polit- 
ical philosophy contrasted with 
that of, 70-72; general plans 
and ambitions of, in period be- 
fore the war, 91 ; feeling in, 
over world-wide development 
of English-speaking peoples, 
93-95 ; reasons for failure of, 
to spread German type of civ- 
ilization, 95-96 ; discouraging 
conditions in large colonial do- 
main of, 96-97; reasons for 
viewing English-speaking peo- 
ples as chief obstacle to prog- 
ress of German power and 
prestige, 97-100; duel between 
Anglo-Saxondom and, 99 ; 
" blood and iron " methods of, 
to construct a Greater Ger- 
many, 101 ; British foreign pol- 
icy dictated for past fifteen 
years by menace of, 105-120; 
diplomatic settlement between 
Great Britain and, in 1914, 115- 
119; domination over Europe 
by, one of issues at stake in 
present war, 125-127; future 
of liberalism throughout world 
dependent upon defeat of, 130- 
131 ; prevention of menace of, 
by alliance of English-speaking 
peoples, 165 ; incorrect to say 
that economic conditions im- 
pelled to war, 209-210; char- 
acter of tariff system of, 216- 
217; project of, for a Central 



European economic and polit- 
ical unit, 227-230; future of 
trade between America and, 
244-245 ; effect of ruthless con- 
duct of, on future trade, 247; 
hostility toward America, 258; 
danger of expansion of, in 
South America, 261-263. 

Great Britain, position of, under 
system of international alli- 
ances, 60-61 ; international pol- 
icy of, as contrasted with Ger- 
many's, 69; proposals made by, 
looking to an Anglo-American 
alliance, 102-103 ; diplomatic 
settlement between Germany 
and, in 1914, 115-119; foreign 
policy of, one of renunciation, 
1 19-120; free-trade system in, 
218-219; policy of, regarding 
colonial trade, 221-225 1 pro- 
posed economic policies of, 
233-240. 

Greece, independence of, due to 
doctrine of nationalism, 47. 

Grey, Viscount, reply of, to Ger- 
many's bid for British neu- 
trality, quoted, 24; quoted con- 
cerning British and German 
plans in Africa, 118; quoted on 
League to Enforce Peace, 149- 
150. 

Grey, Earl, proposal made by, 
concerning Anglo-American 
co-operation, at time of Span- 
ish-American War, 102. 

Grotius, Hugo, view of, of hu- 
man life as a society, 9 ; sys- 
tem of interstate relations 
elaborated by, resulting in 
modern international law, 10. 

Hague Conventions, lack of 

binding force of, 13. 
Harden, Maximilian, quoted on 



3i8 



INDEX 



the Anglo-Saxon hegemony, 
98. 

Hart, A. B., quoted, 190. 

Hawaii, trade arrangements of 
United States and, 219. 

Hay, John, quoted on American 
policy in China, 86-87; pro- 
posals made to, by English 
statesmen, concerning Anglo- 
American alliance, 102-103. 

Headlam, J. W., on Germany and 
peace, 128-129. 

Hobbes, theory of state sov- 
ereignty held by, 8. 

Holy Alliance, characteristics of, 
18. 

Hughes, Charles E., doctrines of 
League to Enforce Peace en- 
dorsed by, 149. 

Hyphenism in United States, 
131-132. 



Imperial Development Board, 
proposed creation of, 238. 

Imperialism, significance of 
word, in connection with Brit- 
ish Commonwealth, 170; real 
spirit of modern British, 171- 
173; steps in the change in 
spirit animating British, 174; 
statement of characteristics of 
British, 187. 

Imperial Mineral Resources Bu- 
reau, establishment of, 240. 

Imperial War Cabinet, meeting 
and scope of, 182; momentous- 
ness of step, in British Em- 
pire's history, 183 ; function of, 
to determine policy to be fol- 
lowed in waging the war, 184. 

Imperial War Conference, rep- 
resentatives of Dominions at, 
182; proposed economic pro- 
gramme discussed at, 240. 



Independence, ideal of, in Amer- 
ican political life, 72. 

India (British), trade between 
United Kingdom and, 223, 224 ; 
proposed revision of trade 
arrangements with (1917), 
235-237; how an English- 
speaking alliance would affect, 
268. 

International law, origins of 
modern structure of, 10; ques- 
tion as to whether really law 
at all, 10; in practice, merely a 
code of rules more or less in- 
effective, 11; lack of tribunals 
for enforcement of, 11; lim- 
ited scope of, 11-13; ambiguity 
of content of, shown by trea- 
ties, 13-14; indefiniteness of 
portion of, based upon cus- 
tom, 14-15; treaties concluded 
under, 16 ; administration of, 
by international unions and 
commissions, 16-17. 

Internationalization of western 
civilization, 34-36. 

Internationalism, development 
of, together with nationalism, 

52-53. 

Isolation policy, followed by 
United States, 73-80; partially 
responsible for present war, 
105; rejection of, by increasing 
number of Americans, 137; en- 
trance of America into Euro- 
pean war marks abandonment 
of, 154; increasing recognition 
by Americans of perils of, 169. 

Italy, unification of, due to na- 
tionalism, 47; entrance into 
Triple Alliance due to fear, 
59; liberty of, may be depend- 
ent on future intimate rela- 
tions of English-speaking peo- 
ples, 257-258. 



INDEX 



3i9 



Japan, England's alliance with, 
60-61, 107, 113-114; Germany's 
attempt to embroil United 
States with, 152 ; plans of, as 
to China, 162-163. 

Jefferson, Thomas, influence of, 
on American foreign policy, 
74-77; quoted on co-operation 
between Great Britain and 
America, 256. 

Jonesco, Rumanian statesman, 
quoted, 59-60. 

Kerr, Philip H., quoted on fac- 
tors in creation of British 
Commonwealth, 40-41. 

Knowledge, effect of spread of, 
on differentiation between na- 
tions, SI-S3- 

Language, effect of unity of, in 
giving Americans a common 
mind, 190. 

Latin America, successful main- 
tenance of American policies 
toward, dependent on British 
support and sea power, 258; 
alliance of English-speaking 
peoples will react to benefit of, 
259-260. 

League to Enforce Peace, termed 
a temporary shelter only, 27; 
four fundamental proposals of, 
138-139; possibilities and lim- 
itations of, 130-147; endorse- 
ment of programme of, by 
President Wilson, 147-148 ; en- 
dorsed also by Mr. Hughes, 
149; Viscount Grey's comment 
on, 149-150; Senate discussion 
of, 150-151 ; alternative pro- 
posals, 155-159; conflict be- 
tween state-sovereignty ideal 
and, 159-160. 

Lecky, W. E. H., cited, 51. 



Lincoln, Abraham, debt of mod- 
ern spirit of imperialism to, 
172. 

Lloyd George, David, quoted on 
the Imperial War Council, 182. 

Lodge, H. C, study of distribu- 
tion of ability in United States 
made by, 191-192. 

London, Treaty of (1867), am- 
biguous character of, 13-14. 

Luther, Martin, theory of state 
sovereignty held by, 8. 

Luxemburg, treaty guaranteeing 
neutrality of, 13-14, 21. 



Machiavelli, conception of state 
sovereignty held by, 8. 

McKinley, William, quoted to 
show new attitude of United 
States as a world-power, 82- 
83. 

Madison, James, quoted on co- 
operation between Great Brit- 
ain and America, 256. 

Mahan, A. T., on effect of Amer- 
ica's policy of non-interven- 
tion, 85. 

Massey, William, on decreasing 
economic interdependence, 227. 

Mazzini, principles of, quoted, 
6>, 134. 

Mediaeval conception of com- 
munity of mankind, 7 ; differ- 
ence between modern ideas 
and, 8. 

Mexico, attitude of United 
States toward problem pre- 
sented by, 81-82; Germany's 
attempt to embroil United 
States with, 152. See Latin 
America. 

Militarism, dangers of, to be 
prevented by co-operation of 
English-speaking peoples, 263- 



320 



INDEX 



265 ; menace of, inherent in 
preparedness, 265. 

Milner, Lord, on spirit of mod- 
ern British imperialism, 171, 
172, 187. 

Mitteleuropa project, 227-230, 
244. 

Monroe Doctrine, effect of con- 
cept of, on American political 
life, 72, 75 ; events leading up 
to enunciation of, 76-79; obli- 
gations forced upon America 
by, 80-82; as affected by pro- 
visions of League to Enforce 
Peace, 145-147 ; Germany's 
challenge to, in offer to Mex- 
ico, 152. 

Moral quality in neutrality, dis- 
cussion of the supposed, 134- 

135. 
Morocco, British policy concern- 
ing, in 1904, 108-109; trade ar- 
rangements of France and, 
220. 

Napoleonic wars, protraction of, 
resulting from America's pol- 
icy of isolation, 85. 

Nation, definition of, 45. See 
State and nation. 

Nationalism, discussion of use 
and meaning of word, 41-43; 
origins of doctrine of, 44-46; 
the joint product of ideals of 
state sovereignty and eight- 
eenth-century revolutionary 
rights, 46-47; some results of 
rise of doctrine, 47; in some 
cases disintegrates, in some 
consolidates, 47-48 ; primarily 
a disintegrating force, 48 ; no 
inherent antagonism between 
internationalism and, 53 ; a dis- 
ruptive force when thwarted 
in attempts at self-expression, 



53-54; effect of present war 
upon, 56-58. 

Naumann, Friedrich, on the Ger- 
mans as " bad Germanizers," 
95 ; quoted in connection with 
Central European project, 229. 

Neutrality, reasons for Ameri- 
can, and feelings in United 
States concerning, 133-134; un- 
tenability of doctrine recog- 
nized by President Wilson, 
138; America forced to de- 
part from course of, 151-153 ; 
effect of policy of, on relations 
between Entente Powers and 
America, 196. 

Olney, Richard, statement made 
by, during Venezuela boundary 
negotiations, 80; dictum of, as 
to unnaturalness and inexpe- 
diency of political union be- 
tween European and American 
states, 136. 

Pacifism, growth of, in America, 
with progress of war, 136. 

Pan-Americanism, theories of 
Adams and Clay concerning, 
78-79; reversion to idea of, as 
a result of war, 136; obstacles 
to, 136-137; no conflict be- 
tween alliance of English- 
speaking peoples and, 260-261. 

Paris, Economic Conference at 
(1916), 230-232. 

Parliamentary sovereignty, pass- 
ing of theory of, 176-180. 

Persia, British policy toward, as 
dictated by German menace, 
109-113. 

Philippine Islands, trade arrange- 
ments of United States and, 
219; extent of trade between 
United States and, 220. 



INDEX 



321 



Pollock, Sir Frederick, affirma- 
tive view of international law 
as real law held by, 10 ; quoted, 
159. 

Porto Rico, trade arrangements 
of United States and, 219. 

Portsmouth, treaty of, 114. 

Preparedness, realization of ne- 
cessity for, in America, 136; 
measures taken toward, 138; 
menace of militarism inherent 
in, 265. 

Protective tariff systems, a cause 
of international antagonisms, 
211-212; American and Ger- 
man, 214-217. 

Public opinion in America, 131- 
133. 

Rohrbach, Paul, quoted concern- 
ing Germans and Anglo-Sax- 
ons, 98. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, quoted on 
responsibilities of United 
States under Monroe Doctrine, 
81. 

Rosebery, Lord, on reorganiza- 
tion of British Empire after 
the war, 181. 

Russia, British arrangements 
with, concerning Persia, 110- 
iii. 

Santo Domingo, American inter- 
ference in, 81. 

Sea power, importance of, to se- 
curity of United States, 254; 
what is implied by, 254; se- 
curity to be attained by Amer- 
ica from joining forces with 
British Commonwealth, 255 ; 
nature of, not changed by the 
submarine, 256; importance of, 
to English-speaking peoples if 
Germany should conquer in 



war, 257; freedom of, from 
dangers of militarism, 265. 

Security, pre-eminently essential 
for United States and British 
Commonwealth, 266-267. 

Shuster, W. Morgan, career of, 
in Persia, 112. 

South America, possibilities of 
German expansion in, 261-263. 

Sovereignty of the state, modern 
doctrine of, contrasted with 
mediaeval ideal of unity, 7-10; 
the fundamental corner-stone 
of the modern state system, 31 ; 
theory of, not in accord with 
actual facts, 31-32; interna- 
tionalization of western civil- 
ization at variance with doc- 
trine of, 37; selfishness of for- 
eign policy under, 68; impos- 
sibility of league of nations to 
insure peace under, 150-160; 
relation between economic in- 
terdependence and, 210-21 1. 

Spanish-American War, signifi- 
cance of, regarding America's 
foreign policy, 81. 

State, mediaeval and modern 
theories of, contrasted, 7-9. 

State and nation, confusion from 
interchangeable use of words, 
42; two fundamentally distinct 
concepts, 43. 

Steel-Maitland, quoted on " Em- 
pire " and " Commonwealth," 
171. 

Submarine, nature of sea power 
not fundamentally changed by 
the, 256. 

Taft, W. H., quoted in connec- 
tion with League to Enforce 
Peace, 140. 

Tariff systems, an aid to state 
sovereignty, 210; not produc- 



322 



INDEX 



tive of international good-will, 
211 ; an indirect denial of unity 
of mankind, 212; of United 
States, Germany, and Great 
Britain, 213-219; policy of 
America, France, and Great 
Britain regarding colonies, 
210-225. 

Treaties, ambiguity of content of 
international law as embodied 
in, 13-14- 

Triple Alliance, elements enter- 
ing into, 59-60. 

Tunis, trade arrangements of 
France and, 221. 

Turkey, settlement between Great 
Britain and Germany concern- 
ing (1914), 116-117. 

Union, dominant ideal of, in 
American political life, 72. 

Unions for administration of in- 
ternational interests, 16-17. 

United States. See America. 

Unity of English-speaking peo- 
ples, 169-198. 

Unity of mankind, mediaeval con- 
ception of, 7. 

Unity of western civilization, 33- 
34 ; setback to, a result of pres- 
ent war, 56-58. 

Usher, Roland, quoted on possi- 
bility of German expansion in 
South America, 262. 

War of 1 812, effect of, upon An- 



glo-American relations, 194- 
195. 
War of 1914, effect of, upon na- 
tional feeling, 56-58; might 
have been averted by an An- 
glo-American alliance, 104-105 ; 
issues at stake in, 125-132; 
America's entrance into, 153- 

154- 

Wars, influence of economic 
factors in, 204-207. 

Washington, George, influence of, 
upon America's foreign policy, 
74; lessons drawn from char- 
acter of, by present-day im- 
perialists, 172. 

Wilson, Woodrow, course fol- 
lowed by, in treating Mexican 
problem, 81-82; quoted on 
America's attitude during Na- 
poleonic wars, 85; policy of, 
of following course of public 
opinion, 137-138 ; league of na- 
tions to enforce peace advo- 
cated by, i38ff. ; programme 
proposed by League to Enforce 
Peace endorsed by, 147-149; 
recognizes impossibility of 
armed neutrality and advises 
entrance into the war, 153 ; 
league of self-governing de- 
mocracies proposed by, 155. 



Zabern affair, evils of militarism 
illustrated by, 263-264. 



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